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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PETS 
AND THE POLITICS OF TOUCH 
Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch examines texts of the era in 
which both humans and animals find empowerment at the point of physical encounter. I 
challenge contemporary perceptions of human-pet relationships as sweetly affectionate by 
focusing on touch. I uncover an earlier interest in the close reciprocal relationships between 
human and nonhuman animals, arguing that these nineteenth-century thinkers presented 
what I call a “politics of touch,” in which intimate and often jarring physical encounters 
allow for mutuality and autonomy. I first turn to Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley (1849) and 
protective violence, a condoned ferocity that frequently unites and guards pet and pet 
keeper against unwanted amorous intrusions, while also showcasing animal agency and the 
possibility of deviation from the pet keeper’s wishes. Brontë’s animals simultaneously 
preserve and rework the traditional form of the marriage plot, allowing for powerful 
animal-centric possibilities. In chapter 2, I analyze the affective maternal and erotic bonds 
between women and their pets in Olive Schreiner’s novels. While this touch was frequently 
seen by both protofeminists and people antagonistic to women’s rights as a cause for 
disdain because affection was supposedly misplaced, it is a crucial part of Schreiner’s 
feminist project in that it provides forms of maternity outside of the socially mandated 
wifehood and motherhood that Schreiner so resents for stripping women of their autonomy. 
For chapter 3, I seek to complicate readings of Count Fosco, the compelling villain of 
Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White (1860), to show the disquieting sympathy that 
privileges odd women and animals. Heeding Count Fosco shows that valuable sympathy 
is not a pretty picture of a lovely woman walking with her purebred dog, but rather the 
excessively grotesque images of an unattractive woman holding a dying dog in her arms 
and mice and birds erotically clamoring over a fat man’s body. The final chapter considers 
the violent sympathetic touch evidenced in the practice of mercifully killing grieving dogs 
in Frances Power Cobbe’s animal advocacy texts. I argue that Cobbe’s schema recognizes 
gender fluidity as she posits a feminized animal grief marked by excess, while she 
concurrently masculinizes human sympathy by making it violent through mercy killings 
that complicate our accepted understandings of nineteenth-century sentiment.  
In contrast to other scholars of nineteenth-century animal studies who look at how 
humans understand and treat animals, my focus on the reciprocity of human-animal touch 
keeps animals at the center of my analysis. I argue that nineteenth-century sympathetic and 
sentimental texts, often dismissed as trite or as creating distance between the sympathizing 
subject and object of sympathy, demonstrate theoretical and political complexity through 
	 	 		 		
representations of shockingly intimate touch. In doing so, Victorian writers anticipated and 
even transcended recent theoretical conversations in the field of feminist animal studies. 
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INTRODUCTION. NINETEENTH-CENTURY PETS AND THE POLITICS OF TOUCH 
When Elizabeth Russell’s pet spaniel, Sally, died around the year 1840, story has it 
that the woman turned her dead dog into a rug so that it could continue taking the carriage 
rides on her lap that they both so enjoyed when the dog was living (fig. 1). Russell was the 
second wife of the first Duke of Cleveland, William Harry Vane, an avid sportsman and 
politician who spent most of his time at Raby Castle.1 The taxidermy dog simultaneously 
harkens and stands in sharp contrast to the other stuffed animals that populate Raby 
Castle—the victims of the hunts of the Duke and others—and to the commemoration of 
the Duke himself, who was memorialized with a statue at Staindrop church. Sally 
juxtapositioned against the hunting trophies highlights the distinctions between the 
following: the man’s hunting dogs kept in a kennel and the lady’s house pet; the masculine 
violence of the hunt and the natural death of the pet dog; and, finally, the traditional stiff 
taxidermy and the rug that is flexible and beckons physical encounter between the live 
human and the dead dog. Moreover, taxidermy is frequently designed to look real and 
animate, while the flatness of Sally’s body on the rug takes away the possibility of 
verisimilitude and calls attention to the loss of the living animal.2 The memorialization of 
Sally also contrasts with that of the Duke, who died in 1842, his statue and body kept in 
the church, while Sally remained in the domestic space. Sally’s memorial is her body, while 
the Duke’s is a hard, cold replica of the human frame. Sally’s physical accessibility even 
in death signals the focal point of Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch: 
gender, human-pet touch, and the anti-anthropocentrism of these relationships. 
	
1 See entry on “Vane, William Henry” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; Landau. 
2 For an extended discussion of Victorian taxidermy, see Amato, “Dead Things: The Afterlives of 
Animals” from Beastly Possessions: Animals in Victorian Consumer Culture. 
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The long eighteenth century saw a rise in the prevalence of pet keeping in both 
English homes and literature. Pets served as inspiration for poetic mockery, like Belinda 
and her lapdog, Shock, in Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the Lock (1712) and the departed 
feline of Thomas Gray’s “Ode on the Death of a Favourite Cat Drowned in a Tub of 
Goldfishes” (1768). Other companion animals were the recipients of earnest praise, such 
as the mourning dog of William Wordsworth’s “Fidelity” (1807). Whether depicted in jest 
or seriousness, pets came to be a consistent presence in the literary and public 
consciousness.3 If the Victorian era is a period of transition, then part of what is being 
turned away from is traditional conceptualizations of human-pet relationships, especially 
as they manifest themselves in literary tropes: the frivolous upper-class lady and her 
lapdog, kittens as doll-like pseudo-children, and canine fidelity past the point of death. At 
the same time that older tropes are being reworked, I also see authors allow nineteenth-
century pet characters to impose themselves into formal structures, in particular as paternal 	
3 For an extended discussion of the rise of pet keeping in the eighteenth-century, see Tague, Animal 
Companions: Pets and Social Change in Eighteenth-Century Britain; Brown, Homeless Dogs and 
Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination.  
Figure 1. Sally Rug, ca. 1840 
	 	 3 
figures shaping the progress of the marriage plot or grotesque creatures who unsettle the 
bodies of sensation fiction’s readers. I hold that representational strategies from the 1700s 
continue to be utilized into the nineteenth century, but often distorted into even more 
violent and eroticized versions of their former selves.	
 While the eighteenth-century provides important contextual information for this 
project, new animal welfare advocacy organizations and evolutionary discourses were 
unique to their nineteenth-century moments. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, 
England saw originary attempts at legislative changes to benefit animals.4 Laws were 
proposed in 1800 and 1802, notably supported by William Wilberforce, abolitionist and 
eventual founding member of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, among 
others. In 1809, Lord Erskine proposed legislation, protecting primarily horses and cattle, 
which passed the House of Lords only to be defeated in the House of Commons. Even 
though these early century attempts at legislation benefiting animals failed, the successful 
passage of Martin’s Act (the Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act) in 1822 highlighted just how 
far sensibilities had shifted in a relatively short period of time. The Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty of Animals (SPCA) was formed in 1824 and was officially endorsed 
by Queen Victoria in 1840, giving it the nomenclature that we know it by today: the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). The famous Battersea Home 
for Lost and Starving Dogs was established in 1871, a descendent of the Holloway Home 
for Lost Dogs supported by Frances Power Cobbe’s 1867 The Confessions of a Lost Dog. 
Cobbe founded the Victoria Street Society in 1875 to fight vivisection, with this becoming 
a more radical organization than the RSPCA in its willingness to struggle against prominent 	
4 For a detailed look at the early animal welfare movement, see Kean, Animal Rights: Political and 
Social Change in Britain Since 1800. 
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men of science, rather than focusing on working class abuses such as those performed by 
cruel cart drivers or the poor entertained by bullbaiting. Animal experimentation was 
particularly affected by the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, though many thought this 
provision did not provide enough protections for nonhumans.  
These animal welfare developments happened concurrent with shifting 
understandings of connections between humans and animals. Evolutionary discourse was 
rife, with Charles Lyell’s wedding evolution with natural theology in Principles of Geology 
(published in three volumes between 1830-33), Charles Darwin’s watershed publication of 
On the Origin of Species (1859), and Herbert Spencer’s mid-century coinage of the term 
“survival of the fittest.”5 The advancement of evolutionary thought meant that beliefs in 
old hierarchical systems declined, including the Judeo-Christian stewardship model 
defined by human management, control, and care of animals and the great chain of being 
that held that humans were both spirit and flesh held above merely mortal animals. In a 
world where humans were coming to be seen as biological kin to nonhuman animals and 
thus advocating for better treatment of these relations, pets were the animals that many 
people most closely cared for and engaged with in adoptive familial relationships. Pet 
keeping reached a new peak in the nineteenth century. Ritvo notes that “[t]he British had 
owned dogs from the beginning of recorded history, but the relation of most Victorian 
fanciers to their animals, kept purely for companionship and amusement, was rather new, 
especially outside of the highest social ranks” (Animal Estate 85). For Kreilkamp, a certain 
kind of pet keeping was a Victorian creation that defines the way we perceive the period: 
“Victorian British culture did in fact raise pet loving to new heights and lay claim to a 
	
5 The term “survival of the fittest” originated in Spencer’s The Principles of Biology (1864).  
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fundamental role in the construction of the modern family pet…as a cherished object of 
sentiment” (Minor Creatures 30). This project sees these human-pet families as depicted 
in Victorian literature not just as the predecessors of similar bonds between people and 
animals today, but also anticipatory of the rich theorization of feminist animal studies 
scholarship, including works by Donna Haraway, Barbara Smuts, Susan Fraiman, and 
others, as is discussed below. 
In the long nineteenth century, human-animal relationships infiltrated discourses 
upholding or decrying strict gender ideology. Particularly, questions about the treatment of 
women and animals were enmeshed in the era, whether through activists including Mary 
Wollstonecraft and Frances Power Cobbe, both of whom crusaded on behalf of both 
women and animals,6 or through women writers who were also pet keepers and depicted 
those relationships in their works. This connection between the experience of women and 
animals was something that those who were disparaging of both women’s rights and animal 
welfare latched onto as well. When Thomas Taylor responded anonymously to Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), he attempted to undermine 
his more famous female predecessor by presenting the mock argument that not only women 
but also animals should receive equal rights: “We may therefore reasonably hope, that this 
amazing rage for liberty will continually increase…and that they will as universally join in 
vindicating the rights of brutes, as in asserting the prerogatives of man” (vii). A Vindication 
of the Rights of Brutes, also published in 1792, claims that Wollstonecraft, “though a virgin, 
is the mother of this theory” (15). Taylor questions the proper femininity of a woman of 
such openly articulated opinions, since Wollstonecraft the writer and thinker has been 	
6  Wollstonecraft’s advocacy for animals was part of her model of children’s education. See 
Original Stories from Real Life (1788) and Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787). 
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impregnated and given birth, evidently without having sex. 7  Much the same as 
Wollstonecraft is sexualized for her thoughts on women’s rights, Taylor eroticizes the 
affinity between women and animals: “I shall begin with the elephant, a beast by nature 
very amorous; and from his prodigious size, very well calculated to become the darling of 
our modern virgins, who have wisely laid aside the foolish veils of antiquity, and have 
assumed greater boldness, are seldom intimidated at any thing uncommonly large” (76). 
Taylor speaks to a supposed historic ignorance of sexuality that unmarried women (like 
Wollstonecraft) no longer possess. The so-called “virgins” are “wisely” exposed and 
“bold,” and the passage that ironically insists upon the knowing sexuality of the “virgins” 
shockingly culminates with innuendo about the male anatomy, though still ostensibly 
speaking of the elephant. These gendered insults about women as thinking, erotic creatures 
who care too much for nonhuman animals evinced interconnections between gender and 
species oppressions. In turn, those looking to dismantle traditional gender roles during the 
long nineteenth century could reframe these critiques into an empowering politics that 
benefited both humans and animals. 
Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch challenges the anthropocentric 
paradigm of nineteenth-century animal studies by focusing on how Victorian writers 
conceptualized a model of human-animal relationships defined by mutuality and centered 
on touch. Scholarship by James Turner, Harriet Ritvo, Deborah Denenholz Morse, and 
Martin A. Danahay has provided insights into human perceptions of animals, human 
behaviors towards animals, and the human hierarchies with which animals interact.	 I 
	
7 Taylor is also possibly hinting at Wollstonecraft’s personal exploits that would be revealed to the 
public posthumously with the publication of William Godwin’s Memoirs of the Author of a 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1798). 
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examine how Victorians attempted to move beyond this anthropocentric humanist thought 
as they anticipated what have come to be major concerns in contemporary feminist animal 
studies, including Haraway’s emphasis on “touch across difference” (When Species Meet 
14). Haraway’s touch-driven philosophy highlights the importance of embodiedness, the 
physical connection between different species, and intersectionality, which for Haraway is 
a critique of the exclusionism (be it based on race, gender, or species) prevalent in 
humanism, as she insists that different “companion species must…learn to live 
intersectionally” (18).	 Whereas Haraway focuses on human-animal companion 
relationships today, I consider earlier texts, including Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley (1849), 
Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm (1883) and From Man to Man, or Perhaps 
Only… (begun in the 1870s, but published posthumously in 1926), Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White (serialized from 1859-1860, and published in volume form in 1860), and 
Frances Power Cobbe’s The Confessions of a Lost Dog and “Dogs Whom I Have Met” 
(1872). The goal of this project is to uncover the Victorian interest in the close reciprocal 
relationships between human and nonhuman animals, as well as show the ways that these 
bonds are deployed in literature for social and political ends. Through this analysis, I argue 
that these nineteenth-century thinkers presented what I will call a “politics of touch,” in 
which mutuality and autonomy are negotiated at the point of intimate physical encounter.	
In my exploration of the politics of touch, I highlight violence (protective and sympathetic) 
and intimacy (familial and eroticized) between humans and animals. 	
Most of the critical works in the burgeoning field exploring long nineteenth-century 
pet keeping practices teach us more about human social structures than about the 
relationships between humans and their animal companions. Tague, for example, argues 
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that eighteenth-century pet keeping practices reflect major financial shifts (the rise of 
consumer capitalism), scientific discoveries (the hominoid ape), and philosophical 
movements (the age of sympathy and sensibility), and that reflecting on human-animal 
relationships allows us to better understand these events in human history. Tague explicitly 
defends the anthropocentrism of this reading: “As a historian, I focus unapologetically on 
humans. I am interested in animals primarily because of their impact on human life, rather 
than the other way around—not because I think animals are unimportant, but because 
ultimately the study of history must be a study of humans” (Animal Companions 9). I 
respect Tague’s candor, acknowledge the disciplinary differences between my work and 
hers, and see the very real limitations in thinking through the animal experience (though in 
literature all that we are considering is representation). Still, more work can be done to shift 
the focus from the human in scholarship about human-animal relationships. The human 
also comes to the fore when cultural geographer Philip Howell argues “that the Victorian 
‘invention’ of the dog was at the same time a material and imagined geography of 
domestication” (3), meaning that the dog is predominant as an actual presence in English 
homes of the era and in how people conceptualize what it is to be a home. Howell most 
certainly looks at the special proximity of humans and pets, but he does not really speak in 
terms of touch, meaning that his work tells us more about spaces and domestic structures 
than about intimate relationships. While my project also shows how human-pet 
relationships impact domestic structures, it is an important distinction for me that this 
intimacy destabilizes not just gender categories (what it means to be a “woman” or “man” 
in the home), but species categories as well (what it means to be an “animal” in the home). 
Furthermore, Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch deviates from the 
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skepticism with which scholars view literary representations of pets in the era. Monica 
Flegel’s monograph considers “the companion animal in Victorian literature and culture in 
order to interrogate how pet relations worked both to constitute and disrupt domestic 
ideology, from couplehood, marriage, and reproduction to parent/child and sibling 
relations” (2). Flegel points to the importance of human-animal bonds in relationship to the 
Victorian emphasis on what she calls (borrowing from Lee Edelman) “reproductive 
futurism,” by which she means the privileging of heteronormative unions that create 
offspring and thus continue family lines (8). 8  While Flegel points to human-animal 
relationships either upholding heteronormative structures or as a source of profound 
anxiety, I look at pet keeping largely as it is viewed optimistically as an opportunity for 
creating meaningful domestic configurations away from traditional conceptualizations of 
the family, especially as they provide a welcome alternative to the more oppressive aspects 
of traditional gender roles. In Victorian Dogs, Victorian Men, Keridiana Chez argues “that 
the nineteenth-century English and American bourgeoisie developed the use of animal 
companions as emotional prosthesis, attaching dogs to themselves to enhance their 
affective capacities and to complete their humanity” (2). In the schema that Chez outlines, 
animals are objectified and used to create meaning external to themselves. But my work 
shows that we can find textual moments where animals are more than just a means to an 
anthropocentric end. Ivan Kreilkamp’s Minor Creatures: Persons, Animals, and the 
Victorian Novel pays little heed to gender or empowering possibilities. According to 
	
8 While I agree with Flegel that human-pet relationships presented alternate relationship models, 
her argument that “‘families’ made up of a single human or a non-reproductive couple and their 
pets [were seen] as a sign of social failure and deviant sexuality” (11) does not take into account 
the extent to which family structures of the time were flexible. As Marcus explains in Between 
Women, female marriages were often socially if not legally sanctioned, and even given legitimacy 
through the pet: “pets were a way for women to represent a marital bond” (52).  
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Kreilkamp, Victorian literary creatures are never protagonists and seldom even characters 
in realist novels. While I agree with the first part of this claim, Nineteenth-Century Pets 
and the Politics of Touch reveals several exceptions to the argument that animals fail to 
register as characters. Most of the pets described in this project are undeniably characters, 
albeit minor ones. Tartar, Doss, Holly, Lakespur, Rose, and even Fosco’s unnamed mice 
and birds shape the plot structure (Brontë), represent the author’s theoretical and ethical 
interventions (Schreiner), and influence the readers’ encounters with genre conventions 
and experience of characters (Collins). This project does not take a quixotic view of human-
pet bonds as always empowering, but does call attention to occasions of theoretical and 
personal significance in these texts.   
For this project, I am borrowing from the tradition of contemporary feminist critical 
animal studies, a mode of thought defined by an interest in both intersectionality,9 by which 
I mean looking at animal experience in relationship to gender, sexuality, race, and class 
positionalities, and embodiedness, which emphasizes the bodily component of intimate 
relationships.10 Interest in the latter can be seen in studies by anthropologist Smuts on 
“embodied communication” through which “meaning is mutually constituted, literally 
embodied as two individuals’ behaviors (‘the parts’) combine to create something new 
(‘the whole’)” (“Embodied Communication” 137). This embodied communication allows 
	
9 In “Pussy Panic versus Liking Animals,” Fraiman holds that one of the primary flaws with the 
leading figures in the field of animal studies (particularly Cary Wolfe) is that they do not think 
intersectionally (114). A seminal example of the interest in intersectionality is Adams’s The Sexual 
Politics of Meat: A Feminist Vegetarian Critical Theory. All references to Fraiman in this 
introduction are talking about “Pussy Panic.” 
10 Converse to this embodiedness, we can look to the Derridean model of animal studies, which has 
been critiqued by both Haraway and Fraiman for being marked by look, rather than touch. In “The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Derrida famously stands naked in front of his cat 
and exchanges stares with the animal, an encounter that leads Derrida to think about the animal 
experience and pity the animal, but not to achieve an experiential connection with his cat.   
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for the formation of bonds between animals of the same species and also between humans 
and animals. Responding directly to Smuts’s writings and especially useful for my project 
is Haraway’s work on companion species, a categorization that includes everything from 
bacterial microorganisms to companion animals, and her emphasis on “worldliness and 
touch across difference” (When Species Meet 14).11 In When Species Meet, Haraway argues 
that touch leads to ethical responsibility between companion species: “My premise is that 
touch ramifies and shapes accountability. Accountability, caring for, being affected, and 
entering into responsibility are not ethical abstractions; these mundane, prosaic things are 
the result of having truck with each other” (36). With Haraway’s association between touch 
and accountability in mind, I argue that exploring representations of pet keeping, especially 
with an eye to physical encounter between animals and humans, makes evident what I am 
calling a “politics of touch” in the nineteenth century. Important to this is what I will term 
“embodied sympathy,” which I define as cross-species compassion accompanied by 
physical encounter, and marked by ethical responsibility on the part of the human.  
Looking at nineteenth-century texts through this theoretical lens and with the 
concept of a politics of touch in mind is useful for two reasons. First, this helps us to read 
nineteenth-century sympathetic and sentimental texts in a more nuanced way, with an eye 
to how they operate as complex modes of discourse rather than being an easy play on reader 
emotions. At the same time, this allows us to see moments when nineteenth-century texts 
anticipate current discussions in animal studies, a foreshadowing of current thought that 
makes it clear that earlier conceptualizations of animals were far richer than the 	
11 Fraiman points to both Smuts and Haraway as offering feminized ways of thinking about animals, 
as she notes that even when Haraway’s animal studies works do not focus on issues of gender 
“Haraway takes every opportunity to mention her own longstanding feminism and the pioneering, 
ongoing importance of feminist scholarship to thinking about species” (111).   
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anthropocentric humanist tradition that we understand them to be a part of. This project 
builds on a range of scholarship that looks at nineteenth-century writings about animals in 
relationship to interlocking systems of oppression. I contend that the connection between 
the physical touch essential to pet keeping and intersectional politics in the period enlivens 
the understandings of corporeal connections in ways that potentially allow agency and 
empowerment for both humans dissatisfied with narrow gender expectations (often 
women) and animals, with human-pet relationships as a possible site of resistance for these 
groups. 
 Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch looks at literary representations 
of Victorian pet keeping as a way of complicating common understandings of sympathy. 
In both animal studies scholarship and literary criticism, sympathetic and sentimental texts 
are often dismissed as trite or as creating distance between the sympathizing subject and 
object of sympathy. 12  Philip Armstrong, in What Animals Mean in the Fiction of 
Modernity, positions both nineteenth-century scientific discourse and modernism against 
the sentimentality of the long nineteenth century. Converse to the chronology and 
definitions of sentimentality and sympathy offered by Armstrong and others, I argue that 
the intimate experiential connections and especially the physical contact of human-pet 
relationships as portrayed by many Victorian writers serve to deplete distance in a way that 
draws attention to the commonalities between animals and humans. Various forms of 
sensory perception and connection are applicable to human-pet relationships, most notably 
the visual gaze, but I place my emphasis on touch precisely because it so completely 
removes the space between differing groups. I join Philip Howell both in exposing the 	
12 See Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy; Nancy Armstrong, How Novels Think 15; Philip Armstrong, What 
Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity 220-225.     
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“fiction of uniform national sentiment” (177) and in the goal of “chang[ing] the minds of 
those who react instinctively against the supposedly empty sentimentality inherent in 
companionship with animals” (182). However, Howell’s idea of “ruthless sentimentality” 
directed at the street animal but not the pet (176) does not allow for the at times violent, at 
times erotic embodied sympathy that is welcomed into the home, as analyzed in this 
project. Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch also follows a recent turn in 
nineteenth-century animal studies towards affect theory.13 In Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Pedagogy, Performativity, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick points to the “particular intimacy [that] 
seems to subsist between textures and emotions,” and notes the dual meanings of 
“touching” as a physical encounter and as the provocation of an emotional response (17). 
Touch is an action that can inspire heightened feeling, but this also can become political 
when it defies ideological gender expectations, cultivates affect outside of those traditional 
gender roles, and exerts a choice that finds meaning where it is not expected.  
Although this project’s central focus is on species and gender, largely because of 
the gender and class positionalities of the authors surveyed, issues of race and class also 
underpin this work. The intersection between the treatment of animals and the treatment of 
the working classes in England has been commonly discussed since Turner’s and Ritvo’s 
books in the 1980s, and more recent works, including Tague’s Animal Companions and 
Sarah Amato’s Beastly Possessions, look at animals as commodities to be exchanged and 
the class system. Postcolonial works, notably Kurt Koenigsberger’s The Novel and the 
Menagerie, deal with the violence of empire as it harmed both racialized and animal others 
in the Victorian era. This criticism often focuses on people interested in animals from a 	
13 See Chez, Victorian Dogs, Victorian Men: Affect and Animals in Nineteenth-Century Literature 
and Culture; Nyman and Schuurman, Affect, Space and Animals. 
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distance: the wealthy animal welfare advocate concerned with laboring animals, animals 
transported from far lands to be displayed behind cages in zoos, the evolutionary discourse 
that links different nations and races with less evolved species, neither of which may have 
ever actually been encountered by the thinker. I hone in on the understudied personal, local 
connections, exploring them in terms of the pets and gender; however, issues of race and 
class make up important contexts for my own writing. Attention to the classed prescriptions 
for acceptable animal companions for proper middle and upper class subjects recurs in this 
project, as well as the rebellious potential for people who decide to transgress class 
boundaries in their choice of pets. Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley and Olive Schreiner’s Lyndall 
both keep company with dogs seen as better fitted for members of the working classes, and 
these women and their dogs all appreciate the value of men who fall lower on the social 
ladder than their female counterparts—Louis and Waldo, respectively. Wilkie Collins’s 
Count Fosco, too, keeps mice and birds that were normally associated with the working 
class, despite his mercenary aims and the pretentions of his title. Moreover, Schreiner, in 
depicting Baby-Bertie in From Man to Man as a fallen woman turned commodity to be 
exchanged between men, demonstrates that gender and species act similarly in a capitalist 
commodity culture. Likewise, race comes to the fore when Brontë, Schreiner, and Cobbe 
wield language that compares and conflates animals with racial others. The close physical 
interactions between women or ambiguously gendered men with their pets, as well as the 
similar constraints placed upon animals and women (of the middle and upper classes) as 
petted domestic creatures, make these human-animal companions productive for writers 
interested in the reworking of traditional domestic structures that can come when oppressed 
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groups quite literally touch. But other forms of oppression are never completely out of 
sight.   
Beyond the very specific terms—politics of touch, embodied sympathy, protective 
violence, relational touch, grotesque sympathy, and violent sympathy—that are crucial to 
my work, other more general keywords are of paramount importance in a study on human-
animal relationships, in which the language used to describe both humans and animals is 
politically fraught. Derrida’s “The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” 
discusses the complexity of language, particularly the violence of naming: “The animal is 
a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name that they have given themselves 
the right and the authority to give another creature” (118). Further, Derrida describes the 
“crime” of conflating “all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common 
category of the animal” (126). While acknowledging the problematic nature of the term, I 
usually use “animal” rather than the wordier, if also more accurate, “nonhuman animal” 
throughout this work.14 Unless otherwise noted, when I use “animal” the “nonhuman” in 
front of it should be implied. Further, I employ the words “pet” and variations on 
“companion animal” to describe the animal of the human-animal relationship, and 
“companion,” “human companion,” and “pet keeper” for the humans in these pairings. The 
word “pet” itself provokes complicated interpretations. Keith Thomas describes the pet 
(opposed to the broader categorizations of domestic and wild animals) as animals marked 
by three characteristics: they are able to come into the home,15 they are given names, and 
they are not a source of food (112-115). Erica Fudge adds to this definition the idea that 	
14 Seeber helpfully defends a similar choice of terminology for the purpose of readability. See Jane 
Austen and Animals xi. 
15 I will here emphasize the distinction between feminized house pets and the dogs oft associated 
with masculine pursuits like hunting that were usually kept in kennels. 
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pets are “animals that are kin” (16). Yi-Fu Tuan is notoriously more critical of the role of 
pets, seeing them not as “privileged,” but rather as “diminished being[s]”; at the same time, 
Tuan highlights that animals are not the only petted creatures, noting that other oppressed 
figures, such as women, children, and slaves, can also fall under that category (139-141). 
The disempowerment of pets is evident in other language used to describe pets and their 
human companions, such as the troubling terms “master,” “mistress,” and “owner,” with 
their clear connotations of objectification and animal slavery. These terms, I should add, 
will only be critically employed in my project when borrowed directly from the text being 
discussed. Therefore, when looking at Frances Power Cobbe’s The Confessions of a Lost 
Dog, I consider the terms “master” and “mistress” that Cobbe employs throughout. 
However, I join recent works on pet keeping that demonstrate how pets are simultaneously 
privileged and oppressed, as well as how that fluid positioning complicates other seemingly 
strict binaries, such as human and animal, objectified thing and relationship partner.16 
While I certainly allow that the human-pet relationship is one that is marked by unbalanced 
power, my project considers how close physical relationships, as well as the role of other 
systems of oppression (particularly gender), can complicate this power differential.  
	
16 In Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes, Brown claims that contemporary animal studies looks 
at animals as though they are either completely anthropomorphized (Haraway) or alienated from 
humans (Derrida). However, Brown argues that eighteenth-century literature shows flexibility in 
depictions of imaginary animals, in which they are neither entirely anthropomorphized nor alien, 
but rather they move between the two. Similarly, Tague’s work in Animal Companions 
demonstrates that the pet occupies space between object and companion, animal and human. Amato 
highlights the ambivalence with which the pet as a possession is treated with “simultaneous 
imperatives of love, companionship, moral enhancement, utility, discipline, abuse, investment, and 
profit” (23). Finally, Howell notes that “[d]ogs were symbolically as well as materially 
‘messy’…[in] their potential to transgress boundaries” (23), and holds that sticking to a strict 
narrative of animal oppression gives humans credit for too much agency and animals not enough 
(9).  
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The moments of physical intimacy between humans and companion animals that 
are the focal point of my work often occur at and shape significant life moments—
including courtship, motherhood, old age without marriage or children, and death. Thus, 
the chapters are arranged to reflect the typical chronological pattern for the life process, 
rather than following dates of publication or any other system of organization. Charlotte 
Brontë’s Shirley is at the center of “Biting Courtship: Animal Judgment and the Courtship 
Narrative.” In this chapter, I look at the role of Tartar as guard dog using protective violence 
to fortify Shirley’s home and body from unsought romantic invasions. Sometimes Tartar’s 
judgment aligns with Shirley’s wishes, as when he forcefully removes the insufferable 
curate, Mr Donne, from Shirley’s property. However, Tartar’s high valuation of Shirley’s 
eventual husband, Louis, while the heiress still feels resentment of the poor but genteel 
tutor reveals that Tartar makes his own decisions about his human companion’s potential 
suitors and guides Shirley’s choices like a respected father. At stake in this chapter is the 
significance of canine intervention in the structures of both Victorian domesticity and 
narrative plot. In chapter 2, “Human-Animal ‘Mother-Love’ in Novels by Olive 
Schreiner,” I analyze the affective maternal and erotic bonds between women and their pets 
in Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm and From Man to Man. While familial 
touch between humans and animals was frequently seen by both protofeminists and people 
antagonistic to women’s rights as a source for disdain—because it distracted from serious 
pursuits like being a good wife or educating children or self—I argue that mothering dogs 
and cats offers an option other than heteronormative domestic structures. In Woman and 
Labour (1911), Schreiner describes traditional marriage as a form of prostitution that is 
disempowering for women, terming the practice “sex parasitism,” but her fiction shows an 
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opportunity for intimate and caring relationships outside of marriage that permit the 
enactment of what the New Woman heroine of From Man to Man calls “mother-love.” The 
third chapter, “Crawling, Clawing Human-Animal Sympathy in The Woman in White,” 
considers the attraction of Count Fosco to and for mice, birds, and an old maid. Consisting 
of claws penetrating skin and beaks encountering human lips, the human-pet embodied 
relationships in Collins’s novel is unsavory for other characters and readers to behold. Yet, 
this unappealing touch forms a grotesque sympathy that values surplus women and 
animals, while refusing to privilege anthropocentrism and heteronormativity for a 
marriageable woman. Although the ability for mutual touch seemingly stops with death 
and burial, “Embodied Grief and Violent Sympathy in Frances Power Cobbe’s 
Representations of Grieving Dogs” looks at Cobbe’s revision of the canine fidelity trope. 
While tales commonly had faithful dogs returning to the graves of their beloved human 
companions, Cobbe’s dogs display physical manifestations of grief that were so dramatic 
that the animals are shot, apparently because this was the only way of easing their 
pathologized suffering. This chapter also considers how the instrumental or mediated 
violence of killing grieving dogs acts in comparison and contrast to the brutality Cobbe 
critiques in her antivivisectionist work. This chapter underscores how the excessive 
feminized embodied grief exhibited by animals and the masculinized violence of women’s 
sympathy opposes gender expectations and enriches our understandings of nineteenth-
century sentiment. In nineteenth-century literature and culture, pet keeping included attack 
dogs, erotic encounters with animals, mice and mongrels, mercy killings, bleeding and 
dying animals, taxidermy pets, and more. This project seeks to illuminate how 
uncomfortable to behold nineteenth-century pets and the politics of touch could be, but 
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also how Victorians used these strange encounters to redefine gender roles, distinctions 
between species, and the family.   
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CHAPTER 1. BITING COURTSHIP: ANIMAL JUDGMENT AND THE COURTSHIP 
NARRATIVE 
 In Thomas Rowlandson’s undated Cat Like Courtship (fig. 2), a portly gentleman 
with a puckered face attempts to force his attentions on a distressed lady, who anxiously 
tries to escape his grasp. The chaotic scene features three domestic pets violently coming 
to the woman’s defense, clawing their way up the man’s back and biting his derrière. 
Rowlandson’s comedic yet troubling scene goes against common conceptions of single 
women with their companion animals. Monica Flegel argues that animals in nineteenth-
century courtship narratives generally either act as stand-ins for future spouses (in the vein 
of the romantic friend) or as signs of a likely unmarriageable spinster.17 As Rowlandson’s 
print suggests, however, Flegel’s categorizations leave out the desirable but undesirous 
women rejecting would-be lovers, with the notable aid of discriminating companion 
animals, in this case feline. Along similar lines, guard dogs—burly or diminutive, serious 
threats or comic relief—populate many Victorian novels, including Emily Brontë’s 
Wuthering Heights (1847) and Elizabeth Gaskell’s Cranford (1853), protecting against 
home invasions by unwanted guests and burglars. This chapter considers an atypical guard 
dog, one who uses protective violence in response to attempted romantic invasions of the 
female domestic space and body. The focal point of this chapter is Charlotte Brontë’s 
Shirley (1849), in which a pet acts as a mediating figure who can demonstrate a violent 
touch towards amorous men that his human companion cannot, while having the agency 
and wherewithal in his own right to function as a judicious guardian within the courtship 
scene. Furthermore, Brontë’s novel allows animals to model prudent violence that becomes 	
17 All references to Flegel in this chapter point to Pets and Domesticity in Victorian Literature and 
Culture. 
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acceptable for certain human characters to imitate in defense of the woman’s home, body, 
and autonomy. Violent touch safeguards the woman’s choice of whom to affectionately 
touch, a decision on the part of the pet that pays no heed to societal expectations regarding 
relationships between different classes and species. 
 
 
 
Critics looking at animals in Shirley tend to focus on Shirley being bitten by the 
potentially rabid Phoebe “as a convenient deus ex machina” (Ritvo, Animal Estate 169) 
that tames Shirley and allows her to marry Louis.18 However, when we focus on Shirley’s 
relationship to her dog, Tartar, we see that instead of simply being used to housebreak the 
heroine in order that she can be a properly domesticated woman under Louis’s control, pets 
	
18 This reading usually appears fleetingly in studies that focus on other Brontë sister depictions of 
animals. See Surridge, “Animals and Violence in Wuthering Heights.” Mentions of animals in 
Shirley also serve as supplemental material in histories (for example, in The Animal Estate, Ritvo 
describes Shirley in order to give context to her discussion of rabies in the nineteenth century).  
Figure 2. Thomas Rowlandson's 
Cat Like Courtship 
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also function as important members of the family, intimately involved with the heroine 
pre-marriage and having a say in who and what behaviors will make up the post-marriage 
family. In the process, animals present a model of just embodied violence, judging other 
characters and displaying their responses through assaults. The only extended look at 
animals in Shirley is Karen Dodwell’s “Thinking with Dogs in Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley,” 
which argues that Tartar’s and Louis’s ferocity demonstrates anxieties about working-class 
revolts; I concur that the violence of the pair is significant, but I hold that it represents a 
philosophy of savage animalistic nature that privileges the knowingness and rightness of 
the human and animal beast within the novel.19 Tartar’s repeated attacks against the titular 
character of the “Mr Donne’s Exodus” chapter can be read as an extension of Shirley’s 
feelings for the laughable curate who fails to comprehend that young women are not in 
love with him, but Tartar’s affection for Shirley’s eventual husband, Louis, even while 
Shirley holds him at a distance makes evident that the canine remains his own master. In 
this chapter, I argue that rather than being a mere reflection of human emotions or one-
dimensional indicators of good and bad characters (Louis is good, Donne is bad, and Tartar 
is there only to show this), animals in courtship texts can act as agents expressing their own 
interpretation of the wooers (and the wooing itself). Authors like Charlotte Brontë represent 	
19 While there is a dearth of animal studies analyses of Shirley, scholarship from this perspective 
on other novels by the Brontë sisters is a bit more common. For an examination of animals in 
Charlott Brontë’s Jane Eyre, see Anderson and Lawrence, “‘No net ensnares me’: Bird Imagery 
and the Dynamics of Dominance and Submission in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre.” For readings 
of Anne Brontë’s novels, see Berg, “‘Hapless Dependents’: Women and Animals in Anne Brontë’s 
Agnes Grey”; Flegel, “Love Me, Love My Dog: The Role of the Pet in Rituals of Courtship, 
Domesticity, and Parenthood” from Pets and Domesticity in Victorian Literature and Culture; 
Newman, “Animals in Agnes Grey.” For discussions of Wuthering Heights, see Davies, “Emily 
Brontë & the Animals” from Emily Brontë: Heretic; Kreilkamp, “Petted Things: Wuthering Heights 
and the Animal”; Lutz, “Keeper, Grasper, and Other Family Animals” from The Brontë Cabinet: 
Three Lives in Nine Objects; Surridge, “Animals and Violence in Wuthering Heights.” Kreilkamp’s 
chapter in Minor Creatures on the Brontës generally (expanded from the above mentioned article), 
titled “Petted Things: Cruelty and Sympathy in the Brontës,” does not reference Shirley. 
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animal opinions as being of worth. This chapter centers on the concept that I call “biting 
courtship” in which animals perform agentive violent touch through which they 
simultaneously preserve and rework the traditional form of the marriage plot, allowing for 
powerful decentering of the human in favor of greater mutuality between humans and 
animals in decisions about domestic configurations.	 Moreover, the human characters, 
oppressed by their gender or class positions, are most empowered when they utilize this 
violent animal agency as a model for their own conduct.	
Human-pet relationships as represented in Shirley complicate understandings of the 
word “violence,” dismantling the negative connotations the term has that associate it with 
brutal humans and savage beasts; additionally, Brontë undermines some of the arguments 
about the violence of pet keeping as it is understood by animal studies practitioners. 
Thinking through the complex ways that violence is manifested has long been crucial to 
the animal studies project, notably in Yi Fu Tuan’s Dominance and Affection, in which he 
shows the violence of trying to contain pets or stripping them of their animality. This abuse 
is physical in that it is confining the animal body within the home, but not in the way that 
we typically expect. A reader knows that Heathcliff hanging Isabella’s dog is violent 
(Wuthering Heights 133), for example, but this overt cruelty is not exclusively what Tuan 
points to; the petted Carlo from Cranford allowed to overindulge in treats is a better 
illustration of Tuan’s version of the corruption of human-pet relationships. In the form of 
Tartar, however, the pet is stripped of neither his animality nor agency. Tartar is not made 
a petted, anthropomorphized “fur baby” by coming into the home, but rather his human 
companions exhibit animal tendencies in following his condoned ferocity.20 Converse to 	
20 For a critique of treating animals as “furry children,” see Haraway, Companion Species Manifesto 
37; When Species Meet 213. 
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conceptualizations of animals in which humans are thought to be civilized and animals 
brutally violent, a thorough analysis of Shirley shows not only a human tendency towards 
animalized violence but also a support for this physical anger when driven by justice that 
both humans and animals can determine. In the form of Tartar, the fierceness of the beast 
is welcomed into the home, discussed in the first section of this chapter which explores 
how this violent animal presence drives the marriage plot and creates a revised version of 
paternal control that is more egalitarian with regards to gender and class. The next section 
considers humans who also demonstrate this animal drive. The biting courtship plot and 
the guard dogs therein show pets fighting back against humans, as animalized ferocity is 
allowed and even at times encouraged. 
Paternal Guard Dogs and the Marriage Plot 
In a novel that ends with a double marriage, the love matches of Robert and 
Caroline, and Louis and Shirley, Brontë criticizes marriage in two ways: by showcasing 
unhappy examples and by populating the novel with men who view it as nothing more than 
a business transaction. Failed marriages include Mr Helstone’s brief union with Mary 
Cave, which ends in the early death of the disillusioned wife, and the broken marriage of 
Caroline’s parents. Guided by these failures, Mr Helstone becomes a vocal opponent of 
matrimony: “It is decidedly the wisest plan to remain single, especially for 
women…Millions of marriages are unhappy: if everybody confessed the truth, perhaps all 
are more or less so” (97, 98). Advocates of marriage for money include Malone, who will 
allow “an advantageous connexion, such as can be formed in consonance with dignity of 
views, and permanency of solid interests” (23), Yorke’s encouragement of Robert to find 
“a wife with a few thousands, who would suit both me and my affairs” (159), and Mr 
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Sympson with his perpetual quest for an advantageous marriage for Shirley and, by 
extension, his family. All of these men use somewhat coded, if still unambiguous, 
language—“interests,” “affairs,” etc.—to describe what is less prettily put as a union that 
benefits them financially or with regards to social status, showing a willingness to sell 
themselves or family members in marriage if the price is high enough. Robert shamefully 
proposes to Shirley for the financial support that she can give him, after previously 
maintaining that marriage is either for the rich who can afford it or the poor who have no 
other pleasures to live for (158), and refusing “to have his affections inextricably entangled, 
nor to be drawn, despite his reason, into a marriage he believed to be imprudent” (103). 
While neither Caroline nor Shirley show interest in marrying without love, Robert has to 
make it through much of the novel and Shirley’s bitter rejection before he shares their belief 
in the companionate ideal: “I’ll do it no more…never more will I mention marriage to a 
woman, unless I feel love. Henceforth, Credit and Commerce may take care of themselves. 
Bankruptcy may come when it lists” (503). Economic terms can be explicitly employed 
now that these concepts are seen as faulty instigators for matrimony. The capitalized Credit, 
Commerce, and Bankruptcy here are personified subjects who may behave as they will 
without dictating Moore’s romantic decisions henceforward, but other nonhuman 
characters are not so far dismissed from holding sway in courtship outcomes. Companion 
animals espouse companion relationships among humans, ones that do not acknowledge 
class or rank, but rather physical affinity between potential partners. In Brontë’s 
composition of the marriage plot in Shirley, bad marriages must be violently guarded 
against and good marriages must be violently defended, with animals allowed into the 
process and human participants animalized. While Tartar and other guard dogs who 
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ferociously interject in the marriage plot do not fit Flegel’s model of pets politely acting as 
a romantic friend of the style that Sharon Marcus examines in Between Women, he does 
behave like a violently protective parent. I join scholars like Marcus and others who 
describe the complex family structures in which marriages are formed, but I show pets as 
active forces participating within these systems.     
Brontë positions Shirley as a potential opponent of home and marriage expectations 
by depicting her deviations from traditional femininity. Shirley is manly in name, in her 
possession of money and property, in her role as protector, particularly her wielding of a 
firearm the night of the riot, in her power of choice in the marriage market, and in her 
preferred canine companion. 21  Throughout the novel, much is made of Shirley’s 
masculinization: “Shirley Keeldar, Esquire, ought to be my style and title. They gave me a 
man’s name; I hold a man’s position: it is enough to inspire me with a touch of manhood” 
(194). Shirley has a man’s dog to go with her name and position, a pet called Tartar, whose 
disposition matches the meaning of his name: “a rough and violent or irritable and 
intractable person” (OED n. 2 and adj.). Men suggest that Shirley change her dog so that 
she will fall in line with expectations for upper class femininity. Donne argues that Shirley 
should have a pet fit for a lady, not a big and boisterous mixed breed dog: “Can’t fancy a 
lady fond of that brute — ’t is so ugly — a mere carter’s dog — pray hang him…And 
purchase in his stead some sweetly pooty pug or poodle: something appropriate to the fair 
sex: ladies generally like lap-dogs” (265). The curate’s call for the dog to be killed shows 
his capacity for violent words, but this is not followed up with actions. Donne’s assertion 
	
21 See 188, 191-197, 230, 234, 258, 286, 309-311, 315-317, 319-320, 341. For a discussion of 
Shirley as a “female gentleman,” see MacDonald, “Class and Gender in the Brontë Novels” 491-
492.  
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speaks to a classed expectation that Tartar should be a laboring pet in the service of the 
working classes. The alliteration of “purchase…pooty pug or poodle…appropriate” 
highlights the contradictions between Donne’s intentions and reality. The repetition of the 
hard p sound reflects the power Donne believes he holds over Shirley as a professional man 
and, he supposes, potential marriage partner. Though his talking down to Shirley seems a 
bit like someone speaking to an infant, his dismissive response to Shirley actually makes 
him sound foolishly simpering. In a chapter that sees Donne exert his superiority over the 
people of the region that he serves, Donne undermines his self-elevation by the use of 
“pooty,” local vernacular for “pretty.” The use of the word “purchase” emphasizes Donne’s 
sense of a pet as an object for a lady to acquire. Furthermore, the animals of choice bring 
British imperialism and conflict to mind, as the poodle is a French dog, striking given the 
setting of the novel in 1811-12 against the backdrop of Napoleonic Wars, and the pug’s 
association with conquest in Asia. In his recommendation that Shirley pick a new 
companion animal, therefore, Donne reveals his adherence to systems of gender, species, 
class, and geographic domination. Tartar’s name also points to imperial conquest, as the 
understanding of a “tartar” as uncontrollably violent is based on stereotypes of natives of 
the area of central Asia previously called the Independent and Chinese Tartary, and the 
appellations “Tartar” and “Turk” were used interchangeably in the era  (OED n. 2 and adj.). 
Surprisingly, Brontë gives the imperial other—the “Tartar”—control over English 
subjects, and in so doing reverses hierarchies that assume English dominance; moreover, 
she evokes racist stereotypes about women’s oppression in Eastern cultures in order to 
simultaneously uphold that notion (Tartar controls Shirley’s plot) and upset it as Tartar 
protects Shirley against patriarchal forces. 
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Tartar makes hazy the distinction between working dog and pet, as well as the 
concomitant class and gender understandings. Tartar, being “a rather large, strong, and 
fierce-looking dog, very ugly, being of a breed between a mastiff and bull-dog” (191), 
resembles Heathcliff’s dogs, who would work the farm of Wuthering Heights and protect 
the home from unwelcome guests, more than a gentlewoman’s companion. Shirley’s dog 
does perform important labor as guard dog within the novel, using violent touch to protect 
the sanctity of the marriage plot, the domestic fortress of Fieldhead, Shirley’s material 
possessions, and her body from unwanted intrusions. Acoording to the rules of coverture, 
a husband was to protect and control his wife. Following this concept, nineteenth-century 
laws held that Shirley would cede her property to her husband at the time of marriage, as 
John Stuart Mill describes in The Subjection of Women (1869): “She can acquire no 
property but for him; the instant it becomes hers, even if by inheritance, it becomes ipso 
facto his” (154).22 This spousal authority would not just extend to material possessions. 
Her husband would also have full access to her body given that the law did not accept the 
concept of marital rape, as a husband could force his wife into “the lowest degradation of 
a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her 
inclinations” (Mill 155-156, ital. mine). 23  Tartar guards the house and its primary 
inhabitant, but not only in the traditional way of protecting the domain from burglars. 
Potential husbands, including Donne and the other curates, the Moore brothers, Sam 
Wynne, and Sir Philip Nunnely, can take Shirley’s property and perform violence against 
	
22 While this speaks to the court of common law, wealthier women could potentially have their 
estate secured for them in the court of equity; however, mention of this is not made with regard to 
Shirley’s property. See Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England.	
23  For further discussion of marital rape, particularly late century pushes for legislation, see 
Phegley, Courtship and Marriage in Victorian England 166. 
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her body if they were to have bad intentions and attach themselves to Shirley without 
mutual love and respect. Unacceptable matches are therefore the threat against which 
Tartar helps to guard, playing a paternal role in the absence of Shirley’s deceased father 
and in opposition to the power-hungry Uncle Sympson. Like Olive Schreiner’s Doss, 
whom I describe in the next chapter, Tartar offers a powerful revision of what might make 
a suitable nonhuman companion for a woman of the higher classes. While Schreiner uses 
this alternative to the lapdog to offer different forms of motherhood, Tartar serves as a 
parental figure casting his judgment on the courtship scene and protecting Shirley and her 
estate from unacceptable advances.  
 The curates’ invasion of Fieldhead for a social call reflects these larger concerns 
about the security of the female home and body. The first attack occurs as a result of 
Malone’s misreading of Tartar’s boisterous greeting, with the curate wielding a weapon in 
response to no real threat on the dog’s part: “Some bustle was heard. ‘Down, sir! — down!’ 
exclaimed a high-toned, imperious voice, and then came a crack of a cane or whip. 
Immediately there was a yell — a scutter — a run — a positive tumult” (261). Somebody 
impulsively refers to the dog as a “sir,” a name signaling a degree of deference and respect 
to the beast of the house, perhaps an unconscious acknowledgement of the authoritative 
power that Tartar wields as guardian. Brontë earlier describes Tartar’s barks as him “giving 
tongue,” a particularly embodied description of animal voice, whereas the men’s 
verbalizations in this passage are ambiguously disembodied—it is unclear whose words 
are “high-toned and imperious” and who lets out the “yell.” The vocalizations here also 
present the contradictions between the loud and domineering and the fearful screams, 
feminine in the high pitch but masculine in the “imperious” nature. Although it is unclear 
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which of the pair bellows, Shirley’s reprimand of Malone and the fact that he was “wildly 
flourishing a knotty stick,” even after Donne’s hurried departure, makes evident that it is 
he who assaulted the dog. Malone’s weapon allows for a mediated violent touch, much like 
the guns used to kill grieving animals and the instruments used by scientific men 
experimenting on animals discussed in chapter 3 of this project. Brontë associates this 
device of Malone’s with cowardice, similar to Lockwood desperately grabbing any 
household item to save him from Heathcliff’s angry dogs in the opening of Wuthering 
Heights (4). Brontë juxtaposes the impotent male anger of Donne, Malone, and later 
Sympson with a more direct and efficacious violence embodied by dogs and animalized 
humans throughout the novel.  
Even though two skirmishes take place in “Mr Donne’s Exodus” and two men 
inspire Tartar’s wrath, only Donne warrants mentioning in the title and participates in the 
battle that makes up the climax of the chapter. That both Donne and Malone earn Tartar’s 
ire—the former by making Shirley upset with his inflammatory rhetoric, the latter for his 
physical assault on the dog—shows the close connection between verbalized philosophical 
violence and that enacted on the body. Still, the focus on Donne in this chapter brings to 
the fore the insidiousness of problematic ideas, and the particular ineligibility of a man of 
such thinking as a companion for a woman like Shirley. Donne starts his offense when he 
begs for money for missionary work: “The population of Ecclefigg are a parcel of brutes 
— we want to civilize them” (271). Donne’s endeavor hinges on presenting the recipients 
of his charity negatively as animals and as a pack rather than individuals, an insult against 
the working classes, but in spite of this Shirley offers Donne a small amount of money for 
his labors. Disappointed in the scantiness of her donation, Donne complains without 
	 	 31 
ceasing, again talking condescendingly of people and place: “Wretched place — this 
Yorkshire…the people — rich and poor — what a set! How corse and uncultivated!” (272). 
Donne wants to make the people more human—civilized, cultivated, refined—but the 
novel, especially the character of Shirley, does not similarly value distancing people from 
their animal brethren. Even though Brontë, as well as Donne, animalizes the working 
classes and the Yorkshire people (Louis, Shirley, and the millworkers, for examples), this 
beastly nature is not unambiguously viewed as a negative quality. 
The narrator describes Shirley’s rage at Donne’s disparaging comments about the 
Yorkshire people, herself included, in decidedly physicalized language, making evident the 
animal passion within her. She demonstrates bad table manners as she “leaned forwards on 
the table, her nostrils dilating, her taper fingers interlaced and compressing each other hard” 
(272), with the violence of the squeezed hands juxtaposed against their delicate size, and 
later the narrator remarks on her “darkened brow, curled lip, and incensed eye” (273). 
Brontë gives no detail of Shirley’s interiority, focusing instead on the way these inner 
feelings manifest themselves on her body. Shirley’s snarl and flaring nose would be more 
expected from Heathcliff’s guard dogs than an heiress hosting a social gathering; in fact 
there is a near exact repetition between the woman’s “curled lip” and the dog’s “lip curled 
up” from Wuthering Heights (4). Still, Shirley’s mounting bodily anger only goes so far. 
She dismisses Donne from her property and makes clear that he is not welcome back using 
words and gestures: “‘There, — you have reached the climax,’ said Shirley, 
quietly…nobody could control her now, for she was exasperated; straight she walked to 
the garden-gates, wide she flung them open” (273). Shirley’s anger is clear, but it is the 
fact that “Tartar was again rising” that insures that Donne makes his exit. Shirley defies 
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social expectations as she loses her temper in this scene, letting a little bit of animal rage 
out, but she does so “quietly.” Tartar can demonstrate physical violence that Shirley cannot. 
Later Shirley describes the weight of gender constraints that forced her to curb the 
demonstration of her anger: “Had I been a gentleman, I believe I should have helped him 
off the premises by dint of physical force” (282). Therefore, Tartar’s attack is a strong 
exertion that can be read as an extension of his companion’s feelings that she must conceal, 
showing Tartar to be in tune enough with his companion to reflect her own distaste and 
violent urges. 
In representing Tartar’s physical encounters, Brontë considers three types of touch 
that exist on a continuum: violent touch at one end, indifferent touch in the middle, and 
affectionate touch as the other extreme. Shirley’s interactions with Tartar and the 
relationships between her prospective marriage partners and various dogs bring this schema 
to the fore. Tartar’s encounter with Donne and Malone exemplifies a mutually bad and 
disapproving touch. Even more of a nuisance for Shirley is Mr Sam Wynne, who “was one 
of the objects of her aversion; and the more so because he showed serious symptoms of an 
aim at her hand” (291). Whereas Malone and Donne believe they can endear themselves to 
any marriageable female of the novel, Wynne and his family focus solely on Shirley, with 
Wynne becoming the first to propose to Shirley in a novel in which almost every single 
male character of an appropriate age seeks to make the heiress his wife (439). The marriage 
negotiations in this case take place between Sam Wynne’s father and Shirley’s uncle, to 
the exclusion of the man, woman, and dog who should actually have a say, so Shirley 
refuses the offer to her uncle’s dismay. While the father and uncle carry on the cold 
negotiations to Shirley’s detriment from a distance, Tartar is more intimately attached to 
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Shirley than is her uncle, and the close human-animal dyad will become a triad after the 
nuptials. Ultimately, Sam Wynne’s pointer, Phoebe, bites Shirley and creates the rabies 
scare that leads Shirley to Louis’s arms and the altar, but the possibility was revealed “that 
the dog was not mad: that it was only ill-usage which had driven her from home: for it was 
proved that her master was in the frequent habit of chastizing her violently” (573). Phoebe, 
the mistreated female dog exploited for the masculinized violence of hunting, leads Shirley 
to a better union, with the help of Tartar. In depicting all of these characters who provoke 
bad violent encounters with animals, Brontë makes an intersectional social critique of the 
like domination of women, animals, and the working classes, maltreatment that can take 
physical or verbal forms. But Brontë does not lose sight of the animal amidst these other 
oppressions.  
Just because one is not abusive, however, does not guarantee Tartar’s or Shirley’s 
approval. The most amiable of the curates, whose character warrants his name, Mr 
Sweeting, is mocked by his friends “as ‘the ladies’ pet’” (9). Although he is not the 
recipient of Tartar’s violent disapprobation, neither does he meet with the dog’s approval: 
“Mr Sweeting followed, and would have played with him, but Tartar took no notice of his 
caresses: it was only his mistress’s hand whose touch gave him pleasure; to all others he 
showed himself obstinately insensible” (266). Sweeting attempts to meet Tartar with what 
are positive buzzwords in Donna Haraway’s theorization of bonds between companion 
species, her emphasis on “touch across difference” (When Species Meet, 14, ital. mine) and 
“play, and not just pity” (22, ital. mine). Tartar’s refusal to pay attention to other friendly 
advances highlights the power of his cognition and choice. Given the exclusionary 
discrimination of this quote’s “only” in the insistence that “it was only his mistress’s hand 
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whose touch gave him pleasure,” it is even more striking when Tartar positively responds 
to Louis’s touch.  
In his disdain for Malone and to an even greater extent Donne, and in his relative 
indifference for Sweeting, Tartar’s disinclination mirrors that of Shirley; however, Tartar’s 
affection for Louis Moore is not so perfectly aligned with Shirley’s preferences. Tartar 
does not simply serve as an index of a human character’s wishes, highlighting both the 
judgment and self-assertion of the nonhuman animal separate from his human companion. 
The reader eventually comes to find that, much like Tartar, Shirley loves Louis Moore. 
Still, Shirley desires to keep Louis at a distance, an attempt at returning the coldness 
exhibited by the tutor who is too conscious of his class status in relation to her. Perhaps 
again here Tartar exhibits the feelings that Shirley may not show because of social 
pressure—Shirley cannot violently attack Donne as Tartar does and Shirley cannot be 
caressed by Louis as Tartar is, though presumably she would enjoy such impassioned 
physical connection with these men. At the same time, Shirley is less accepting of Tartar’s 
affection for Louis than she is of his violence against Donne. Just as Tartar expresses his 
disapprobation via violent touch, Tartar’s regard is expressed via what Barbara Smuts calls 
“embodied communication,” the “critical part of our inter-species language” built on “gaze, 
motion, gesture, and touch” used to bring multiple creatures within the same species and 
across species “into active communication” (“Embodied Communication” 137). Though 
Tartar asserts his meaning and his alpha positioning in his ferocious message directed at 
Donne, the communication between Tartar and Louis is a far more evenly balanced 
exchange. Tartar’s fondness for Louis becomes apparent when he welcomes the tutor who 
enters otherwise invisibly into a friendless room, at which point the dog would “rise from 
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his lair at Shirley’s feet, and betake himself to the taciturn tutor” (424-425). The “lair” calls 
to mind the dwelling of a wild animal, and thus Brontë brings the beastly into the public 
room of a gentlewoman, showing Shirley’s unique willingness to keep the unorthodox 
violent pet near to her. The delicately human Shirley, “holding out her white hand, and 
speaking softly, tried to coax him back,” but the animal Tartar defies his companion’s 
wishes: “Tartar looked, slavered, and sighed, as his manner was, but yet disregarded the 
invitation, and coolly settled himself on his haunches at Louis Moore’s side. That 
gentleman drew the dog’s big, black-muzzled head on to his knee, [and] patted him” (425). 
Both Shirley and Louis compete for the dog’s attention, with the passage cataloguing the 
actions and movements that indicate their pleas and the dog’s favorable response to Louis. 
Also listed are a series of body parts, human and animal, male and female, highlighting the 
importance of embodied messages and the role that Tartar plays as communicative 
intermediary between the humans that are neither talking to nor touching each other.	Later, 
when Tartar had returned to Shirley’s feet, “the audacious tutor by one word and gesture 
fascinated him again. He pricked up his ears at the word; he started erect at the gesture, and 
came, with head lovingly depressed, to receive the expected caress” (425). Upon drawing 
Tartar away from Shirley, Louis “smiled one little smile to himself” and later “the 
significant smile again rippled across Moore’s quiet face” (425). The telling look of 
pleasure indicates not simply joy in Tartar’s company, but pride in his power to receive 
Tartar’s physical expression of approval and, by extension, in the ability to get the attention 
of and a response out of Shirley.	
Tartar’s prescient endorsement of Louis and the eventual match between the tutor 
and the heiress shows that the animal takes over an important position in heteronormative 
	 	 36 
domestic structures. The dual roles of husband and father are closely intertwined with the 
presumed power of the parent to sanction the match between his daughter and would-be 
son-in-law, plus the respect in which the husband’s authority replaces that originally held 
by the father. In this sense, the biological father is the “first father,” while the husband 
becomes the “second father.” Shirley teems with multiple men vying for the position of 
father figure and/or husband to the parentless heiress. Uncle Sympson, the curates, Robert 
and Louis Moore, Sam Wynne, and Sir Philip Nunnely all with more or less success 
connive to assert some control over Shirley, eager to replace the original male authority in 
Shirley’s life, her deceased father, who is absent from the text. In her look at Pride and 
Prejudice (1813) as case study, Susan Fraiman argues that the typically idealized Elizabeth 
Bennet and Mr Darcy marriage plot actually demonstrates the heroine’s “humiliation” at 
the hands of Mr Bennet and his replacement, Mr Darcy, with this pair of men acting as a 
“double father” (169). 24  For Fraiman, the “enhanced status—as husband, hero, and 
authorial figure” is the site of patriarchal power in the text (182). While readers today are 
still apt to embrace the marriage between the protofeminist Elizabeth Bennet and Mr 
Darcy, the coming together of Shirley and Louis Moore is far more troubling to our modern 
sensibility.25 Yet the idea of first and second father remains important to our understanding 
of the fatherless Shirley, as does the question of authorial power held over women. 
Accepting this model, Louis clearly becomes the second father, while Uncle Sympson 
	
24 All references to Fraiman in this chapter point to “The Humiliation of Elizabeth Bennett.” 
25 Rosengarten explains that “many readers find [Shirley’s] romance with her former tutor Louis 
Moore…unconvincing and disappointing” (177).  
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strives and fails to fill the role of first father. In his role as guard dog, I contend that Tartar 
acts as a stand-in for the first father.26 
In the absence of Shirley’s biological father, Sympson sees himself as playing the 
role of first father and desperately wants to transfer the authority over the difficult Shirley 
to her husband, though not without insuring a gain in family fortune and respectability: “he 
anxiously desired to have his niece married; to make for her a suitable match; give her in 
charge to a proper husband, and wash his hands of her forever” (439). Even as Shirley asks, 
“[w]hat shadow of power have you over me?” (441), Sympson believes that his previous 
position as guardian to Shirley as ward, a relationship in which Sympson holds that Shirley 
was treated like his “own daughter” and he behaved as “a parent to her” (514, 515), 
necessitates that she follows his guidance now. Sympson is marriage-obsessed, but he 
wants to see Shirley settled rather than happy, with his approval driven by the pecuniary 
benefits and prestige of the match, not by the compatibility of his niece and her potential 
life partner. He is meddlesome, he presumes his ability to promote or deny matches, and is 
infuriated when he finds that Shirley will not conform to his wishes. The temperamental 
uncle is prone to threats (of leaving Fieldhead, for example) and insults (Shirley is 
“unwomanly” and uses “[u]nladylike language” in refusing to obey his commands [441]). 
Despite his insistence on his paternalistic power, he is as ineffectual in his insistence upon 
his will as Mrs Bennet trying to get Elizabeth to marry Mr Collins. Shirley insists to 
Sympson that she will love the man that she marries: “Before I marry, I am resolved to 
esteem — to admire — to love” (441). Therefore, Shirley refuses to follow Sympson’s 
	
26  Flegel argues that a pet in courtship texts serve as placeholder for “seemingly inevitable 
offspring” and “prepares the woman for and is eventually displaced by the male husband” (Pets 
and Domesticity in Victorian Literature and Culture 22). 
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plots that have nothing to do with amorous feelings or respect for character: “Now, sir, do 
you begin to be aware that it is useless to scheme for me?...My heart, my conscience shall 
dispose of my hand — they only” (522). But in making her own choice, she follows the 
democratic leanings of her dog, who cares for the affection and kindness of certain 
individuals, with his affinity based on neither money nor rank. Though Tartar does not 
force his hand (or paw) in the way that Sympson (or Mrs Bennet) does, he holds sway (like 
Mr Bennet in Fraiman’s reading of Pride and Prejudice). Tartar does move the plot, but he 
does not simply exist as a narrative device in order to do so.     
Tartar acts as Shirley’s first father in his guarding of her, his sanction of Louis, and 
his violent rejection of the curates; Louis becomes the second father, allowing him 
authority over the heroine who previously stood out for her seeming autonomy. Louis’s 
power is animalized through his class positioning27 and his capacity for violence. However, 
this revision yet upholding of traditional heteronormative structures is at least somewhat 
mitigated by Shirley’s power to choose who has power over her: the dog and the lower-
class tutor, rather than the uncle and the aristocratic Sir Philip Nunnely, whom Sympson 
wants her to marry. In a sense, ceding authority to these lowly—in terms of class and 
species—creatures is even more rebellious a statement than claiming complete 
independence from masculine domination. Shirley has the strength to bestow dominance 
over herself and a willingness to grant it where it traditionally does not belong. Louis 
influences both Shirley and the story itself. In one of the more interesting narrative moves 
of the novel, Brontë in “Written in the Schoolroom” deviates from the third person 
narration of the majority of the novel in order to give Louis the authorial voice, as this 	
27 See Dodwell, “Thinking with Dogs in Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley”; MacDonald, “Class and 
Gender in the Brontë Novels” 496. 
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chapter comes from Louis’s journal account of his amorous coming together with Shirley.28 
Here, Louis, like Fraiman’s account of Darcy, “takes back his story and, in a play for 
literary hegemony (to be author and critic both), tells us how to read him” (Fraiman 176). 
First, Louis manipulates language to make Shirley jealous with his discussion of “some 
young, penniless, friendless orphan girl,” who he would educate and then marry: “I should 
like to be first tutor and then husband. I would teach her my language, my habits, and my 
principles, and then I would reward her with my love” (178, 179). By misleading Shirley 
with his words, driving her to express her love for him, and commanding the story for this 
section of the novel, Louis’s influence over the text mirrors the capacity Shirley grants him 
to rule over her. His linguistic power is impressive considering his class position, but not 
surprising given the necessary profession that his social status leads him to. In “Written in 
the Schoolroom,” Tartar for the most part exits the text in body, replaced by Louis as 
Shirley’s faithful pseudo-canine companion, authoritative and ferocious.  
Animalized Lovers 
The fierce independence of the novel’s titular character on the one hand and her 
climactic taming in the culmination of the marriage plot on the other may feel incongruent 
to contemporary readers disappointed to see the heroine put herself under the control of 
her husband, taking up a position at his feet. But attention to human-animal relationships 
and the animal analogies employed at the novel’s close not only complicate but offer a 
means of salvaging Shirley’s autonomy in ways that scholars often avoid by focusing on 
Caroline.29 While Deborah Lutz describes Shirley without hesitation as Brontë’s “most 
	
28 For a reading of Louis as author of the proposal, see Wilt, “Shirley: Reflections on Marrying 
Moores” 11-12. 
29 For an exception to this tendency in the scholarship, see MacDonald, 497.	
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feminist novel” (57), she does so by pointing to Caroline as the focal point of the text’s 
feminist politics, and Herbert Rosengarten likewise sees Caroline as the novel’s central 
female: “Though Shirley is the titular heroine of the novel, Caroline is in every sense its 
heart. She is a character whose mind we see into most frequently, and who we identify 
most closely with the author’s own viewpoint” (176). Caroline does certainly best align 
with what scholars and biographers know of Charlotte’s behavioral tendencies and her 
understandings of gender and animal welfare politics. Rosengarten’s description of 
Caroline’s “empathy with the downtrodden, along with her love of nature and animals” 
(176) echoes Elizabeth Gaskell’s assertion that “[t]he helplessness of an animal was its 
passport to Charlotte’s heart” (Life 213-214). Yet Gaskell’s description goes on to highlight 
another Brontë sister’s philosophy of human-animal relationships, as Gaskell juxtaposes 
Charlotte with Emily by explaining that “the fierce, wild, intractability of its nature was 
what recommended it to Emily” (214). Whereas Caroline serves as a model for a certain 
kind of human-animal sympathy in the novel, Shirley embraces a love for a domestic 
animal without divorcing him from his animality. Tartar retains some “fierce, wild, 
intractab[le]” qualities, while remaining in the domestic space and for the most part acting 
as a loving domestic companion.   
Both Caroline and her eventual husband, Robert, demonstrate a gentle benevolence 
in their encounters with animals that follows a paternalistic stewardship model. Robert’s 
kindness to Caroline’s animals is in fitting with the tradition of Brontë criticism that holds 
that men who are kind to animals are the ones who are suitable marriage partners, while 
those who are cruel (the majority of men) are unacceptable as potential spouses.30 Malone, 	
30 For examples of these readings, see Berg, “‘Hapless Dependents’: Women and Animals in Anne 
Brontë’s Agnes Grey”; Kreilkamp, Minor Creatures; Newman, “Animals in Agnes Grey.” 
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whom we saw pick a fight with Tartar aided by his “cane or whip” (261), also misguidedly 
attempts to “make himself sociable and charming…by pinching the ears of an aged black 
cat, which usually shared with Miss Helstone’s feet the accommodation of her footstool” 
(164). Brontë contrasts Malone’s playfully violent incursion on the elderly cat’s space with 
Moore’s more affectionate touch: “he elicited no vivacities from the cat, did nothing to it, 
indeed, beyond occasionally coaxing it from the stool to his knee, and there letting it purr, 
climb to his shoulder and rub its head against his cheek” (164). Later in the novel, animals 
provide Caroline a way to vaguely talk about an unnamed “somebody,” clearly Robert, and 
articulate the love and physical draw that innocent beings feel for him to Shirley: “We have 
a black cat and an old dog at the rectory. I know somebody to whose knee that black cat 
loves to climb; against whose shoulder and cheek it likes to purr. The old dog always comes 
out of his kennel and wags his tail, and whines affectionately when somebody passes” 
(205). The later passage spoken by Caroline is a close repetition of that which came earlier 
in the voice of the third person narrator, particularly with the same body parts that the cat 
touches being emphasized—the knee, shoulder, and cheek. Whereas Robert “lets” and 
“coaxes” in the former excerpt, the animals are at least somewhat more agentive in the 
subsequent telling in that they are driven by their own wants. Caroline continues to describe 
how Robert “quietly strokes the cat, and lets her sit while he conveniently can, and when 
he must disturb her by rising, he puts her softly down, and never flings her from him 
roughly; he always whistles to the dog and gives him a caress” (206). Throughout, not 
being needlessly violent is what makes Robert exceptional and attractive, whereas 
Malone’s masculine cruelty seems to be the rule. The text creates a triangulation where 
Robert touches the pets that Caroline also touches, so the animals serve as mediating 
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figures between the would-be lovers. Caroline seems to be feeling vicariously through 
Robert touching the pets; given that the human couple cannot “rub against,” “stroke,” or 
“caress” each other in this way, this human-animal physicality is the closest approximation 
of the erotic encounters with Robert that Caroline desires. Much the same, Caroline cannot 
speak her longing for Robert to the world, so this thinly coded expression to Shirley is the 
best outlet Caroline has. Ultimately, the rectory is filled with Caroline’s menagerie of 
pets—the old cat and dog, “the new tortoise-shell kitten basking on the kitchen hearth” and 
“the canary-bird, which a sudden blaze from the fire had startled on its perch” (562), and 
even the “little mouse familiar to her chamber” for whom Caroline lays out food and whom 
she refuses to kill (244-245)—but their characters are not further drawn through naming or 
the detailing of character traits. None of these creatures have the individuality or narrative 
significance allowed to Tartar. Just as Robert and Caroline’s courtship is more saccharine 
than Louis’s eventual command of Shirley, the pets that move their marriage plot do not 
have the same philosophical heft as Tartar’s protective violence.  
The novel reverberates with images of humans and other animals occupying a spot 
at the feet of another, a placement that has hierarchical implications of a superior leader of 
the pack lording over his or her inferior. This language appears in reference to offerings 
and sacrifices placed at the feet of gods (492, 496, 576), the fear of England falling “under 
the feet of France” (310), and Caroline experiencing a brief moment of frustration with the 
old maids, as “[m]entally, she trod them under foot” (177). Shirley rests “at the foot of 
some tree of friendly umbrage” (219), suggesting a Romantic communion with and respect 
for powerful nature. Animals, especially Tartar, frequently rest at the feet of their human 
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companions.31 On initial observation, one might be troubled by the power imbalance of 
this human-animal arrangement, but, rather than merely revealing human dominion over 
the lower animals, I argue that it indicates specific animals exerting their judgment to defer 
to specific humans as leaders of the pack. Tartar will not sit at Sweeting’s or Donne’s feet, 
but he will choose to take a place at the feet of Louis or Shirley, with these particular 
humans acting as alpha dogs regardless of their supposedly subordinate gender or class 
positioning. Humans, too, sit at the feet of others, again showing surprising values in who 
is being looked up to: frequently alpha females educating younger women. Jessie Yorke 
sits at the lowly Caroline’s feet and talks “first about religion, and then about politics” 
(384), and Shirley’s “study is the rug, her seat a foot-stool, or perhaps only the carpet at 
Mrs Pryor’s feet” (365). This imagery also comes to the fore during confessions of love. 
Robert, finally candid in his love, confesses a repeated urge to fall at Caroline’s feet (569). 
Shirley, though “cool and lofty,” ends up “kneeling before the fire, almost at his [Louis’s] 
feet” (435). Louis claims that he would fall at the feet of a poor woman (578) and 
temporarily occupies a spot at Shirley’s feet (593), while Shirley maintains her pleasure in 
her submissive position once engaged to be married to Louis: “I am glad I know my keeper, 
and am used to him…only at his feet will I repose” (586). Finally, Louis is not attracted to 
Shirley for her wealth, as many others are, but rather he loves her in spite of her money 
and because of her shortcomings: “I worship her perfections; but it is her faults, or at least 
her foibles, that bring her near to me…these faults are the steps by which I mount to 
ascendancy over her. If she rose a trimmed, artificial mound, without inequality, what 
vantage would she offer the foot” (488). Louis reveres Shirley as a goddess, but he loves 
	
31 See 164, 427 for general references. For Tartar specifically, see 262, 338-339, 424-425, and 427. 
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being able to climb like a conquering hero over her weaknesses in order to rule over her, a 
problematically violent image to be sure. 
Dominance and submission are a crucial part of the rhetoric that Shirley and those 
around her use to describe her marriage prospects. She holds that Sir Philip “is very amiable 
— very excellent — truly estimable,” but she will not marry him because he will not 
“master” her: “He is…not my master…I will accept no hand which cannot hold me in 
check” (516). The term “master” (and “mistress”) returns again and again throughout the 
text: Robert Moore is master to the millworkers, Shirley is mistress to Tarter, Louis is 
master to Henry (and previously Shirley) as tutor, Shirley wants a husband who will master 
her. But Shirley is careful to clarify that she wants her master to be just, not tyrannical. “A 
tyrant would not hold me for a day — not for an hour,” Shirley insists, “I would rebel — 
break from him — defy him” (516). Shirley cannot destroy the marriage laws and will not 
defy the gendered expectations that give her husband supreme power over her, but in 
marrying Louis she plays the system. She chooses a master whose power over her she will 
enjoy and will make her a better person: “Did I not say I prefer a master? One in whose 
presence I shall feel obliged and disposed to be good…A man whose approbation can 
reward—whose displeasure punish me. A man I shall feel it impossible not to love, and 
very possible to fear” (516). All of this language has a masochistically erotic valence, as 
Shirley will love the man who controls, punishes, and causes her to fear. Using words that 
apply to a number of oppressive relationships—master and slave, master and working class 
employees, master and pet—to outline the marriage union is troubling, even if this 
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terminology also applies to the gender hierarchy.32 But just as Shirley at times dominates 
over Tartar, yet maintains a friendly companion relationship, Shirley expects to enjoy 
Louis’s company in spite of his control: “be my master where I am faulty; be my friend 
always!” (587). Shirley selects a man she sees as worthy of being leader of the pack. 
 Brontë uses animals in conventional ways when she coopts them for metaphorical 
use and to critique idly violent masculinity throughout Shirley—this standard employment 
makes the appearance of animals like Tartar, driven by his own powerful choice and 
driving the plot in the process, and figurative animals put in service of advocating 
animalized humanity stand out even more in contrast. Mr Sweeting is “the lady’s pet” (9), 
while Shirley treats her disabled nephew, Henry, as a “pet” as well (423, 432). The text 
also animalizes Henry’s disability, describing him as a “young, lame, half-grown lion” 
(575). Shirley talks of Robert Moore having “all a bulldog’s tenacity” (222), being “a hard 
dog” (242) and “a puppy…a quiet, serious, sensible, judicious, ambitious puppy” (248). 
The trope of the caged bird appears when Shirley calls Caroline a “[m]ateless, solitary 
bird!” (220) and Caroline experiences a rare encounter with Robert “as an imprisoned bird 
would the admission of sunshine to its cage” (355).33 Another simile occurs when Caroline 
follows Mrs Pryor “like a dog” once she figures out that she is her mother (418). The 
archetypical cruel boys abusing animals, so common to the Brontës and nineteenth-century 
texts more generally (including Frances Power Cobbe’s The Confessions of a Lost Dog), 
appears with Caroline’s assessment of male children: “Generally, I don’t like school-boys: 
	
32 See John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women 154-155. Mill compares the English wife to a 
slave, misguidedly underestimating the horrors of slavery, but also highlighting certain 
intersections between differing forms of oppression. 
33 For reference to bird imagery in other Brontë novels, see Anderson and Lawrence, “‘No net 
ensnares me’: Bird Imagery and the Dynamics of Dominance and Submission in Charlotte Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre.” 
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I have a great horror of them. They seem to me like little ruffians, who take an unnatural 
delight in killing and tormenting birds, and insects, and kittens, and whatever is weaker 
than themselves” (431). As young Martin Yorke plays games with Caroline’s feelings 
regarding the injured Robert Moore, the narrator explains that “it reminded him of what he 
had once felt when he had heard a blackbird lamenting for her nestlings, which [his brother] 
Matthew had crushed with a stone” (535).34 In spite of these typical uses of figurative 
animal language and human violence against animals as indicative of flawed male 
characters, the associations of Louis and Shirley with untamed animals towards the novel’s 
conclusion do more complex work of presenting a philosophy of embracing animalized 
human violence. 
The linguistic associations of Shirley and Louis with wild and domestic animals 
celebrates the type of judicious violence and affection that Tartar displays as the novel’s 
model pet. Even as Louis becomes her “master,” Shirley is described as “[s]ister of the 
spotted, bright, quick, fiery leopard” (581), “leopardess” (585, 586), and “[p]antheress!—
beautiful forest-born!—Wily, tameless, peerless nature!” (591). Louis masters Shirley, 
though she remains a wild and violent animal who needs to be mastered and can still resist 
this domination. She refuses other potential marriage partners because she knows that she 
could and would resist their power over her. While Shirley is a big cat, Louis is compared 
to none other than Tartar,35 a likeness that he embraces largely based on the touch that it 
allows him:  
	
34 In Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, young John Reed “twisted the necks of the pigeons, killed the 
little pea-chicks, [and] set the dogs at the sheep” (17). Tom Bloomfield in Anne Brontë’s Agnes 
Grey is similarly cruel to birds. 	35	See 582, 586, 587 for repetitions of this comparison. 
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Tartar is your dear companion…In the winter evenings, Tartar lies at your feet: you 
suffer him to rest his head on your perfumed lap; you let him couch on the borders 
of your satin raiment: his rough hide is familiar with the contact of your hand: I 
once saw you kiss him on that snow-white beauty-spot which stars his broad 
forehead. It is dangerous to say I am like Tartar: it suggests to me a claim to be 
treated like Tartar. (582-583) 
Louis’s detailed memory shows his persistent watching of dog and woman and the 
significance of all of these physical encounters that make a lasting impression on him. 
While the passage highlights Shirley’s artificial human femininity, with her dress and her 
scent, Louis is alarmingly bestial. The focus on various parts of the body and touch 
highlights the erotics of the lady and the dog who has access to her lap, a trope which I will 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter. At the same time Louis fills the role of the jealous 
male observer who wants to share similar proximity to the woman.36 The tutor has the 
ability to gaze at Shirley and her pet, but that is not enough for him, as he, too, wants to 
touch the woman. Paradoxically, it is good for Louis to be thought of as a dog, while he 
presents this as precarious for Shirley because it grants him full access to her body. Both 
Shirley the leopardess and Louis the Tartar-like dog are animals to be tamed, but the big 
cat is the more predatory animal; both are capable of violence, but, if Tartar and the 
leopardess were to fight, the dog could be mauled to death. The text can be dependent on 
animals as metaphors and similes here rather than on actual animals themselves because 
	
36 See Brown, “Immoderate Love: The Lady and the Lapdog,” particularly her discussion of the 
male onlooker, 73; Braunschneider, “The Lady and the Lapdog: Mixed Ethnicity in Constantinople, 
Fashionable Pets in Britain”; Garber, Dog Love; Tague, Animal Companions. 
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the animals of the text—Phoebe and especially Tartar—have actively done their work to 
bring the preferred couple together.  
With Louis taking Tartar’s place as intimate companion, he also begins to play the 
role of violent guard dog. Protecting a house was a task that Louis had familiarity with, 
having once guarded Symspon-Grove against burglars when Sympson was too fearful to 
do so: “in his wretched cowardice he [Sympson] would have given a vain alarm, without 
daring to offer defense: I had then been obliged to protect his family and his abode by 
mastering himself — and I had succeeded” (590). Louis had to control his superior’s body, 
again “mastering,” in order to attack the bodies of the intruders and risk his physical safety 
in the process. When Sympson resists Shirley’s ability to make her choice of spouses, Louis 
explains that he will now corporeally and metaphorically “stand between Miss Keeldar and 
all annoyance” (589), as Tartar had done with Donne before. Upon hearing Sympson’s 
chastisement of her and Louis’s engagement, Shirley “turned white as death: she shook all 
over: she lost her strength” (590). Again her emotion is physicalized, again she needs a 
guard dog to come to her defense, which Louis does. Ultimately, Louis becomes an 
animalized man expressing Shirley’s wishes and protecting her body and intentions, even 
if it takes physical violence in order to do so: “I left her, made one bound across the room 
— that Mr Sympson vanished through the door as if shot from a cannon — I also 
vanished…I held Sympson before me crushed into a chair, and my hand was on his cravat: 
his eyes rolled in his head — I was strangling him, I think” (590). Leaving the swooning 
Shirley, Louis prioritizes a more efficacious violence that moves the plot, comparable to 
Tartar attacking Donne, Phoebe biting Shirley, and Shirley intervening in a dogfight. Both 
Louis and Sympson are rendered as inhuman in this instance, with Louis becoming a 
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leaping animal and Sympson an inanimate object (a canon ball) projected by external 
stimulus. The qualification of the “I think” shows the blurriness of Louis’s memory, 
suggesting that he is driven by violent instinct rather than deep consciousness of the 
situation, a Cartesian animal rather than human.37 Louis as automata, physically acting out 
Shirley’s feelings, is less agentive than Tartar following his own whims and impressions. 
Throughout the novel, Brontë mocks the ineptitude of would-be dominant men, 
particularly by highlighting their dealings in ridiculous words rather than violent deeds. 
We last hear of Mr Donne in “The Winding-Up” begging like a dog for support of his 
projects (595-596). This big talk matched by an inability to physically engage most 
memorably manifests itself in “Mr Donne’s Exodus,” as Donne locks himself into a room 
and later escapes the estate in order to evade Tartar’s ferocity. Much like Donne against 
Tartar’s violence, Sympson, in spite of his lofty and impassioned commands, is helpless 
when faced with Shirley’s decision and her fiancé’s fierceness, as Louis clarifies: “it was 
a fury incapable of producing a deed: that man, properly handled, must ever remain 
impotent…I know his wife, over whom he tyrannizes in trifles, guides him in matters of 
importance” (591). Shirley loathes Sympson’s “dictatorship” (519) and his “petty tyranny” 
(521), but though he strives for a rule that is total, he never succeeds in bringing his unjust 
wishes to fruition. The novel condemns Sympson and Donne for their anger without 
violence or justice, and Sam Wynne and Malone for their mediated violence without 
justice. Brontë, therefore, implies that to be a suitable master one must at times be violent 
and must always be just. While Tartar is in part excised from the latter part of the novel, 
the first father replaced by the paternalistic control of Louis, Tartar performs a final feat of 
	
37 For his description of animals as automata, see Descartes, “Animals are Machines.” 
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passive physical violence that undermines Sympson’s power as guardian and seemingly 
endorses Louis’s role as the dog’s successor. After the conflict between uncle and niece 
regarding her failure to marry in accordance with his wishes, Sympson leaves the 
conference in a huff: “Tartar lay outside across the mat—Mr Symson almost fell over him: 
in the climax of his exasperation he hurled an oath at the dog, and a coarse epithet at his 
mistress” (522). Tartar and his human companion are grouped together as recipients of 
Sympson’s futile rage expressed in empty words. 
Although Tartar is less predominant in the closing of the marriage plot than he was 
in “Mr Donne’s Exodus,” he is not entirely gone at the close of the novel as Flegel would 
have it: “He or she may bring the romantic couple together and may serve as a place-holder 
and/or symbol of the children they will have, but once that function is complete, the pet no 
longer has a place in the narrative” (46). The novel makes it clear that the first family does 
not entirely disappear with the weddings that create the second family. Much like 
Caroline’s mother giving her blessing for her daughter’s wedding, but not completely 
removed from this new family as she plans on living with Robert and his bride after the 
nuptials, Tartar in his paternal role seems to support the union between Shirley and Louis, 
and one can safely presume that he will stay in the home with the couple after their 
marriage. Louis is the primary guard dog for Shirley at the end of the novel, but Tartar is 
still there to trip people up as needed. Therefore, bringing the animal into the marriage plot, 
even as heteronormative systems are upheld, shows how Victorian writers such as Brontë 
used the power of the pet to rethink these domestic structures, as well as the ways that 
violent animality is useful therein. Rowlandson’s animals on attack and Brontë’s Tartar 
	 	 51 
reveal that not all men who want access to the woman’s home and body are welcome, and 
sometimes it takes the growl and the bite of the guard dog to keep would-be suitors out. 
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CHAPTER 2. HUMAN-ANIMAL “MOTHER-LOVE” IN NOVELS BY OLIVE 
SCHREINER 
When Olive Schreiner died in 1920 her original interment in Cape Town was brief, 
as her husband, Samuel Cronwright-Schreiner, was later able to perform a second burial 
that followed his unorthodox wife’s wishes. The reason for this additional inhumation was 
that Schreiner “had left precise instructions about her final resting place, which was to be 
with her baby and favourite dog on the top of a mountain in the Karoo” (Burdett, Olive 
Schreiner 86). The only child that Schreiner did not lose to miscarriage died in early 
infancy in 1895, and the grieving mother required that “its small coffin [be] moved from 
place to place” with her as she followed her nomadic writer’s existence (68). These stories 
highlight the importance of maternity in Schreiner’s life, and feminist and ecocritical 
scholars have long mined motherhood’s prevalence in Schreiner’s works, particularly The 
Story of an African Farm (1883) and From Man to Man, or Perhaps Only… (begun in the 
1870s, but published posthumously in 1926).38 However, if we attend to the dog as well as 
the baby in this odd burial, we see the striking significance of pet keeping for Schreiner.39 
Given “the liminal status of pets, on the border between human and animal” (Tague, 
Animal Companions 10), and “the pet’s status as a creature that is somewhere between the 	
38  For analyses of motherhood in Schreiner, see Burdett, “Capturing the Ideal” 167; Haskill, 
“Valuable Failure as a Unifying Principle in The Story of an African Farm” 83, 92-95; Monsman, 
Olive Schreiner’s Fiction 72. For ecofeminist readings of maternal landscapes, see Stott, “Scaping 
the Body: Of Cannibal Mothers and Colonial Landscapes” 158-164; Hetherington, “Feminism, 
Freethought, and the Sexual Subject in Colonial New Woman Fiction” 53.  
39 Since my publication of this chapter in article form, Ivan Kreilkamp released Minor Creatures 
with a chapter on “‘Infinite Compassion’: Nonhuman Life in Schreiner’s The Story of an African 
Farm.” Kreilkamp’s chapter compellingly outlines the way that Schreiner’s “visceral, tactile 
sensation” allows for a unique form of sympathy (170) and presents Lyndall’s relationship with the 
dog, Doss, after her child’s death as a new mother-child relationship (172). However, I want to 
push further than Kreilkamp on the intersectional feminist implications for how this can rework 
Victorian family structures in a way that is useful for both women and animals. All references to 
Kreilkamp in this chapter point to Minor Creatures.	
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wild animal and the human” (Fudge 8), an examination of pet keeping in Schreiner’s works 
provides a means of intervention in both the ecological and especially the domestic 
philosophies that Schreiner’s writings interrogate and innovate. Schreiner’s pets bring 
nature into the home and, in doing so, these animals represent the potential for reformation 
therein.  
If, as Rebecca Stott has argued, Schreiner both idealizes and criticizes motherhood 
in her works (159), her pairing of motherhood with the human-pet bond in her writings and 
in her burial plans suggests that pet keeping offers a form of maternity without the 
problematic gendered restrictions. Both African Farm and From Man to Man present 
alternate adoption and motherhood models with pets as children and, at times, parents to 
their human companions. These unique relationships display the potential for significant 
reciprocal agency between woman and animal. Moreover, Schreiner takes pet parents 
seriously through her reworking of two earlier tropes—that of the lady and the lapdog, and 
that of kittens as doll-like children—which originated in the 1700s and remained prevalent 
throughout the 1800s. Crucial to these interspecies bonds is intimate familial touch between 
human and animal. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick explains the importance of touch due to the 
“particular intimacy [that] seems to subsist between textures and emotions,” and the use of 
the word “touching” to refer both to embodied encounters and something that demands an 
emotional response (17). By emphasizing affective, physical maternal bonds between 
women and their pets, Schreiner presents human-pet relationships defined by touch as a 
crucial part of her feminist project in that they provide intimacy apart from marriage and 
forms of maternity outside of the socially mandated wifehood and motherhood that 
Schreiner so resents for stripping women of their autonomy. 
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Motherhood in general is a point of philosophical interest for Schreiner’s New 
Woman heroines, which makes their interspecies maternal relationships all the more 
meaningful. Lyndall asserts that “[w]e bear the world, and we make it” (African Farm 160) 
and Rebekah advocates “mother-love” (From Man to Man). For Rebekah, “mother-love” 
is a sacramental act of nurturing emblematized by the physical relationship of 
breastfeeding: “love becomes incarnate in the female mammal feeding her young from her 
breast—this is my blood which I give for the life of the world—through all nature, life and 
growth and evolution are possible only because of mother-love” (185). Schreiner’s 
disavowal of Christianity in favor of theism is well-documented, but she utilizes the idea 
of the New Testament Eucharist, with its emphasis on the embodied connection between 
Christ and his followers as a sign of divine love, to elevate motherhood essentially to a new 
religion that utilizes and emends evolutionary thought. Rebekah puts “mother-love” in 
clear opposition to Spencerian evolutionary theory with its emphasis on survival of the 
fittest: “Man individually and as a race is possible on earth only because…love and the 
guardianship of the strong over the weak has existed. You may almost estimate the height 
of development in the creature by the amount of mother-love and care he stands for” (185-
186; emphasis added). Not only is “mother-love” ethically sound, but this ethics of 
maternal care also aids in survival.40  
“Mother-love” has the power to transcend traditional conceptualizations of 
motherhood, which were dependent on the constraints of heteronormative relationships and 
gender ideology. Carolyn Burdett emphasizes the gender-neutrality of Schreiner’s 	
40 Kreilkamp coins the term “meirkat ethics” to describe Rebekah’s and Schreiner’s understanding 
of caring for the weak in relationship to evolution. This reading, while persuasive, elides the term 
that Schreiner herself gave to this phenomenon (“mother-love”) and the importance of gender and 
motherhood to her ethical vision. See 151-154. 
	 	 55 
“mother-love,” which, as the Schreiner’s pronoun “he” above suggests, “is not a 
naturalistic or essentialist category. It is a self-conscious counter-ethics which can (and 
must) be a quality of men as much as women. Thus her examples of ‘mother-love’ are 
males of different animal species” (Olive Schreiner 57).41 Similarly for Ruth Knechtel, the 
animistic unity present in From Man to Man comes from the shared ability for humans and 
other animals to benefit from these nurturing mother-child relationships, as Knechtel 
explains that “Rebekah associates the successful future of an infant (animal or human) 
[with] the materiality of the mother’s body and nurturing” (270). Both Knechtel and 
Burdett note the significance of the fact that “mother-love” appears as a feature common 
between species, as well as between genders in Schreiner’s work—animals care for their 
young just as humans care for their offspring. However, “mother-love” can also operate as 
a cross-species alliance. In Schreiner’s novels, humans mother pets, and pets occasionally 
mother humans. These examples of “mother-love” enrich our understanding of maternity 
in Schreiner’s novels, while at the same time demonstrating how deeply Schreiner was 
thinking about the issues central to animal studies today: concerns surrounding the extent 
to which animals can maintain agency given the dominance and affection42 in human-pet 
relationships. 
The New Woman and the Lapdog: Feminist Revisions of the Lady and the Lapdog Trope 
Schreiner revises the frequently analyzed trope of “the lady and the lapdog” as part 
of her representation of the New Woman, inventing in the process the figure that I will call 
“the New Woman and the Lapdog.” In Schreiner’s new schema, the New Woman’s relation 
	
41  For a consideration of “mother-love” in relationship to the colonial context, see Burdett, 
“Capturing the Ideal” 178. 
42 See Tuan, Dominance and Affection: the Making of Pets. 
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to her lapdog becomes a means of bridging the gap between nature and culture, de-
objectifying both the woman and animal, and providing a valuable form of maternity. 
Theresa Braunschneider, Laura Brown, Ingrid Tague,43 and others have discussed the 
ascendency of the lapdog as a cultural phenomenon in the 1700s and 1800s. In the popular 
imagination and artistic representations there were three common features of the lady and 
the lapdog trope, which are as follows: first, the dog is a fashionable possession; next, the 
dog operates as a site of sexual rebellion, as a single woman could have a dog in her bed 
and hold him to her body; and, finally, the dog is a recipient of maternal affection. Much 
of the power of this trope is in its “blurring of the human-animal hierarchy” (Seeber 79). 
The sexual positioning of the pet dog has been particularly important in scholarship on the 
lapdog. Brown, for instance, focuses on the criticism of “[t]he ‘bedfellow’ setting, the 
female breast, the tenderness, the caress, the embrace, the kiss, the tear, and, in short, the 
heights of love” in the woman-dog relationships, and how this leads to “hierarchy reversal” 
(85). In Dog Love, Marjorie Garber explores the potential for bestiality in human-pet 
relationships: “The most frequently described canine sexual partners…were not mastiffs 
but lapdogs, whose name described not only their privileged place, but sometimes their 
imagined function” (143). Donna Haraway, probing the meaning of “companion species,” 
explains that “to companion is ‘to consort, to keep company,’ with sexual and generative 
connotations always ready to erupt” (When Species Meet 17). While scholars often hone in 
on the sexual, my focus here is on the maternal nurturing that occurs across species in 
Schreiner’s writings and that receives little attention, as well as on the incredible flexibility 
in these bonds. This malleability means that the roles of mother and child can alternate 
	
43 In Animal Companions.	
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between the woman and the animal, but also that, at times, there can be a shift from the 
parent-child touch to the erotic (and potentially sexual), or even that these interactions can 
operate as both erotic and maternal simultaneously, especially with dogs lying upon the 
human companion’s breasts.44	
Although lapdogs—particularly the sexualized kind—operated as “a staple trope of 
the antifemale verse satire of the first half of the eighteenth century” (Brown 71), even 
proto-feminist writers of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century criticized the lapdog. Their 
preoccupation here was not with deviant sexuality, but rather with ladies mothering their 
lapdogs, placing excessive attention on the trivial pet while ignoring their “real” human 
children. In Mansfield Park (1814), Jane Austen satirizes the novel’s lazy and indifferent 
mother: “To the education of her daughters, Lady Bertram paid not the smallest attention. 
She had not time for such cares. She was a woman who spent her days…thinking more of 
her pug than her children, but very indulgent to the latter, when it did not put herself to 
inconvenience” (16). 45  While Austen renders her critique in a playful tone, Mary 
Wollstonecraft,46 Emily Brontë, and Frances Power Cobbe present the bad mother as no 
laughing matter. Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) chastises 	
44 For the distinction between “erotic” and “sexual,” see Marcus, Between Women 113-114. While 
Schreiner’s maternal human-pet relationships can be read as having underlying sexual implications, 
these bonds are undeniably erotic. For a discussion of how familial relationships, including sibling 
and parent-child, can slip into the erotic, see Corbett, Family Likeness 113 and 151.  
45 In “Slipping the Leash: Lady Bertram’s Lapdog,” Palmer argues that Austen is critiquing the 
“caninizing” of Lady Bertram. For analysis of the relationship between Lady Bertram’s faulty 
maternity and her lack of compassion for Fanny and the Antiguan slaves, as well as a discussion of 
the pug’s subjectivity, see Seeber, Jane Austen and Animals 79-80.	
46 With her English mother, German father, and access to a relatively extensive library while living 
in Cradock as a young adult, Schreiner was clearly engaged with European culture, and had plenty 
of opportunity to come in contact with this trope in various literary texts. It is certain that she had 
exposure to Wollstonecraft’s writings on the subject, as she worked on an ultimately unfinished 
introduction to A Vindication of the Rights of Woman during the late 1880s. Whether Schreiner 
intended Doss and Lyndall as a direct response to the lady and the lapdog trope or not, the 
connections provide a valuable context for reading her works.    
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“she who takes her dogs to bed, and nurses them with a parade of sensibility, [but] when 
sick, will suffer her babes to grow up crooked in a nursery” (316), highlighting the 
proximity of the pet as the mother’s bedfellow, as well as the moral and physical deficiency 
(crookedness) resulting for the child with such poor upbringing. The author represents this 
behavior as offensive, especially as it blurs the lines between human and animal: “I have 
been desired to observe the pretty tricks of a lap-dog, that my perverse fate forced me to 
travel with. Is it surprising that such a tasteless being should rather caress this dog than her 
children?” (309). At first it seems that the “tasteless being” of the second sentence refers 
to the lower animal—the “lap-dog” of the previous sentence—but the latter sentence 
actually illustrates that the despised subject is the woman who would care for the dog over 
her children. In a piece from Emily Brontë’s 1842 Brussels devoirs titled “Le Chat” (“The 
Cat”), she derides the mother who thoughtlessly allows her boy child to kill butterflies and 
herself is cruel to animals through excessive attention: “some genteel lady, who has 
murdered half a dozen lapdogs out of pure affection” (qtd. in Davies 249). Roughly thirty 
years after this homework paper by Brontë, Cobbe closely echoes the concern of her 
predecessors: “The lady of fashion, who leaves her child unvisited for days in its nursery, 
under the care of menials, while she watches the feeding of her spaniel, and covers it with 
caresses, is about as odious a specimen of humanity as may easily be found” (“Claims of 
Brutes” 284). Much like Wollstonecraft’s “tasteless being,” Cobbe’s “odious specimen of 
humanity” shows a perception that faulty relationships with animals seriously degrade the 
human companion. For these writers, it is particularly the misplaced physical encounter 
with the animal that marks the failure of maternal duty; both the passages by Wollstonecraft 
and Cobbe stress the “caress” as the point of severest blame, while for Brontë “pure 
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affection” is linked with “murder.” These writings offer several points of critique: first, 
they explicitly communicate disdain for women who forfeit the potentially politically 
powerful role of motherhood (especially as Wollstonecraft sees the position) in order to 
play house with dogs; they suggest resentment of how these women feed stereotypes of 
trivial femininity, so counterproductive to the advocacy of rights for women; and, finally, 
they reveal unease about the ability of humans to maintain their high position on the species 
hierarchy when they participate in too intimate interactions with the lower animals. In her 
reworking of the trope, however, Schreiner refuses to trivialize the woman or express 
anxiety concerning the blurred lines between human and animal. In African Farm, the 
mothered dog is not a source of ridicule, but instead a site of serious feminist politics as it 
allows an alternative to typical gendered domestic relationships in which to meaningfully 
enact of “mother-love.”   
Schreiner draws on but also diverges from the tradition of the lady and the lapdog, 
especially with regard to the type of woman and dog represented in African Farm, deviating 
from the typical class and breed expectations. Despite Lyndall’s middle-class education 
and potential for playing her hand well on the marriage market, her status as an orphan 
with no inheritance makes Lyndall’s social positioning precarious. Just as Lyndall, by 
choice and by birth, is far from the frivolously fashionable lady, Doss is not the standard 
lapdog. Described by Gregory as “a horrid snappish little cur” (173), Doss shares with 
Lyndall a parentless state and an uncertain heritage. The word “cur” has negative 
connotations of low breeding and irritably violent behavior, and is used popularly as 
synonymous with “mongrel,” or mixed breed dog. In the end, Doss’s rough animality 
mimics Lyndall’s own deviation from the ideals of femininity she learned at her finishing 
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school. Schreiner plays on the trope of the lady and the lapdog, defined usually by extreme 
upper class femininity, and hardens it through Lyndall’s working class companion of 
choice and Lyndall herself. Nonetheless, Doss’s growling judgment (like Tartar before 
him) of Gregory and Bonaparte throughout African Farm, as well as the affectionate 
physical proximity which he maintains in relationship to Lyndall, make him a fairly close 
descendent of his lap adorning animal cousins.  
We can best see the depth of Doss and Lyndall’s bond, one of Lyndall’s most 
sustained relationships throughout the novel, in a scene that takes place after the death of 
Lyndall’s baby and in which she is dying herself.47 In her final illness, Lyndall holds Doss 
to her as she would a nursing infant: “Gregory lifted him [Doss] and laid him at her side. 
She made Gregory turn open the bosom of her night-dress that the dog might put his black 
muzzle between her breasts. She crossed her arm over him. Gregory left them lying there 
together” (243).48 Although this passage takes place six months after the death of Lyndall’s 
newborn, the narrative structure makes sure that her short-lived motherhood is at the fore 
throughout the entirety of the chapter in which the selection appears. The excerpt where 	
47 In “Figures in a Ground: An Ecofeminist Study of Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African 
Farm,” McMurry holds that Doss can be grouped with “the ‘Kaffirs,’ the Hottentots, the various 
animals that inhabit the plain (perhaps demeaning to be lumped together here but appropriate since 
they are also so lumped in the text)” as a throwaway character (436). However, Doss first appears 
in the narrative roughly one page before Bonaparte Blenkins (who McMurry considers more 
important) and remains a significant player for a long while after Bonaparte’s exit (excepting 
Bonaparte’s brief reappearance in Tant’ Sannie’s anecdote). For Kreilkamp, “Doss is an important 
(semi-)character throughout the novel,” and the relationship between Lyndall and Doss only 
becomes truly dynamic in the scene I discuss in this paragraph (171-172). I argue that we see an 
important physical relationship between Lyndall and Doss and character development for the dog 
earlier in the novel that culminates in the scene discussed here. 
48 The emphasis on Doss’s “black muzzle” is evocative of racial difference. By focusing on an 
intimate maternal encounter with a black animal, Schreiner shows an urge to care that goes beyond 
species and possibly racial boundaries, a move that has the potential to complicate our 
understandings of Schreiner’s sometimes conservative racial politics. For analyses of Schreiner and 
race, see Chrisman, “Empire, ‘Race’ and Feminism at the Fin de Siècle: the Work of George 
Egerton and Olive Schreiner,” as well as Bristow, “Introduction” xxvii.     
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Lyndall holds Doss as a child comes between the single paragraph where Gregory learns 
from the landlady about both the birth and death of the baby, the graveside vigil in the rain 
that likely led to Lyndall’s illness (237), and the passage where Lyndall herself describes 
the tiny creature’s demise (246). Thus, though a relatively long chronological span has 
passed, memory of the baby lingers in the text, just as it is clear that it remains on Lyndall’s 
mind. This narrative preoccupation with motherhood, as well as the highly evocative nature 
of Lyndall holding the dog to her naked breast, associates Doss with the child. At the same 
time, Doss, while figured as a child, is also in the position to give care, choosing to stay by 
Lyndall’s side when she is alone, very ill, and grieving. Therefore, both simultaneously 
participate in the bestowal of “mother-love.” The intimacy of this scene as an erotic and 
maternal bodily encounter is heightened by the fact that it is the only such physical 
connection directly rendered, given that the sexual experience(s) with the father of 
Lyndall’s child and the birth of the baby itself all take place outside of the main narrative. 
The relationships that Lyndall puts at a distance so that she can try to maintain control over 
her own life are the same ones that Schreiner represents peripherally within the narrative. 
The physical and emotional bond with Doss can remain at the fore because it is more 
socially sanctioned than the lover out of wedlock and illegitimate child; more importantly, 
it is a meaningful relationship for Lyndall that does not force her to conform to societal 
expectations. 
Throughout the novel, many of Lyndall’s musings about the restricted position of 
women center on motherhood, and Doss helps to resolve what turns out to be her 
ambivalence towards the subject. On the one hand, motherhood is a site of tremendous 
empowerment for women, as it gives women the platform from which to shape “great” 
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men: “The souls of little children…keep for ever the shadow that first falls on them, and 
that is the mother’s or at best a woman’s. There was never a great man who had not a great 
mother” (160). However, while “[t]here are other women glad of such work,” Lyndall 
brashly asserts that gaining power through this means does not appeal to her: “I am not in 
so great a hurry to put my neck beneath any man’s foot; and I do not so greatly admire the 
crying of babies” (150). Here Lyndall only imagines the relationship with human children 
as one marked by sound, the presumably excessive vocalizations of the crying infant, rather 
than touch. Moreover, Lyndall associates marriage with extreme violence and lack of 
control, but also emphasizes her power to refuse or at least delay such a union. The 
repetition of the “so great[ly]” and the negative language in the pair of litotes make for a 
striking understatement about these family structures that are of paramount importance in 
Lyndall’s experience. With this violence and control in mind, Lyndall holds that “[i]t must 
be a terrible thing to bring a human being into the world” (176), and insists that the 
glorification of motherhood is actually nothing more than a patriarchal deception: “They 
say, ‘God sends the little babies.’ Of all the dastardly revolting lies men tell to suit 
themselves, I hate that most” (176). On top of ignoring that women might want other 
opportunities for themselves and the physical challenges of being pregnant and giving birth 
in the nineteenth century, the understanding that reproduction is in divine hands is 
significant given the lack of control that women had over their own reproductive choices.  
Further, this language also strips men of their role in the process, and thus culpability if a 
child is born outside of wedlock. Much of Lyndall’s resistance to motherhood stems from 
the fact that it provides only a limited and prescriptive authority, one that forces women to 
act in one location of duty. Lyndall highlights that not all women were meant for the 
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domestic roles of wifehood and motherhood, but that they are expected to fill those roles 
all the same, while the men who could perform those duties perfectly are also out of place: 
“‘There,’ said Lyndall, ‘goes a true woman [Gregory]—one born for the sphere that some 
women have to fill without being born for it” (164). In spite of the seeming essentialism of 
Lyndall’s assertion that there is “a true woman” (which she most certainly is not), as well 
as presumably a true man (which Gregory most certainly is not), Lyndall calls attention to 
gender fluidity and ambiguity as there are any number of individuals who do not fit within 
these strict binarized categories. Still, Lyndall finds a maternal role through pet keeping 
that is not dependent on a strictly constructed gender binary and does not just serve 
masculine needs. 
Lyndall’s provocative statements about motherhood come when she is pregnant 
herself, and they express her unwillingness to fully accept the gendered consequences of 
her sexual choice. The prenatal ambivalence that Lyndall articulates later extends to her 
perception of her own baby. The chapter that details her illness and Gregory’s nursing of 
her persistently focuses on Lyndall’s maternity—Lyndall’s loss of her child drives her to 
her death, and she keeps a sympathetic view of the infant in her thoughts towards the close 
of her own life. Yet, even as she grieves for the dead infant, Lyndall insists that she did not 
look at it with a mother’s love: “I did not love it…I did not care for it; but it was so little” 
(246). Although she claims that she “did not care for it,” however, her mental and emotional 
focus on the child shows that she cares in some way. The emphasis on the baby’s size, 
using the same adjective (“little”) often used to describe Doss, makes clear the desire to 
protect the small and frail. A contradiction exists here between the supposedly natural 
maternal affection that Lyndall possesses—the desire to nurture the creature that “was so 
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little”—and her knowledge that this type of love can serve to enchain her and other women 
who deviate from traditional domestic expectations. Doss as a diminutive dog offers an 
outlet for maternal care that does not require Lyndall to cede her independence.  
Explicit is Lyndall and Doss’s shared connection, implicit is their shared 
oppression—experiences of domination which make them both needful recipients of 
“mother-love.” Lyndall’s relationship to Doss is described in terms of love, touch, and 
mutual autonomy and subjection, as we can see at the moment when Doss remains at the 
physical and rhetorical forefront as Lyndall negotiates a potential marriage with Gregory. 
The pregnant Lyndall tells Gregory that she will marry him to legitimate her child: “If you 
are willing to give me your name within three weeks’ time, I am willing to marry you…I 
want nothing more than your name” (199). When Gregory questions the seriousness of 
Lyndall’s proposal, Doss’s interaction with Lyndall helps her explain her understanding of 
love in relationships: 
She held out her fingers for Doss to lick.—‘Do you see this dog? He licks my hand 
because I love him; and I allow him to. Where I do not love I do not allow it. I 
believe you love me; I too could love so, that to lie under the foot of the thing I 
loved would be more heaven than to lie in the breast of another…’(199)  
Here Lyndall maintains that her “love” for Doss is the reason that she permits his licking, 
the physical manifestation of what is assumed to be his love. Lyndall insists upon her power 
to allow or disallow physical connection based on whether or not she loves, so she resists 
the idea that Gregory might anticipate the physical consummation that would be considered 
his right and her obligation if she marries him in a society that does not acknowledge the 
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existence of marital rape.49 Lyndall’s anxiety in this quote comes from her understanding 
that the love and physical connection she permits can leave her open to violent encounters. 
This speech about lying “under the foot of the thing I loved” is clarified when Lyndall later 
talks to her unnamed lover who has impregnated her, for here we find that she is willing to 
marry Gregory precisely because she does not love him and he is “[a] fool,” while she 
cannot marry her lover because she does care for him and thus to marry him would grant 
him too much power over her (203). In Lyndall’s mind and against common expectations, 
the rise of companionate marriage only gives men greater means of controlling women. If 
a woman loves her husband, she will willingly give him his way, just as Charlotte Brontë’s 
character Shirley willingly gives Louis his way, as we saw in the last chapter, and Madame 
Fosco gives the Count his way and Marian fears doing the same, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter on Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White. In this chapter from The Story of 
an African Farm, Doss anxiously intuits the peril to Lyndall’s freedom, as he helplessly 
looks at the couple “not at all sure that she was not being retained in her present position 
against her will” (208). Importantly, Doss is physically present in both of these scenes, 
with Gregory and the mystery man, respectively, and Lyndall includes him in the 
conversation about relational power dynamics and touch. Doss provides Lyndall with a 
means of expressing love that does not require being under anyone’s foot, and lying 
literally under a paw of one who has a similar lack of power is less violent than lying “under 
the foot of” a man.  
The connection between Doss and Lyndall enables not only Lyndall but also Doss 
to choose a companion, preference expressed through embodied communication. As 	
49 For a description of 1880s movements to criminalize marital rape and grant women greater sexual 
autonomy, see Phegley, Courtship and Marriage in Victorian England 166.	
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discussed in the introduction and previous chapter, embodied communication is defined by 
Barbara Smuts as “a critical part of our inter-species language” and is a way that “meaning 
is mutually constituted, literally embodied” between individuals through “gaze, motion, 
gesture, and touch” (“Embodied Communication” 137). There are three philosophical 
conversation scenes between Waldo and Lyndall in the latter part of the book, perhaps best 
described as feminist lectures occasionally punctuated by Waldo’s brief responses, all of 
which conclude with Doss following “close to her side” (162) and the pair leaving Waldo 
behind alone, though he is supposedly Doss’s “master.” With Lyndall’s arrival in one of 
these passages, “Doss, who had lain at his master’s side, climbed over the bench, and curled 
himself up in her lap. She drew her skirt up over him” (185). Switching companions, Doss 
decides to occupy an intimate position upon Lyndall’s lap, and Lyndall encourages this 
togetherness as she even shares clothing with him and wraps them both under the same 
skirt. At one point Doss is presented with a consciousness of choice and a valuing of the 
two individuals between whom he must divide his allegiance, as he stands with “a look of 
painful uncertainty depicted on his small countenance,” but he ultimately selects Lyndall: 
“Should he stay with his master or go?...he put down the little paw and went. Waldo 
watched them both in at the door and then walked away alone. He was satisfied that at least 
his dog was with her” (166). Here the narrator briefly interrupts the rendering of Doss’s 
physical responses to give voice to his thoughts in free indirect discourse, translating the 
cognition behind the similarly articulate embodied communication. Doss’s most 
meaningful embodied communication with Lyndall utilizes touch, while he speaks to 
Waldo through motion, as when he puts his paw down and walks away. Although the 
narrator uses the term “master” and the possessive “his dog,” the language of patriarchal 
	 	 67 
ownership has little meaning and value for Waldo here, as the text highlights Doss’s own 
agency and self-possession. Waldo does not force Doss to stay with him, and his marginal 
contentment in the fact that Doss appreciates and keeps company with someone Waldo 
himself values does not dictate the terms of Doss’s choice. The implicit sadness of Waldo 
remaining isolated as his two closest companions go off with each other underlines the 
magnitude of the fact that Waldo allows Doss to adopt his companion of choice. Smuts 
notes that with embodied communication often “meaning arises from the pattern of 
interaction rather than the behaviors shown by each individual” (“Embodied 
Communication” 140). No individual, human or animal, dictates to the other(s) so much 
as it is the combination of their collective physical interactions that communicates a 
message. Touch, proximity, and distance are ways for all members of the triad to 
communicate their desires and provide a language to be interpreted. Waldo accepts Lyndall 
and Doss’s communication, which leaves Waldo alone.   
Doss communicates his devotion to Lyndall, an exertion of will that complicates, 
even if it does not entirely dismantle, the idea of the objectified lapdog. Doss’s preference 
for Lyndall leads Waldo to give the dog to her: “I want you to have him. He loves you 
better than he loves me” (191). Because Waldo allows Lyndall “to have” Doss, this is a 
bestowal of a good, but it is one in which Waldo is not completely active and Doss is not 
completely passive and objectified—Waldo leaves Doss to do what he presumes the dog 
wants based on the embodied communication in which Doss actively participates. The dog 
has some agency, or, rather, Waldo tries to give the dog some agency. Further, after 
receiving Doss as a gift, Lyndall never claims ownership or dominion over Doss—she 
terms herself neither “owner” nor “mistress” (when the terms “mistress” or “master” 
	 	 68 
appear in the text they are always in the voice of the narrator, not spoken by Lyndall or 
Waldo). Schreiner revises the lady and the lapdog trope here to show human-animal co-
agency rather than objectification. Lyndall and Waldo permit Doss to be an actor in the 
same way that they want to be in control of their own lives. Thus, Doss’s unique position 
reflects both the lack of autonomy and the desired power of decision so valued by the 
feminist heroine and, less explicitly, by her working class friend. 
By expressing his preference for Lyndall by his affective, physical presence at her 
side, Doss can be read either as a child choosing which parent he prefers or as a parental 
figure performing the act of adoption. Doss also shows the ability for a male and nonhuman 
figure to demonstrate the tenets of Rebekah’s “mother-love,” which she defines as the 
“love and the guardianship of the strong over the weak” (185). In exploring Schreiner’s 
other examples of mothering children and an infantilized maternal figure, Ruth Parkin 
Gounelas notes the flexibility of the interconnected roles: “mother and daughter merge, 
and alternate roles” (107). A similar merger and alternation happens between Doss and 
Lyndall, both parentless and in need of care at various points in the text, as they each at 
different times operate as the strong mother or the weak child. When Doss’s paw is injured 
by a stone, for instance, Lyndall tenderly comforts him in his pain: “Lyndall was softly 
touching the little sore foot as she read, and Doss, to show he liked it, licked her hand” 
(198). Doss’s reciprocal ability to offer care is most evident when Lyndall cannot leave her 
boarding house bed as she dies, for Doss chooses to keep a compassionate vigil reminiscent 
of a mother nursing a sick child, but also of a child caring for a dying parent. This flexible 
embodied relationship between human and pet allows for both mutual agency and the 
reciprocal benefit of receiving care. 
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Baby-Bertie Plays House with Kittens in From Man to Man 
 
Just as the lapdog in African Farm opens up new possibilities for worthy recipients 
of familial affection, kittens in From Man to Man grant the “fallen” Baby-Bertie an unusual 
outlet for her maternal nature. In this novel, the naïve Baby-Bertie loses her virginity to her 
tutor (who then promptly leaves South Africa for his native England), and she eventually 
runs away to England herself to become kept by a man referred to only as “the Jew”50 once 
her sexual experience becomes the topic of gossip. When Bertie’s dejection makes her a 
less than amiable companion for the Bloomsbury lover, he (though not an appreciator of 
animals) brings pets into his home upon learning that “[t]he—lady likes—cats!” (362). As 
he had hoped, Bertie’s relationship with the trio of kittens initially revives her: “he was 
astonished to hear shouts of laughter through the closed door…he was astonished at the 
door to see Bertie kneeling on all fours in her white nightdress” (363). The third person 
narrator renders the scene through the gaze of the Bloomsbury lover, and his mere presence 
as an interloping observer to an extent disrupts the intimacy of the passage. Still, Bertie, 
whose depression and ennui have made her a lifeless figure for most of her time in England, 
becomes a living animal with the arrival of the kittens, participating in rollicking play down 
“on all fours” with the cats. Her scanty attire of only a nightdress—the same article of 
clothing that Lyndall wears as she caresses Doss—heightens the erotic intimacy of the 
	
50 Schreiner’s novel refuses to name major characters who are of an older generation than Bertie 
and Rebekah. This namelessness and the corresponding limits in character development create a 
certain haziness around these other figures, including Bertie and Rebekah’s father and their “little 
mother.” The choice highlights the perceived alienation in suffering for the protagonists of the 
novel and the limited lines of communication between generations. The one-dimensionality in the 
characterization of “the Jew,” who is older than Bertie as a “man of about fifty” (306), also 
participates in this effect. Throughout this section, I will refer to Bertie’s first lover, Percy Lawrie, 
as “the tutor,” “the Jew” as her “Bloomsbury lover” (based on his area of residence in London), 
and the latter’s cousin as “the cousin.” 
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scene because it is a garment not to be seen by many; simultaneously, however, the 
whiteness of the outfit symbolizes the purity of the encounter as Bertie “looked like a tall 
white angel” (363). The kittens take advantage of having their human companion placed 
for easy access upon the floor: “one [of the kittens] was mounted already on her back, and 
one, as she knelt with her head down, was leaping up at the long loose braid of curly hair 
hanging over her shoulder and trying to hold it with his paws.” This play is marked by 
mutually reciprocated physical connection, as not only do the kittens climb on Bertie’s 
back and attach themselves to her hair, but Bertie also holds “them all three in her arms, 
pressing her face against each” (363). In this initial meeting of human and animals, Bertie 
and the kittens prefigure Donna Haraway’s call for “play, and not just pity” (When Species 
Meet 22).51 Doting maternal nurturing follows this game-like playful proximity when 
Bertie takes the kittens to sleep with her, and “put their basket close by her bed on a chair 
where she could put out her hand and feel them” (364). Much as a newborn baby might be 
kept in a bassinet near its mother, the kittens remain close to Bertie as she sleeps. Bertie 
and her kittens demonstrate a powerful alternative domestic entity, in that their bonds are 
based on mutual touch, play, and care, rather than masculine domination. Bertie nurtures 
the kittens as members of her family, and in giving her something to care for they at the 
same time work to ease her suffering.   
Even though the mutual touch-based play of the original interaction between Bertie 
and the kittens has an organic nature, Bertie has trouble conceptualizing family units 
without a domestic space defined by quantifiable and cost-laden objects. Once Bertie 
	
51 Haraway here is chastising Derrida in his work “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)” for thinking about the cat, pitying the cat, but not engaging in respectful and 
communicative play with the cat. 
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ceases to play with the kittens, “she wanted at once to go and buy some things for them” 
(363-364), and the text catalogues her purchases: a cradle, food bowls, bells and ribbons 
for them to wear, pillows and mattresses, linens, and handkerchiefs with which to clean 
their faces (364-365). Bertie’s relationship with her kittens begins to mirror her union with 
the Bloomsbury lover, particularly his extensive buying for her, and merges into a more 
hierarchical association based on age, with Bertie taking upon herself the role of doting 
mother to the doll-like, infantilized kittens. Looking adoringly at the cradle of kittens with 
their names, Holly, Lakespur, and Rose, embroidered on their blankets, Bertie declares 
them to be “just like little babies, eh?” (364). 52  The kittens are simultaneously 
anthropomorphized and objectified, increasingly associated with the consumer objects that 
Bertie lavishes on them. Ruth Parkin Gounelas explains that during her time in London 
Bertie becomes increasingly objectified as well: “The description is mostly external; 
objects and physical gestures (or, rather, the lack of them) confine and define her…she is 
reduced to the status of the objects that surround her” (111-112). Parkin Gounelas does not 
include the kittens in the list of defining things, but the pets occupy an important position 
between living beings (nature) and consumer items (culture); Bertie’s physical interactions 
with them, as companions filled with life, have a healing potential through the nurturing 
play that brings contentment to humans and pets, but when they are treated as things they 
become just another sign of her own forlorn place among goods with which she feels 
limited relationship. That Bertie’s relationship to her animal companions at times deviates 
	
52 Haraway repeatedly returns to the problematic treatment of animals as “furry children,” a move 
that “demeans dogs [and other animals] and children” (Companion Species Manifesto 37), arguing 
that “it is essential for a human being to understand that one’s partner is an adult (or puppy) member 
of another species, with his or her own exacting species interests and individual quirks, and not a 
furry child” (When Species Meet 213). 
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from the shared autonomy and the flexibility of roles that are present between Lyndall and 
Doss reflects Bertie’s own lack of freedom and damaged sense of self-worth. The 
disempowered Bertie takes authority where she can find it and mimics the domestic 
structures that she had previously accepted blindly. Though it was her infantilization that 
left her unprepared to respond when her tutor sexually coerced her, Bertie always accepted 
and enjoyed being babied on her family’s farm in South Africa, and felt deeply the loss 
when she was stripped of the innocent positioning and no longer felt able to live up to the 
ideal of being “Baby-Bertie.” Her treatment of the cats is a similar kind of comfortable 
domination. While physical interaction of a sort persists between Bertie and the cats, this 
connection cannot continually ward off Bertie’s malaise, as her human companion had 
hoped: “Sometimes she stroked them as they climbed about her, and she let them sleep in 
her lap; but she spent her day silently dozing before the fire or watching it with wide open 
eyes” (365). Reduced to a thing herself, Bertie cannot completely care for the objects, 
including the cats, around her, or perhaps she even becomes burdened by seeing the 
parallels between her kittens’ lots and her own. 
Schreiner’s depiction of Bertie and her cats borrows from common eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century understandings of both cats and their human companions as 
independent and sexualized creatures. Cats were frequently considered the associates of 
women who resented domestic confinement, as Harriet Ritvo explains that “cats might be 
favored by those who sneakingly sympathized with their desire for independence: they 
were sometimes considered ‘the chosen allies of womankind’” (Animal Estate 23). 
Moreover, cats were seen as the embodiment of untamed and deviant sexuality, being 
“accustomed to making their own [mating] decisions and implementing them out of sight 
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of their owners” (Ritvo, Animal Estate 116).53 Bertie’s character might seem to fit the 
stereotypical associations of cats with autonomous and sexualized womanhood: she is a 
“fallen” woman who deviates from standard domestic expectations for wifehood and 
motherhood. She moves from man to man and home to home throughout the novel, and 
the Bloomsbury lover rewards her for their alliance with fashionable material goods which 
she also bestows upon her kittens. But while cats were frequently associated with powerful 
women in control of their own choices and using that agency to deviate from social norms, 
in Bertie’s case the kittens just reflect her pathetic helplessness. Bertie’s sexual 
(mis)adventures originate in the deceit of others, not in her own volition, and her accidental 
disgrace is accompanied by the sterility often associated with prostitutes and other “fallen” 
women, making the mothering of cats her only maternal option.54 Counter to common 
expectations for the “fallen” woman and her anti-domestic animal companions, Bertie 
longs to return to the traditional home and family from which she was banished, while 
Lyndall strives to a certain extent to upset domestic order and yet is linked with the most 
domestic of animals, the dog. 
Mothering animals does not translate into a life of fulfillment for Bertie, largely 
because those human-animal relationships cannot exist outside of corrupt societal 
arrangements. Ultimately, the masculinized violence that impacts Bertie—including sexual 
and other physical force—comes to be filtered through the cats and enacted on their bodies 
as well. This antagonism is most evident both when the Bloomsbury lover’s cousin tries to 
seduce Bertie and in the lover’s response to the attempted (and what he believes is a 
	
53 Darwin refers to these feline sexual tendencies as “their nocturnal rambling habits” (50). See also 
Tague, Animal Companions 98. 
54 For a history of the association of prostitutes with sterility, see Laqueur, Making Sex 230-232.  
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consummated) coupling. A nefarious housekeeper deceives the cousin into believing that 
his advances towards Bertie are welcome, and, gaining access to Bertie alone in the 
drawing room, he uses the cats as a means of expediting physical closeness to Bertie: “He 
put out his hand with its white fingers and nails and stroked the kittens sleeping in her 
lap…her left hand rested near the kittens; she moved it a little that his hand might not come 
near hers as he touched them” (372). The passage highlights the clean fingers of a man who 
does not have to dirty his hands in his work, while the attention to his nails indicate a 
potential for sharp violence in the encounter. His stroking of the kittens is a sexually 
suggestive bad touch, one that repulses Bertie. He follows this unwanted caress of the cats 
and nearness to their human companion by voicing his desire for a similar intimacy with 
Bertie: “‘It’s a shame all your affections should be showered on them,’ he said softly. ‘One 
envies them their resting place’” (372). The cousin’s language mimics the tone of the 
ubiquitous “male onlooker” in anti-lapdog poetry, all of which “express the envy that the 
potential human partner feels for the nonhuman being positioned at the lady’s breast or 
between her thighs” (Brown 73). That the cousin describes Bertie’s union with the cats as 
shameful indicates the belief that the animals are serving as replacement figures, standing 
in for a lover, and the overt sexual implications of the cousin’s insistence that he would 
like to occupy “their resting place” need hardly be described. When the cousin extends his 
unwanted touch to Bertie herself by kissing her arm, she hastily stands and “the kittens fell 
at her feet” (372). The invasively sexual male encounter, with the unsolicited touch on both 
female and feline bodies, causes a fierce severance of the consensual bond between Bertie 
and her kittens, an abusive pattern that is only heightened when the jealous Bloomsbury 
lover walks in on his cousin with the supposedly unfaithful Bertie.  
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The Bloomsbury lover’s response to finding Bertie and his cousin in the drawing 
room together exemplifies the conflation of violence towards women and that directed at 
pets so often noted in feminist writings about animals. In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol 
J. Adams argues that both meat eating and violence against women are examples of the 
patriarchal culture that privileges violent masculinity, noting not just the ways these 
cruelties are alike but also how they intersect: “Batterers, rapists, serial killers, and child 
sexual abusers have victimized animals…Batterers harm or kill a companion animal as a 
warning to their partners that she could be next” (71). Anticipating55 Adams roughly a 
century before she was writing, Frances Power Cobbe’s “Wife-Torture in England” 
describes forms of violence against women that use animals as a weapon or harm an animal 
as a way to emotionally damage and threaten the wife; examples include a man having a 
bulldog attack a woman (311) or killing a wife’s pet parrot (304). Schreiner’s novel shows 
a similar tendency to emotionally brutalize women through physical violence against an 
animal body. Upon his discovery of her apparent infidelity, Bertie’s lover forcefully 
removes her from his home, with her kittens adding greater chaos to an already intense 
scene: “He had drawn her out of the door on to the landing; the kittens, suddenly awakened 
from their sleep, ran after her, climbing on to her train…He pressed her down step by step; 
the kittens, trying to hold to her dress, slipped down the stairs behind her” (373, 374). In 
this passage, Schreiner contrasts the Bloomsbury lover’s control with the helplessness of 
Bertie and the kittens. Even the physical placement of bodies in the scene points to the 
	
55 While Cobbe certainly foresees Adams’s argument, she does use animals as metaphor within the 
piece, making them into an “absent referent,” through which, as Adams notes, violent and 
oppressive practices against one group are rhetorically exploited to highlight the suffering of 
another group. As an example, Cobbe describes a woman who was “turned…round before the fire 
‘like a piece of beef’” (312), while the treatment of animals that makes that description pertinent is 
not a cause for concern within the text.   
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power differential, with the Bloomsbury lover using the upper hand to push them lower 
and lower. Schreiner positions his violent contact against the kittens desperately trying to 
maintain any possible connection with their human companion. The cats are represented 
as clasping onto Bertie’s clothing, which is as close as they can get to her body itself, as 
they are distanced from her by male force. Bertie’s dismissal from the house creates a stark 
contrast to the passage	 in which Bertie is first introduced to the kittens. In the latter 
selection, the man dominates the happenings, while in the earlier scene Bertie and the 
animals drive the action by following their own playful desires, and the kittens are depicted 
as touching actual parts of her body—her back, her hair, and her face—not just her clothing. 
Bertie later finds that the Bloomsbury lover has killed her cats after kicking her out of the 
house (376), a punishment which forever makes impossible the return of the eroticized 
maternal encounter. While Schreiner acknowledges that anyone can serve as a mother 
regardless of their gender identity, the Bloomsbury lover’s destruction of the kittens is a 
prime example of the physical violence against animals that only men enact in Schreiner’s 
novels. Mothering pets lets neither Bertie nor her animal companions escape from 
victimization at the hands of the cruel world and the corrupt male touch that dominates 
there. 	
Anti-Sentimentalism and the Qualified Optimism of Embodied Grief 
 
Neither African Farm nor From Man to Man allows the mothering of animals to 
last. Cronwright-Schreiner revealed that his wife had planned to follow the cruel killing of 
the kittens with Bertie’s own death at the end of From Man to Man, sexual violence having 
led her to prostitution and disease. Between the death of Bertie’s kittens and demise of 
Bertie and Lyndall themselves, the conclusions of Schreiner’s novels are bleak, with the 
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melodramatic death tolls and the foreclosure of political success that these ends seem to 
represent. Still, there has long been a feminist debate about whether or not to read 
Schreiner’s writings as politically pessimistic. Laurence Lerner argues that “the deep 
pessimism of” African Farm demonstrates Schreiner’s “awareness that this made it a poor 
advertisement for a programme for changing the world” (75), while Kate Flint counters 
that “African Farm is not a pessimistic book; nor was it perceived as such” (244).56 Flint’s 
justification for this assertion is that the novel finds optimism in the profound unity in 
suffering “which is shared—across genders, across (albeit implicitly) races, across 
continents” (244). Though many have described this commonly experienced pain across 
difference as a defining feature of Schreiner’s works, only a few, including Ruth Knechtel 
and Ivan Kreilkamp, point to this as a bond that exists between species. However, I hold 
that looking at pet keeping relationships reveals that there is not just common suffering 
between species, but actual physical connection between individuals across species, most 
evident in the embodied communication between humans and animals in life and the shared 
embodied response to death. In her exploration of these human-pet bonds, Schreiner offers 
a qualified optimism, hopeful in the ability to see alternate family structures, despite the 
patriarchal, imperialist, and speciesist context.  
The paucity of emotional animal grief in African Farm demonstrates the avant-
garde nature of Schreiner’s thinking about animals, as well as her pragmatic view of the 
family structures that she was interrogating. Philip Armstrong argues that sentimentality in 
works by long nineteenth-century writers ran counter to both nineteenth-century scientific 	
56 See also Burdett, “Capturing the Ideal” 170 and Olive Schreiner and the Progress of Feminism 
30-32, 39; Haskill; Kreilkamp 169 and 173-174; Lefew, “Schopenhauerian Pessimism in Olive 
Schreiner’s A Story of an African Farm”; Monsman 50; Tigges, “A Feminist Mirage of the New 
Life: Utopian Elements in The Story of an African Farm” 202. 
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discourse and modernism: “on one hand the Enlightenment, Romantic and Victorian 
genealogy of inter-species sympathy, and on the other, the distaste for sentimentalism 
which is shared by both science and modernism” (220). Armstrong ultimately positions a 
contemporary literary tendency of “anti-sentimentalism,” which he defines in terms of 
embodied (often companion) relationships, anti-intellectual understandings (experience 
over thought), limited emotion, and a bond that is solidified by common mortality, against 
what he thinks of as the earlier sentimental discourse (220-225).57 Schreiner anticipates 
this anti-sentimental register in a way that permits meaningful connection between humans 
and animals, without relying on either distancing sympathy 58  or anthropomorphized 
animals given a familiar language of grief. Schreiner’s anti-sentimentalism is most evident 
in her treatment of interspecies death and mourning. The human-pet relationships that have 
been crucial for their emotional and physical connection receive little narrative detail after 
death, as Schreiner gives considerably more space to the indifferent chickens’ exploration 
of the dead Waldo’s body in the concluding pages of the novel than to Doss’s response to 
Lyndall’s death. While alternate relationships between humans and pets can be imagined, 
they are not sustained and terminate with limited indulgence in the closure of grief, pointing 
perhaps to a cynicism about the ability of these companion bonds centered on relational 
touch to survive, thrive, and be well-respected within the social structures that Schreiner 
saw around her. Although she does not hold that African Farm puts forward a mother-child 
relationship other than the one that Lyndall shares with her deceased infant, Ruth 
Knechtel’s argument that Lyndall “is incapable of survival as a mother” because of her 
	
57 Armstrong uses contemporary South African writer J.M. Coetzee as the best proponent of anti-
sentimental discourse in action.  
58 Kreilkamp touches on Schreiner’s deviation from distancing sympathy in Minor Creatures 170. 
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culture’s failure to accept deviations from traditional womanhood (266) is important to 
consider given that Lyndall’s maternal bond with Doss is also cut short by death. I add that 
the novel is not simply critiquing the limited roles available to women, but also the limited 
family structures that are accepted as legitimate. Even though Schreiner’s alternate families 
are not sustained within her novels, her exploration of these maternal possibilities, however 
abbreviated, remain a significant visualization of other modes of relating.   
Schreiner acknowledges cross-species similarities in her treatment of death, 
particularly in her emphasis on brief but powerful embodied grief in both humans and 
animals. Doss is the only one with Lyndall as she dies. Attempting to travel, “in the closed 
wagon, she lay with the dog at her feet” (251), and a couple of paragraphs later Doss’s 
location within the scene is reiterated, with a note that he “slept on his mistress’s feet” 
(252). The shift has taken place from “at her feet” to “on [her] feet,” emphasizing that he 
is not just close to her but touching and covering her as she lies dying. The next paragraph 
again emphasizes Doss, as “the dog lay on her feet; but he shivered; it seemed as though a 
coldness struck up to him from his resting-place” (252). The coldness that makes Doss 
shake indicates the lack of comfort in the traveling arrangements, but, more importantly, it 
also highlights the nearness of death and the lifeless corpse that Lyndall is soon to become. 
Furthermore, Doss’s shiver gestures toward an embodied understanding of and emotional 
reaction to Lyndall’s mortality. This communicative movement is the last we hear of him 
as Lyndall dies during the final page of the chapter that follows, though it is safe to assume 
that his presence upon her feet does not change. Coming from an animal who does not 
share a verbal language with humans, the physical shiver speaks volumes both as a form 
of embodied communication with Lyndall and as an expression of his grief about her. 
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Echoing this final encounter between Doss and Lyndall, “Bertie shiver[s]” when she learns 
that her cats are killed, before she moves onto her own material concerns as a woman who 
is homeless, moneyless, and supposedly without the honor needed to entitle her to a 
welcome by friends and family (376). The domestic ideal had been shattered before in the 
relationship between Bertie and her kittens, as the animals slipped into a similar object 
status to that of their human companion, yet even without extended mourning these parallel 
shivers also suggest a powerfully expressive physicality. They represent the dying 
language of an embodied communication that requires two participants to thrive, as Smuts 
describes: “For the heart to truly share another’s being, it must be an embodied heart, 
prepared to encounter directly the embodied heart of another” (“Reflections” 108). Here it 
is also helpful to remember that “to shiver” is not just defined as the bodily response to 
elemental or emotional stimuli (OED n. 3 and v. 2), but it also means “[t]o break or split 
into small fragments or splinters” and “[t]o fly in pieces; to split” (v. 1). In both novels, the 
language evokes the breaking up of the meaningful embodied communication and alternate 
family structures of the mother-child bonds.    
Returning to Schreiner’s response to her dog’s death and the reunion with her 
favorite companion animal at her burial can aid in the reading of Doss’s and Bertie’s grief, 
especially for the reason that it reiterates the limits of verbal responses to the human-animal 
maternal bond. In The Life of Olive Schreiner (1924), Cronwright-Schreiner tells of the 
death of Nita, Schreiner’s dog, after being run over by a cab: “When I came in Olive was 
in a most distressing agony of grief, and her dear little pet’s body lay dead on her bed. 
Olive cut some of Nita’s white hair off to keep and then had the little body enclosed in a 
leaden coffin. The two, inseparable in life, now lie together with our baby” (342). 
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Cronwright-Schreiner does not give the language of his wife’s grief in this passage, but 
rather he emphasizes the desperate attempt to maintain intimate bodily touch (similar to 
Doss remaining on Lyndall’s feet) after one half of the dyad has been lost to death, and 
with the understanding that eventually both of the figures will die. The placement of the 
dead pet upon Schreiner’s bed harkens back to the intimacy that the pair shared in life, 
while this also demonstrates Nita’s privileged status as worthy of attention evocative of 
Victorian processes of laying out the dead.59 The “dear little pet’s body,” the smallness and 
materiality of which is highlighted twice using nearly identical language in this brief 
passage, stays present in the biographical narrative, and the dog remained physically close 
to Schreiner in the form of the strand of hair and in the later burial. Although the reciprocal 
embodied relationship central to Schreiner’s exploration of mothering pets is no longer 
possible, that Schreiner would so desperately hold onto that physical connection, to the 
extent that she would choose to “lie together” with the dog even after death, shows her 
sense of the lasting import of this physical connection between animal and human 
companions. The verb “to lie” is crucial in the biography, but also in African Farm as 
Lyndall is dying: “Gregory left them lying there together” (243); “she lay with the dog at 
her feet” (251); and “the dog lay on her feet” (252). Schreiner marks a transition from 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century notions of the lapdog, in which “to lie together” 
was merely an indication of aberrant sexuality and womanhood, to an alternative familial 
order where the maternal and erotic act of “lying there together” opens a realm of 
empowering possibilities for both the New Woman and her animal companion.   
  
	
59 See Jalland, Death in the Victorian Family. 
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CHAPTER 3. CRAWLING, CLAWING HUMAN-ANIMAL SYMPATHY IN THE 
WOMAN IN WHITE 
Touch as a mode of communication is especially important in Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White (1859-1860), a novel where much cannot or will not be spoken. Secrets 
abound in the convoluted plot, and characters’ social and class status often demand that 
they keep their truths hidden: Count Fosco’s and Sir Percival Glyde’s conspiracy to acquire 
Lady Glyde’s money; the secret that Sir Percival’s parents were not really married, an 
“illegitimacy” that would strip him of his title and property if known; the love between 
Walter and Laura that cannot be acknowledged because of the disparity in their class 
positioning and her previous engagement to the (falsely) titled Sir Percival. Within these 
myriad secrets and desires, touch communicates unspoken threats or love. The Woman in 
White is also lauded as the first sensation novel, a genre in which the importance of the 
physical senses makes its way into the very name. The oft-quoted meeting of Walter and 
the titular “woman in white” at night, during which “in one moment, every drop of blood 
in my [Walter’s] body was brought to a stop by the touch of a hand laid lightly and suddenly 
on my shoulder from behind me” (23), demonstrates the power of touch to reverberate 
physically on the bodies of characters. These moments are also crucial to the sensation 
genre that is known for its physical effects on typical readers. According to Margaret 
Oliphant’s 1862 discussion of this passage in “Sensational Novels,” “[f]ew readers will be 
able to resist the mysterious thrill of this sudden touch” (qtd. in Ablow, 161), and scholars 
continue to address the embodied response of readers to sensation novels more generally 
and The Woman in White in particular: “the novel was read with…manic urgency. It offered 
jittery pleasures, somatic shocks—effects which worked upon the bodies of its readers. It 
aimed to sensationalize them—to make them catch their breath, their hearts beat faster, 
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their eyes move more feverishly over the page” (Sweet xvi).60 Touch produces physical 
sensations for characters. Reading about these encounters provokes a physical response for 
readers as well, as if they had been touched through the page, moved psychologically with 
bodily ramifications. While touch between humans like Walter and the “woman in white” 
is well-trodden ground in masculinity and genre studies, other touch between humans and 
unappealing or dying animals in the novel remains less thoroughly examined. This chapter 
hones in on grotesque, erotic, violent, and familial physical encounters usually between 
humans and animals, but also between humans and animalized women. In his relationship 
with his mice, birds, and Laura’s sister, Marian, Count Fosco demonstrates this jarring 
touch and shows the possibility of a grotesque sympathy that diverges from a conventional, 
exclusionary form of feeling for only a select group of others. What Walter calls Fosco’s 
“grotesque tenderness” (567) is an aesthetically unappealing and viscerally unpleasant 
sympathy to behold, and yet it is a valuable form of care within the novel.  
Count Fosco demonstrates the complexity that occurs when the seemingly most 
inhumane and selfish character sympathizes with odd animals and women often seen as 
unworthy of such regard in Victorian literature and culture. The plot of The Woman in 
White has Count Fosco conniving with Sir Percival Glyde to get the money of the latter’s 
wife, which she will not give them access to while she is alive. To this mercenary end, they 
pretend that the mad and now dead Anne Catherick (the “woman in white”) is Lady Glyde 
and institutionalize the real Lady Glyde under the name of Anne Catherick. Thus, Sir 
Percival and Count Fosco (through his wife) gain Lady Glyde’s wealth. As cruel as Fosco 
	60 For further discussion of the embodied response of readers, see Sweet, “Introduction” xvi-xix; 
Miller, “Cage Aux Folles: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White”; Ablow, 
“Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Masculinity in The Woman in White” 161. 
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undeniably is to Lady Glyde and Anne Catherick, he is not without sympathetic feeling, 
but it appears in surprising places: with unattractive women and animals. Count Fosco’s 
personal menagerie includes a cockatoo, two canaries, and a family of white mice. On the 
surface, Fosco and his animals demonstrate bad touch—the crawling touch of rodents and 
the clawing touch of birds—to match a bad character. Scholars, including Monica Flegel, 
have explored the Victorian anxieties that Fosco represents through his extreme villainy, 
his effeminacy, and his relationships to people and animals. 61  This chapter further 
complicates our readings of Fosco by focusing on complex juxtapositions: the physical 
encounter between the unquantifiable array of small animals (excessive in quantity) and 
Fosco’s prodigious corporeal form (excessive in size); the titled European seeking wealth 
through cruelty who at the same time aligns himself with working-class pets; Fosco’s 
masculinized violence towards Lady Glyde and Anne Catherick and his feminized 
affection for animals. Although idealized conceptualizations of sympathetic human-animal 
attachment might include a beautiful lady with her purebred lapdog as a stand-in to practice 
for eventual human children, attention to Count Fosco reveals that sympathy can also be 
the grotesqueness of a fat man with the birds that claw and the mice that crawl upon his 
	
61 For specific animal studies readings of the novel, see Flegel, “Pets and Patriarchy: Bachelors, 
Villains, and Their Animal Companions” from Pets and Domesticity in Victorian Literature and 
Culture: Animality, Queer Relations, and the Victorian Family; “A ‘Strange Family Story’: Count 
Fosco, His Animal Children, and the ‘Safe’ Patriarch in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White.” 
More general readings of Count Fosco include Bollen and Ingelbien, “An Intertext that Counts? 
Dracula, The Woman in White, and Victorian Imaginations of the Foreign Other”; Gindele, 
“Wonders Taken for Signs: Marian and Fosco in The Woman in White”; Huff, “Fosco’s Fat Drag: 
Performing the Victorian Fat Man in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White”; Miller, “Cage Aux 
Folles: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White.” For readings of 
masculinity in the novel that focus on Walter and Sir Percival Glyde, rather than Fosco, see Ablow, 
“Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Masculinity in The Woman in White”; Godfrey, 
“‘Absolutely Miss Fairlie’s own’: Emasculating Economics in The Woman in White”; Mangham, 
“‘What Could I Do?’ Nineteenth-Century Psychology and the Horrors of Masculinity in The 
Woman in White.” 
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body and a mustachioed woman caring for a dying stray dog. By finding value in 
unattractive, surplus women and animals, this form of sympathy challenges the 
anthropocentrism and heteronormativity that privileges traditional companion animals and 
marriageable women.  
Fosco’s ugly touch and sympathy may explain why some readers have an affinity 
for the Count despite his despicable nature. In “Sensational Novels,” Oliphant argues that 
“[t]he sympathies of the reader on whom the ‘Woman in White’ lays her spell, are, it is 
impossible to deny, devoted to the arch-villain of the story,” and because readers are so 
drawn to him “it is impossible to treat him as his crimes deserve. He is intended to be an 
impersonation of evil, a representative of every diabolical wile: but Fosco is not detestable; 
on the contrary, he is more interesting, and seizes on our sympathies more warmly than 
any other character in the book” (12-13). With the repetition of the word “sympathy,” 
Oliphant believes that Fosco touches something in the readerly ability to feel. Fosco does 
not just gently provoke sympathy, for Oliphant, but rather he “seizes” it, a term that implies 
forceful, violent touch. Given Fosco’s behaviors throughout the novel, why do readers, like 
Oliphant, find Count Fosco likeable in spite of themselves? To again use Oliphant’s words, 
“[t]he reader shares in the unwilling liking to which, at his first appearance, he beguiles 
Marian Halcombe [Lady Glyde’s half-sister]; but the reader, notwithstanding the fullest 
proof of Fosco’s villany, does not give him up, and take to hating him, as Marian does” 
(12). Oliphant actually cites Fosco’s pets as one of the many reasons for admiring the 
irresistible fiend: “he is more real, more genuine, more Italian even, in his fatness and size, 
in his love for pts [sic; pets] and pastry…every detail about him is necessary to his 
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perfection” (12).62 Oliphant feels for Fosco regardless of his bad behavior.  The contention 
of this chapter is that part of what redeems Fosco in the minds of some readers is the value 
he finds in unorthodox animals and women, worth that is evidenced in shocking moments 
of human-animal touch. 
Problematic Pets and Domestic Invasion 
Given the lazy ease with which he embraces the luxuries of life and the cat and 
mouse games he plays with Laura and Anne, the Count operates like a stray cat brought 
into an English home. Collins reports that Fosco’s approval of an operatic performance 
was “like the purring of a great cat” (569), a simile that anticipates audience interpretations 
of the Count’s characterization as well. Oliphant describes Fosco in a way that evokes a fat 
cat lounging, as “[h]e spreads himself out in the sun with a perfect pleasure and satisfaction, 
which is exhilarating to behold” (13). And Oliphant was far from the only Victorian reader 
to be attracted to Count Fosco: “The principle villain had his admirers…Fosco became a 
favorite moniker for cats” (Sweet xvi). The manifestation of Fosco’s popularity in pet 
names suggests audiences relishing in a certain type of nefarious reputation. Cats in the 
nineteenth century and beyond were thought to be violently cunning, possessing the worst 
characteristics of stereotypical womanhood, and offering companionship to the working 
classes. Harriet Ritvo notes that cats were “[t]he most frequently and energetically vilified 
domestic animal,” largely because a feline “did not seem disposed to acknowledge human 
dominion and could hardly be said to have subordinated its will to that of its human 
masters” (Animal Estate 21-22). Like a cat taking shelter in a human home but not 	
62 In the 2018 BBC adaptation of The Woman in White, the filmmakers do not use pets to make 
Fosco alluring (the animal companions are excised entirely), but rather resort to a more 
conventional attractiveness by casting a tall, dark, handsome, thin, and young actor as the Italian 
Count.  
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accepting that human as an authority, Fosco, while stealing the privileges and comforts of 
those who are higher on socioeconomic hierarchies, does not take those hierarchies 
seriously. Nor does he follow the moral code of the society that protects people like the 
beautiful and wealthy Laura Fairlie, but allows a certain amount of cruelty or at least 
devaluation elsewhere: toward the poor, illegitimate Anne Catherick, the less well-to-do 
and unattractive Marian Halcombe, and lowly animals. Part of the problem that Victorians 
had with cats was that “[o]ften they did not distinguish between animals they were desired 
to kill and those they were not to touch on any account” (Ritvo, Animal Estate 22). The 
concern was not that cats were violent, but rather that their destruction was misplaced. Just 
as cats’ violence did not always fall where humans wanted it to (killing birds instead of 
mice, for example), Fosco’s cruelty impacts those who should be protected according to 
Victorian social mores, if not by law, particularly Laura Fairlie. Society would allow and 
even encourage disregard for Anne or Marian, not for Laura. Fosco’s felineness not only 
denotes deviant morality, but also deviation from gender expectations and aberrant 
sexuality comparable to that we saw in the “fallen” Baby-Bertie’s association with cats. 
His feminized attention to fashion and appearances mimics “the feline habit of repetitive 
self-grooming [that] seemed to correspond to perceptions of female vanity” (Amato 60), 
and the sadomasochistic possibilities that Marian hints at between the Count and 
Countess 63  follows the feline “associat[ion] with devious femininity and aggressive 
sexuality” (61).64 In spite of the negative conceptions of cats, they were still welcomed into 
homes in the nineteenth century, and so too does Count Fosco enter the confines of Sir 	
63 See “[t]he rod of iron with which he [Fosco] rules” the Countess, 222. The sexual innuendo of 
this passage is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
64 For further discussions of perceptions of cats, see Amato, Beastly Possessions 28-29; Tague, 
Animal Companions 63-64 and 116.   
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Percival’s ancestral estate, Blackwater Park, where the Italian expatriate strays from typical 
English domestic expectations.  
By associating Fosco with the feline or at very least the animal, Collins strips him 
of some of the culpability for his crimes since the Count is just a dominant, predatory 
creature doing what he naturally does. In her Brussels devoirs titled “Le Chat” (“The Cat”), 
Emily Brontë defends the cat as human-like in pursuit of his wants, even though humans 
pretend to be better: “A cat, in his own interest, sometimes conceals its misanthropy under 
a semblance of very engaging sweetness; instead of tearing what it wants out of the hand 
of its master, it comes up with a caressing air, rubs its pretty little head against him, and 
advances a paw whose touch is a gentle a down” (qtd. in Davies 248). For Brontë, the cat 
gets what it desires either through violent or affectionate touch, and that self-interest is the 
true natural guide of action for both humans and animals rather than another explicitly 
stated though rarely followed moral code. Fosco, too, offers a different, animal-centric 
view of morality. Laura tries to make a case for English mores to the Count, telling him 
that she has “always heard that truly wise men are truly good men, and have a horror of 
crime,” and he acknowledges the prettiness of the thought: “those are admirable 
sentiments; and I have seen them stated at the tops of copy-books” (231). Still, he dismisses 
the idea, and Fosco uses his mice to mock Laura’s morality: “‘My pretty little smooth white 
rascal,’ he said, ‘here is a moral lesson for you. A truly wise Mouse is a truly good Mouse. 
Mention that, if you please, to your companions, and never gnaw at the bars of your cage 
again as long as you live’” (231). The mice, according to Fosco, do not care about a 
societally constructed moral code, but rather they appreciate that which will help them 
survive, thrive, and enjoy life: “Ah, nice little Mousey! come, kiss me. What is your own 
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private notion of a virtuous man, my pret-pret-pretty? A man who keeps you warm, and 
gives you plenty to eat. And a good notion, too, for it is intelligible, at the least” (234). 
Mice can be trained, but only so far—they will strive to get more food and still attempt to 
destroy their cage—but that is animal nature, and Fosco (like Brontë) implies that it is 
nonhuman animal nature as well no matter what hypocritical pretenses they insist upon. 
Men and women, too, will strive to shirk domestic constraints and fulfil their desires. Much 
later around the climax of the novel, after Fosco has threatened to kill Walter because the 
Englishman stands in the way of his plans, a break in the conversation reveals that the mice 
have not followed Fosco’s injunction regarding their cage: “The silence that followed was 
so intense, that the faint ticking nibble of the white mice at their wires was distinctly audible 
where I stood” (587). Both the mice and the human are breaking the rules set before them, 
but—according to Fosco—it is natural that they should disobey those commands. Fosco 
and his animals undermine conventional English morality, but he has his own “sacred word 
of honour” that he uses in his conversations with Sir Percival to affirm his own truthfulness 
and sense of “the sacred interests of humanity” that leads him to advocate for nonhuman 
animals.65 Fosco offers an alternative family structure, system of value, and understanding 
of sympathy, all of which depend on interspecies touch and an appreciation of those 
embodied bonds with odd human and nonhuman “creatures.”  
Collins presents connections between humans and animals which mimic intensely 
affective relationships between parents and children. The intimacy of mice crawling in and 
out of Fosco’s clothes and birds digging their claws into his arm in The Woman in White 
can be compared to Lyndall holding a dog to her exposed breast or wrapping him in her 
	
65 For Fosco’s appeal to the “sacred,” see 317-318 329, 333, 370, 567, 602, 604. 
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garments in Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter. Schreiner made use of eroticized human-pet touch to theorize “mother-love” as a 
means of nurturance across gender and species, and Fosco’s parental care for his pets shows 
how that affectionate attention can be grotesque to behold. Multiple characters talk of the 
Count as the father to his animal children, including a servant: “He was a big fat, odd sort 
of elderly man, who kept birds and white mice, and spoke to them as if they were so many 
Christian children” (400). Fosco takes defining features of the supposedly perfect English 
family—whiteness, Christianity—and elevates rodents to that level as worthy recipients of 
care. Marian describes him “chirrup[ing] paternally at his small white children through the 
bars of the pagoda” in response to Fosco’s protective exclamation: “I will take my small 
family here — my poor-little-harmless-pretty-Mouseys, out for an airing along with us. 
There are dogs about the house, and shall I leave my forlorn white children at the mercies 
of the dogs? Ah, never!” (229). Here, with the racial undertones in emphasizing the 
animals’ whiteness, as well as their attractiveness, innocence, and vulnerability, Fosco’s 
description of the mice could almost refer to Laura herself. However, Fosco cares so little 
for Laura as a weak creature set up as the ideal object of sympathy by the novel but so 
much for the mice. Whereas Shirley’s Tartar and Lyndall’s Doss are hardly typical tiny, 
weak lapdogs and in size and utility deviate from typical diminutive pets, Fosco’s pet 
children heighten the idea of weakness and smallness beyond traditional pugs, poodles, 
and Pomeranians. Later, when fleeing certain death if he stays in England, Fosco fears the 
fate of his pets when they are separated from their caregiver: “My cockatoo, my canaries, 
and my little mice — who will cherish them, when their good Papa is gone?” (595). The 
number of children in a nuclear family can range to especially high numbers in the 
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Victorian era, and the excess in the number of Fosco’s furry and feathered children—one 
cockatoo, two canaries, and an unspecified number of white mice—mimics this 
indeterminacy. Still, novels rarely take up the families with an excessive number of 
children as their central focus, so many that they cannot be named and given individual 
characterizations, so with the mice Collins presents more than can be contained and 
classified within the conventional novel form and its definition of the family. Given that 
the Countess is 43 years of age when the reader is first introduced to her in the action of 
the novel, she is approaching the end of her childbearing years without human offspring, 
so animals are the only children that they are likely to have. Yet, Fosco is the one who is 
invested in and nurturing towards the pets, showing “mother-love,” not the Countess, who 
exhibits no interest in the animal companions except when her fascination with her husband 
leads her to attend to his relationship with the creatures. Animals allow for an alternative 
to Victorian gender norms and the traditional domesticity of the nuclear family, but The 
Woman in White shows a funhouse mirror version of family and home. Without human 
children or the more typical substitutions of popular domestic pets such as dogs or cats, we 
are left with mice and birds as the odd progeny, doubly disregarding English expectations 
for who should be a member of the family. Not only does the Count challenge the 
anthropocentrism and heteronormativity of traditional human procreation, but he also goes 
against the comparatively anthropocentric and more acceptable (though still thought 
somewhat problematic) alternative of childlike dogs and cats who were often 
anthropomorphized in nineteenth-century culture. While Shirley and Lyndall have their 
dogs and Bertie has her kittens, Count Fosco makes a home with creepy, crawling, clawing 
creatures. 
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At the same time that the Count’s relationship with his pets allows him to play the 
role of nurturing parent, the intimacy of these physical encounters also becomes erotic. 
Flegel has argued that where Count Fosco nears beastiality with his pets he deviates from 
sentimentality and where his human-pet connections approach “raw sex” he departs from 
the familial or paternal, and I challenge these points in a couple of ways.66 First, I push 
against using these terms (“beastiality” and “sentimentality”; “erotic” and “familial”) in 
strict opposition to each other (either/or thinking); rather, both/and constructions highlight 
the ways that the sentimental can be startling, in both its erotic or violent nature, and the 
familial can be erotic.67 While I hold that Fosco’s relationship with his pets is both erotic 
and familial, I want to caution against using the terms “erotic” and “sexual” 
interchangeably in discussing the Count. If we accept Sharon Marcus’s definition of erotic 
bonds as those that “involve intensified affect and sensual pleasure…dominance and 
submission…[and] can exist between two people or between a person and an object, image, 
or text” (114), that can be sexual but are not necessarily so (113), then we can read Count 
Fosco’s affective, affectionate, and hierarchical relationships—both with humans and 
animals—as excessively erotic. The text offers evidence that the bond between Fosco and 
his creatures might or might not be sexual, but the relationships are undeniably erotic using 
Marcus’s definition, and “erotic” is a term that has richer implications of dynamic, 
heightened feeling.   
Fosco’s erotic dominance is marked by touch that is simultaneously pleasurable 
and suggestively violent. Even the animals’ physical and emotional affection for him is 	
66 See “A ‘Strange Family Story’: Count Fosco, His Animal Children, and the ‘Safe’ Patriarch in 
Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White” 109-10.	67	For a discussion of how human-human familial relationships, including sibling and parent-child, 
can slip into the erotic, see Mary Jean Corbett, Family Likeness 113 and 151.	
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something that the Count has controlled, evidenced when Marian declares that “he has 
taught the creatures to be surprisingly fond of him, and familiar with him” (219, ital. mine). 
The active behaviors that Count Fosco cultivates in his pets are their physical encounters 
with him. The cockatoo “hops on to his knee, and claws its way up his great big body, and 
rubs its top-knot against his sallow double chin in the most caressing manner imaginable” 
(219-220). The canaries “perch fearlessly on his hand, mount his fat outstretched fingers 
one by one, when he tells them to ‘go up-stairs,’ and sing together as if they would burst 
their throats with delight, when they get to the top finger” (220). The mice “crawl all over 
him, popping in and out of his waistcoat, and sitting in couples, white as snow, on his 
capacious shoulders. He seems to be even fonder of his mice than of his other pets, smiles 
at them, and kisses them, and calls them by all sorts of endearing names” (220). With the 
animals venturing underneath Fosco’s clothes and the Count exposing his skin to feather, 
fur, and claw contact, the heightened intimacy of these encounters is jarring, yet Collins 
uses the near-orgasmic language in his phrase that the animals that “would burst their 
throats with delight” to show the participants’ pleasure. 
Fosco uses erotic dominance to train and tame not only pets but also women. In an 
oft-quoted line from the novel, Marian reveals in her diary that “[t]he rod of iron with 
which he rules her [his wife, the Countess] never appears in company—it is a private rod, 
and is always kept up-stairs” (222). Here, “the rod” is a phallic symbol and evokes 
flagellation, violence, control, and sexuality.68 To describe Fosco’s dominance, Marian 
uses language that animalizes the women held under his command: “He looks like a man 
	
68 Phallic symbols in relationship to the Count come up throughout the novel, including reference 
to “his large cane with the gold knob to it” and the threat to Hartright to send him a letter “measuring 
accurately the length of my sword” (546, 591).  
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who could tame anything. If he had married a tigress, instead of a woman, he would have 
tamed the tigress. If he had married me, I should have made his cigarettes as his wife does—
I should have held my tongue when he looked at me, as she holds hers” (217). The Countess 
formerly “advocated the Rights of Women” (232), a description that echoes the title of 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s famous A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), which argues 
that women should be educated to reason for themselves. In spite of the fact that the 
Countess was once an outlier like Marian, Fosco’s wife no longer seems to hold an opinion 
of her own apart from her husband. The Count “tamed” his wife (217) to the point that the 
Countess now gazes at the Count “with the look of mute submissive inquiry which we are 
all familiar with in the eyes of a faithful dog” (216).69 The training of Madame Fosco 
echoes Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley, in which the titular character is a “leopardess” and 
“[p]antheress” (581, 585, 586, 591) who desires a mate who can tame her. Shirley and 
Madame Fosco embrace such dominance exerted over them by certain men, while Marian 
sees the allure yet resists abdicating her autonomy. Fosco uses erotic dominance not only 
to tame his animalized wife, but also to tame and train nonhuman animals. The canaries 
are “pretty little cleverly trained creatures,” and the mice “are almost as tame as the 
canaries” (220). The two distinct though similar words—trained, as in the animals are 
taught to actively do things, and tamed, as in the animals are taught to passively not do 
things that the Count does not want them to—suggests the thorough system of control that 
Fosco has over the pets. And, yet, Haraway, in describing her own work training her dog 
Cayenne Pepper, reminds us that training through positive reinforcement can be a mutually 
beneficial relationship building exercise, “a site of intense bodily and cultural exchange” 	
69 The only way that the Countess threatens to resist her training is through her “suppressed tigerish 
jealousy” if the Count acknowledges another woman (216). 
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(Fraiman 112).70 If the woman or animal creature consents to be trained and enjoys the 
process, then it is one opportunity for shared goals and pleasurable embodied experience, 
even if a power differential remains.   
Count Fosco takes the at times uncomfortable understanding of pets and their 
human companions operating as parents and children, relationships shown to be 
simultaneously nurturing and erotic in Schreiner’s novels, to an even more shocking 
extreme than was discussed in the previous chapter. As a large adult man, Count Fosco 
dwarfs his small animal children, unlike many human-pet relationships as represented in 
nineteenth-century images and tales which “advised girls to use interactions with cats to 
prepare for adulthood…[and] practice for motherhood” (Amato 63-64).71 We can think of 
how the proportional sizes of a young girl in relationship to a tiny kitten could correspond 
to a grown woman in comparison to her infant, while the weight difference between the 
same girl child and a full-grown cat or lapdog might be proportionate to a mother with a 
growing child. So, while girls with their pets act as miniature versions of women and their 
babies and children, Fosco upsets the gender, age, and scale of these models. Fosco is a 
grown man, far bigger than the average adult, playing parent to animals that are smaller 
than a kitten—the proportions are off with the “immensely fat” (217) Count and his mice, 
canaries, and even the slightly larger cockatoo. Marian notes the ridiculousness of Fosco’s 
pet keeping, describing it as “childish interests and amusements” that a good Englishman 
would be embarrassed of and apologize for, but explains that “the Count, apparently, sees 
	
70 See Haraway, Companion Species Manifesto 58-62; When Species Meet 208-216; Fraiman, 
“Pussy Panic” 112. 
71 See also Tague’s reading Joseph Wright of Derby’s Dressing the Kitten (ca. 1768-70) for the 
discussion of the discomfort that could arise from young girls dominating animals by treating them 
as doll-like children, Animal Companions 98-100. 
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nothing ridiculous in the amazing contrast between his colossal self and his frail little pets” 
(220). By mentioning the mammoth Count next to the diminutive pets, Marian foregrounds 
the potential for grotesque and violent destruction of animal life. With one misplaced 
movement the Count could kill a beloved pet, large as he is and small as they are. Fosco 
with his pets heightens and makes visible the power dynamics of typical parent-child 
relationships, highlighting the ease with which these bonds can slip into unsafe realms.  
Potential for violence certainly exists in Fosco’s vast size versus the littleness of 
his pets, but that potential is never fully realized, at least not toward the Count’s tiny 
companions. The Count’s movements scare the mice, but this is not a violent touch. For 
example, the Count’s joviality indirectly provokes their fear: “The Count laughed, inwardly 
and silently; and two of the white mice in his waistcoat, alarmed by the internal convulsion 
going on beneath them, darted out in a violent hurry, and scrambled into their cage again” 
(234). Later, Fosco throws down his arm in anger, disturbing the table on which his mice 
are resting, and “the little creatures scampered out of their sleeping-place, as his heavy arm 
shook the table, and peered at him through the gaps in the smartly painted wires” (586). 
Both of these instances involve embodied connection, as the motion of the Count’s frame 
jolts the smaller bodies of the mice, but, though this may provoke fear, it does not imply 
violence through actual physical harm to the animals or malignant intent on the part of the 
Count.  
Even as the Count’s corpulence poses a potential threat of violence towards his 
animals, the animals, particularly the cockatoo, present the equal possibility of animal 
violence directed at humans. Marian narrates that almost all are afraid of the cockatoo, 
including her (usually intrepid) self: “the vicious cockatoo ruffled his clipped wings, and 
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gave a screech that set all my nerves on edge in an instant, and made me only too glad to 
get out of the room” (225). The bird’s movement and voice scare Marian, and she makes 
her exit from the room for fear of a bodily attack. Still, the reference to the creature’s 
“clipped wings” signals control, a physical manipulation of the animal body to make it a 
safer domestic creature. The pet, unnaturally altered, is no longer able to fly away or 
towards prey. Even as the Count has an affectionate relationship with the physically altered 
bird, the bird’s claws and beak remain powerfully able to harm just as they can demonstrate 
affection: “The cockatoo, a most vicious and treacherous bird towards every one 
else…claws its way up his [Fosco’s] great big body” (219). That Fosco’s clothing—
obviously part of the scene—is not mentioned in this passage calls attention to the animal 
“claws” and the Count’s “great big body.” Moreover, the length of cockatoo claws makes 
it likely that they would penetrate clothes or even skin, meaning that this is a somewhat 
painful encounter for the human. Subsequently, Marian tells of “the Count with a piece of 
sugar between his lips, and the vicious cockatoo scrambling up his waistcoat to get at it” 
(289). This meeting is simultaneously affectionate, with Fosco’s mouth meeting the bird’s 
hard, pointed beak in a kiss of sorts, violent, with the cockatoo’s beak coming towards the 
soft lips of the Count, and exploitative, with the Count manipulating the bird’s desire for 
sugar into the physical contact he wants. Violence permeates Fosco’s human-animal bonds, 
but it is never unilaterally human to animal, and it always includes ambiguous intentions 
and a close connection between pleasure and pain. 
In touching his pets, Count Fosco uses language that references the geography of 
the Victorian house. Fosco’s repeated plea to his canaries “go up-stairs” to get them to 
climb up his fingers (220, 267, 566) makes the Count’s body stand in for the home that the 
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animals occupy.72 The animals do not exactly have free reign over the Count’s body as 
home—he tells them where to go and trains them to follow his command—but Fosco 
clearly indulges the animals’ fancies to run about his corporal form largely as they please. 
The male body as the house at first seems to go against Victorian gender ideologies that 
considered the domestic the woman’s domain. Fosco plays both the maternal and paternal 
role with his pets as children and his entire body as the domestic dwelling. When Fosco is 
having this close physical encounter with the canaries, he references the location of the 
most intimate and private rooms of the home, the bedrooms and bathroom upstairs. The 
domestic space in which Fosco’s pets live when they are not climbing upon his body 
emphasizes the control he has over their experiences, but also his willingness to at times 
free them from their confines and their apparent pleasure at being kept near to him. The 
birds live in cages, yet when he lets them out they immediately come to him (219-220), 
and the “white mice live in a little pagoda of gaily painted wirework, designed and made 
by himself…they are perpetually let out, like the canaries” (220). The animals are doubly 
constrained, not just held within the human home, but confined within a specific location 
within the house. Yet the mice are still esteemed to the point that they live in a home named 
after the sacred spaces of Buddhists and Hindus, a move that simultaneously calls attention 
to Fosco’s learning and cosmopolitanism, as well as to the disrespect of imperialism that 
would allow a person to diminish a temple into a miniature home for mice.    
Just as the animals are controlled by Fosco—trained, infantilized, and 
domesticated—Fosco allows himself to be lowered according to Victorian hierarchies—
	
72 For Fosco’s and the canaries’ trick, see 220, 267, and 566; for a discussion of the layout of the 
Victorian home, see Flanders, Inside the Victorian Home: A Portrait of Domestic Life in Victorian 
England. 
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made feminine, childlike, and like a member of the lower classes and other violently 
oppressed groups—by his animal companions of choice. The mouse, in particular, is an 
animal rich with associations. On the one hand, Collins’s depiction of Count Fosco is 
undoubtedly building on the tradition of foreign (especially Italian) Renaissance villains 
with white mice as their companion animals.73 White mice were also associated with 
treasonous and underhanded behavior during the time of Collins’s novel, with the animal 
being used as navy slang for “[a] sly or contemptible person; an informer, a traitor” (OED, 
n. 2).74 That Fosco keeps close company with white mice known for their deviousness is 
fitting given Fosco’s characterization. When not connected with evildoing, the mouse as 
animal and in metaphorical usage still had negative connotations. “Quiet as a mouse,” the 
creature represents “something timid, weak, small, or insignificant” (OED, n. 1). “Poor as 
a church mouse” or “mouse-poor” use the perceived meekness of a nonhuman to describe 
human poverty. Not only were mice used figuratively to represent the human condition and 
actual unwanted mice overrunning some homes of the poor, mice were also linked with the 
lower classes because they were “inexpensive (if not free) to acquire and maintain…they 
appealed to working-class pet keepers” (Amato 30). Moreover, mice also served as good 
animals for young middle-class boys to train (Amato 30). Finally, the connection between 
white mice, “[a] mouse having white fur; esp. an albino mouse of a domesticated breed or 
laboratory strain of the common house mouse” (OED, n. 1), and the scientific 
experimentation that Collins detested as an antivivisectionist should also be noted. Count 
Fosco is approximately 60 years of age, titled, and willing to stop at nothing for financial 	
73 In Middlemarch, Mrs. Cadwallader is said to compare Will Ladislaw to “an Italian with white 
mice!,” a description that is returned to repeatedly and refuted by Dorothea (525, 528, 523, 829).   
74 The OED includes reference to this usage in the 1846 novel Dombey and Son by Collins’s friend 
Charles Dickens. 	
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gain, and yet he surprisingly attaches himself to animals that are metaphorically and 
literally associated with children, the working-classes, poverty, and violent exploitation. 
Fosco’s connection with canaries similarly links him to less-financially lofty individuals, 
since “[t]he breeding of…canaries had long been an organized pastime in working-class 
communities” (Amato 27). Perhaps his marginalized position as an Italian expatriate facing 
English xenophobia leads him to value and nurture creatures in a similarly denigrated 
position, but Fosco’s connection to working-class pets could also indicate that his title is 
false, much like that of his friend. The real irony of association comes with ethical 
symbolism, since canaries “were believed to be ornamental and moral creatures, 
epitomizing domestic bliss and enhancing household harmony…anthropomorphized 
canaries…might serve as moral exemplars to their human companions” (Amato 27). 
Perchance, unlike the mice, this association is ironic and the canaries are not the good 
moral influence that they are thought to be; otherwise, the Count and his canaries could 
offer a valuable alternative morality. Finally, Fosco is feminized (and tied to one of the 
most belittled types of woman) because he “has all the fondness of an old maid for his 
cockatoo” (220). Even Frances Power Cobbe, the advocate for women’s and animal 
welfare discussed in the next chapter, accepts this gendered stereotype of the 
unmarriageable woman leaning on a feathered friend: “every embittered old maid [has] her 
cat or parrot” (“The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes” 283). Ultimately, the seeming 
disjunction between Fosco and his choice of pets complicates many Victorian structures of 
power and value. 
Although Fosco demonstrates comfort with his unusual pets, it does not follow that 
all observers are similarly at ease with the embodied relationships between these human 
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and animal companions. Marian articulates how unpalatable she finds this human-animal 
touch: “[T]he sight of them creeping about a man’s body is, for some reason, not pleasant 
to me. It excites a strange, responsive creeping in my own nerves; and suggests hideous 
ideas of men dying in prison, with the crawling creatures of the dungeon preying on them 
undisturbed” (230). Alternative domestic relationships evoke the punishment for crimes, 
and here embodied affection blurs with the assaults of creatures who bite and crawl upon 
the dead and dying. Marian’s bodily response as an observer echoes how scholars and 
practitioners describe sensation fiction. And, if understandings of sensation fiction’s 
impact on the bodies of readers are to be believed, it is possible that some readers feel a 
physical reaction to the Count and his pets, whether that be Marian’s disgust at this moment 
in the text, her laughter elsewhere because “it was impossible to resist the comical distress 
of so very large a man at the loss of so very small a mouse” (236), or the pleasure of the 
Count himself. The English home and family become unsettled and strange with Fosco, his 
pets, and their strange human-animal touch present.  
“The best men are not consistent in good — why should the worst men be consistent in 
evil?”: Count Fosco’s Valuable, Grotesque Sympathy 
Feeling kinship and sympathy for a cockatoo who might attack at any moment, 
canaries whose petite size makes them odd affective mates for a large human, or mice who 
might crawl uncontrolled through a home or prison is unexpected, yet these are precisely 
the creatures whom Count Fosco cares for the most throughout The Woman in White. He 
resists seemingly easier objects of sympathy, such as an innocent woman who is abandoned 
by most of her family, left without home and fortune. Laura appears to be an obvious person 
to pity, but the Count prefers the ugly and the odd. Fosco has and requests sympathetic 
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feeling for those who seem less conventional recipients: the villains of the novel (612), 
non-traditional pets, and other shocking human and animal “creatures.” In The Woman in 
White, many humans and animals are considered “creatures” vying for reader sympathy, 
and Fosco—in those he sympathizes for and in his ability to receive sympathy from other 
characters and readers—demonstrates how complicatedly violent, exclusionary, and 
unattractive nineteenth-century sympathy could be.  
Given Fosco’s vicious treatment of Laura and Anne Catherick, conniving to get 
access to Laura’s wealth by switching the women’s identities and, once Anne is dead, 
committing Laura under Anne’s name in an asylum, one does not expect to find in this 
character a rich compassion for others. However, as Walter follows Fosco towards the end 
of the novel, he witnesses a disquieting display of human-animal sympathy on the part of 
the Count. Fosco encounters a street performer with a companion animal begging for 
money: “An Italian was grinding an organ before the shop, and a miserable little shriveled 
monkey was sitting on the instrument” (567). While Collins specifies that the organ grinder 
is from the same country of origin as Fosco, the Count rejects both species and national 
kinship, focusing on the monkey instead: “The Count stopped; bit a piece for himself out 
of the tart; and gravely handed the rest to the monkey. ‘My poor little man!’ he said, with 
grotesque tenderness; ‘you look hungry. In the sacred name of humanity, I offer you some 
lunch!’” For the corpulent Fosco, giving up the pastry that he relishes throughout the novel 
is probably a more significant sacrifice than the small alms that the organ grinder requests, 
as he “piteously put in his claim to a penny from the benevolent stranger [but] [t]he Count 
shrugged his shoulders contemptuously — and passed on” (567). This passage ironically 
presents the cruel Fosco as “benevolent” before he turns not just a blind but disdainful eye 
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on human suffering. The Count appeals to the “sacred name of humanity” as he attempts 
to alleviate nonhuman animal suffering, but he disregards human pain. His allusion to that 
which is “sacred” shows that something is in fact holy for someone who appears largely 
immoral in his human relationships. The Count also explicitly calls the animal a “man,” 
seemingly conferring on the creature worth that he does not allow to actual humans in the 
process, and also stripping the term of much of its value and meaning. Importantly, Fosco 
does not know that Walter is following him, so his act of kindness and his sense of the 
“sacred” is not just for show. Walter describes Fosco’s “grotesque tenderness,” implying 
that the compassion goes too far for the monkey and is misplaced away from humans. The 
Dickensian descriptiveness of Walter’s surname—Hartright—suggests that Hartright 
knows where sympathy should lie: not with the monkey over the organ grinder, not with 
Marian over Laura, a point with which Fosco does not agree as he embodies a new structure 
of value that prefers strange women and animals. 
Collins particularly uses a triangulation of creaturely women and pets that he aligns 
with them in the text to demonstrate how Fosco disregards societal standards for feeling. 
First, Collins links Laura with purebred dogs, like her own Nina. These animals may 
become lost, but they always have a home. Alternatively, Anne resembles a stray dog, like 
her mother’s pet who is shot on Sir Percival’s property for trespassing. While both of these 
women evoke traditional, if classed, companion animals, Fosco’s affection for Marian 
leads her to be grouped with the other odd creatures who the Count cares for, including his 
mice, birds, and the poor monkey he meets on the street. For Ivan Kreilkamp, “minor 
creatures” are those nonhuman animals that approach the human and the home, but never 
gain full membership, that often “deserv[e] certain protections but perhaps not quite full 
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rights” (Minor Creatures 15). The position of the creature, be it nonhuman animal or 
woman (men are seldom referred to as “creature” in the novel), is part insider and part 
outsider, a status that allows access: the creature is close and meek enough to reach out and 
touch. 75  Various narrators and speakers persistently emphasize Anne Catherick’s 
“creaturely” status, calling her “an unfortunate creature” (32, 131), “the forlorn creature” 
(32, 96), “the miserable creature” (189), “the little helpless creature” (473), “a frail thing 
to look at, poor creature!” (401), and, most frequently, “the poor creature” (32, 63, 98, 106, 
108, 134, 278, 280, 418, 541). Throughout, the descriptors are not used in simile form 
(Anne is “like a poor creature”), but rather as a noun (Anne is “the poor creature”). And if 
Anne is a “poor creature,” then, by extension, Laura as her double is a creature as well.76 
Marian, speaking of Laura, calls her “[t]he gentle, innocent, affectionate creature” (299), 
while for Walter Laura is “the most innocent and the most afflicted of His [God’s] 
creatures” (430). Still, the word “creature” is less often used as a stand-in for Laura than it 
is for Anne, and when it is used it has very different accompanying adjectives; Laura is 
“innocent” or pure, while Anne is “poor” (with its dual connotations of class and 
experiencing unfortunate tribulations) and weak. The difference between the two 
“creatures” is so stark that Walter hesitates and even fears to compare the two: “To 
associate that forlorn, friendless, lost woman, even by an accidental likeness only, with 
	
75 There are a few exceptions in which men are talked of as creatures in the novel. Fosco refers to 
himself as a creature (606) and Laura calls him “the vilest creature breathing” (296), but important 
here is Fosco’s effeminacy and the different type of violent, cat-like creatures he is associated with. 
Disability is also figured as creaturely, with Frederick Fairlie describing himself thusly (345) and 
Sir Percival’s deformed father called “a hideous creature to look at” (531). 
76  For a discussion of how Walter is dehumanized and emasculated by his class positioning, 
meaning that Laura has to be likewise dehumanized and treated as a helpless “pet” for Walter to 
claim masculine authority through the text, see Godfrey, “‘Absolutely Miss Fairlie’s own’: 
Emasculating Economics in The Woman in White” 172. 
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Miss Fairlie, seems like casting a shadow on the future of the bright creature [Laura] who 
stands looking at us now” (62). Anne and Laura, as creatures, may both be animal-like, but 
they each represent distinct types of animals and deserve, Walter and society would have 
it, different treatment.  
Laura Fairlie is “legitimate,” born of a wealthy father and his wife. Laura is “pure 
bred,” unlike the “illegitimate” Anne Catherick, whose life was the result of a youthful 
fling between Laura’s father and Mrs. Catherick shortly before both were married to other 
people. Just as the distinctions between Laura and Anne are classed and based on the 
supposed propriety of impregnation and birth, similar divides exist between types of dogs. 
Philip Howell, in talking about the Battersea Home for Lost and Starving Dogs, highlights 
“the two distinct classes of ‘lost’ and ‘starving’ dogs,” with the “lost” having a home to 
return to and the “starving” being weak, lower bred, and likely strays unfit for a home and 
who must be “put…out of their misery” (78). Laura at her lowest moments in the plot of 
The Woman in White is lost, with her home, name, and money temporarily taken away 
from her, while Collins treats the lowly Anne Catherick like a starving dog, one who must 
be disposed of as Walter and Laura’s marriage plot progresses. Both Walter and Fosco 
understand a hierarchy whereby Anne’s animalized body is somewhat devalued; Walter 
sees her as less important than Laura, and for Fosco consideration for Anne is not as 
significant as his financial woes. Whereas Walter’s order of value is relatively standard for 
Victorians—based on class, beauty, and species—Fosco’s considers what best benefits 
him: what animal entertains him, what woman enchants him with her intellect, what death 
benefits him financially. This distinction means that the Count does not just devalue Anne 
Catherick, but Laura and Walter as well. Moreover, Fosco skews expectations for keeping 
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companion animals because his beloved pets are not dogs, and the lost and stray women 
who evoke those typically adored pets are not valued by him either. Fosco is emotionally 
touched by and physically wants to touch strange creatures. 
Language used to describe Marian also associates her with nonhuman animals, 
though while Laura and Anne seem to be likened to domestic and stray dogs, Marian as 
creature is one less conventionally kept within the Victorian home, an animal more 
resembling Fosco’s strange pets and the monkey he sympathizes with. Walter, Count 
Fosco, and Marian herself all use the word “creature” to describe Marian, though to 
different ends. Marian calls herself a creature in order to emphasize the helplessness of her 
and Laura’s situation, but also to align herself with weak womanhood. Marian laments that 
Laura has “[n]o father, no brother—no living creature but the helpless, useless woman who 
writes these sad lines” (194) to help her on the eve of her wedding to Sir Percival, and later 
describes herself as “a useless, helpless, panic-stricken creature” (334). More positive 
connotations pervade Walter’s drawing of Marian’s character, as he leans on this half-sister 
of his beloved for guidance and support: “She stopped; drew me nearer to her — the 
fearless, noble creature — touched my forehead, sister-like, with her lips” (125); “the 
generous creature would not wait to hear me. That sublime self-forgetfulness of women, 
which yields so much and asks so little, turned all her thoughts from herself to me” (544). 
Creaturely status allows physical access between characters: the creature Marian can kiss 
Walter; Laura, Marian, and Walter can live together under the same roof when the women 
are displaced creatures. Whereas in chapter 1 the romantic pairs of Charlotte Brontë’s 
Shirley use human-pet touch to demonstrate the touch that they really want to share with 
each other, here human-human touch becomes acceptable precisely because one or more 
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of the humans is figured as creaturely. Walter’s profound admiration for Marian does not 
transform into love, and the reasoning is linked to her appearance, Walter’s description of 
which can be read as zoomorphizing Marian as well. When Walter introduces readers to 
Marian, disappointed that her face does not match her feminine form, the picture the artist 
paints with his words is not that of conventionally appealing womanhood: “The lady’s 
complexion was almost swarthy, and the dark down on her upper lip was almost a 
moustache. She had a large, firm, masculine mouth and jaw; prominent, piercing resolute 
brown eyes; and thick, coal-black hair, growing unusually low down on her forehead” (35). 
Walter explicitly laments “the masculine form and masculine look of the features in which 
the perfectly shaped figure ended,” but on top of his association of Marian with masculinity 
he implicitly equates Marian with racial and animal others by emphasizing her darkness 
and furriness, respectively.77 Thus, unattractively animal and therefore not an ideal woman 
or the weak animal that is conventionally woman, neither Walter nor Marian perceive her 
creaturely self as perfect.   
While Walter and Marian form a relationship of friendship and respect, Laura is the 
one with whom he falls in love; however, Fosco is more taken with Marian, who is 
generally considered a more dynamic character to readers as well.78 At the same time that 
his cruelty towards Lady Glyde and Anne Catherick mars his character, Fosco sees worth 
where others do not. Count Fosco values mice and birds as his pets of choice over the more 
popular cats, dogs, or human children, he values the debilitated monkey over the simian’s 
	
77 For a reading of Marian and how hairy women upset Victorian classifications, particularly 
gendered understandings, see LaCom, “Ideological Aporia: When England’s Hairy Woman Met 
God and Darwin.” 
78 Miller notes that Marian is a “far more ‘interesting’ character,” even as she ultimately upholds 
the status quo (125).  
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human counterpart, and he values Marian Halcombe over her half-sister, Laura Fairlie, 
though the latter is the idealized beauty.79 Fosco chastises Sir Percival for treating Marian 
“as if she was no sharper and no bolder than the rest of her sex” and he celebrates her 
exceptional creaturely status, while delineating a clear opposition between Laura and 
Marian: “this grand creature, who stands in the strength of her love and her courage, firm 
as a rock between us two and that poor flimsy pretty blonde wife of yours — this 
magnificent woman, whom I admire with all my soul, though I oppose her in your interests 
and in mine” (324). The features that hold Marian apart from conventional ideals of 
womanhood—her strength, intelligence, courage, and likely her concomitant outsider 
status—are precisely what appeals to him. Fosco cares for Marian and is drawn to her 
physically as the enemy worthy of him intellectually, and because of that appreciation she, 
according to him, becomes his downfall: “the one weak place in my heart…Behold the 
cause, in my Heart—behold, in the image of Marian Halcombe, the first and last weakness 
of Fosco’s life!” (611). Again, Fosco’s bodily geography and structures of feeling are 
brought to the fore in his emphasis on his “heart.” Fosco reiterates this praise throughout 
the novel, speaking of his “admiration of this sublime creature, of this magnificent Marian” 
(336), “the magnificent creature who is inscribed on my heart as ‘Marian’ — who is known 
in the colder atmosphere of Society, as ‘Miss Halcombe’” (590), and “this sublime 
creature” (590). Although Walter and Fosco use similar language of praise—Marian is 
	
79 In “Wonders Taken for Signs: Marian and Fosco in The Woman in White,” Gindele notes that 
“[i]t is both to be expected and regretted that the villain is the one who fully recognizes Marian’s 
worth” (75). It should be noted that a consideration of animals in the novel shows Fosco to be a 
villain of a different variety than Sir Percival, who is cruel to helpless animals as well as humans, 
as Marian describes: “He [Fosco] winced and shuddered yesterday, when Sir Percival beat one of 
the spaniels, so that I felt ashamed by my own want of tenderness and sensibility, by comparison 
with the Count” (219).  
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“sublime” to both (336, 544), “fearless” to Walter (125) and full of “courage” to Fosco 
(324)—only Fosco adores and physically desires Marian because of her creaturely status: 
“At sixty, I worshipped her with the volcanic ardour of eighteen. All the gold of my rich 
nature was poured hopelessly at her feet. My wife — poor angel! — my wife who adores 
me, got nothing but the shillings and the pennies” (599). The Count puts the issue of valuing 
women, Marian and the Countess, explicitly in terms of money, and Marian is of 
substantially more worth in the Count’s estimation; while Walter does not use the same 
transparency of speech, it is clear that he deems Laura as considerably more deserving than 
Marian of his own “volcanic ardour,” showing that he upholds the exclusionary system of 
value that only considers weak femininity and conventional attractiveness of worth, unlike 
the Count. 
Marian approaches becoming yet another odd pet for Count Fosco—with a 
contradictory identity that combines domesticity, constrainedness, wildness, and 
independence—like his mice, canaries, and cockatoo. Whereas Fosco uses cages and the 
home to confine his animal companions, his dominion of Marian’s body is linguistic and 
narrative. He talks to her and about her, writes in her journal, and narrates her experience 
and his admiration in his confession, all a form of control because he sculpts her story and 
values her without her consent.80 Fosco’s descriptions of Marian throughout his confession 
particularly show this control, with his references to “the magnificent Marian” (602), “my 
adored enemy” (603), “our charming patient” (605), “our interesting Marian” (605), “our 
interesting invalid” (606), and “[o]ur interesting Marian” (606). While these usages are 
	
80 For a reading of Fosco’s violation of the privacy of Marian’s journal as a “rape,” see Miller. In 
“Wonders Taken for Signs: Marian and Fosco in The Woman in White,” Gindele resists the 
extremity of this argument 72-73. 
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immediately (if creepily) complimentary, the quick shift from “the” to the possessive “my” 
and “our” shows the Count attempting to take ownership over Marian like he would a pet. 
Moreover, similar to how Fosco’s relationship with his pets conveys the merging of the 
erotic and the paternal, his affinity for Marian, too, blends “volcanic ardour” (599) with 
“fatherly care” (606). Fosco even describes his “grateful, sympathetic, paternal lines” in 
Marian’s journal (337) and gives her a “affectionate warning, of paternal caution” in a letter 
(448). And the attraction between Fosco and Marian is mutual, try as she may to resist 
being drawn to him, largely because he acknowledges her intellect: “He flatters my vanity, 
by talking to me as seriously and sensibly as if I was a man” (222). Yet Marian combats 
Fosco’s attempt to dominate her as a parent or pet keeper in the end, particularly finding 
his admiration for her distasteful. Perhaps what Marian dislikes about the Count’s penchant 
for her is that he acknowledges and appreciates her deviations from traditionally feminine 
qualities—she tells people and her journal that she is weak like other women, thus declaring 
the Laura-like feminine ideal for herself, but the behavior that she shows is far different.81 
Fosco undermines Marian’s claims to femininity, forcing her into a system of value in 
which she could thrive as an ideal and erotically appealing creature but which is alien and 
uncomfortable given her nineteenth-century English upbringing.   
Not only are Laura and Marian depicted as different types of animals, no matter 
how much Marian tries to declare herself traditionally feminine like Laura, but there is also 
dissimilarity in the way they treat and engage with animals in the novel. Collins equates 
Laura, unlike the homeless Anne, with the ideal pet dog, temporarily led astray from the 
	
81 For a discussion of how Marian offers both an alternative to and upholding of traditional gender 
expectations, especially as she becomes an angel in the house at the end of the novel, as well as 
how she articulates misogynistic axioms about women, see Miller 125, 129. 
	 	 111 
home but belonging there in her innocent and purebred glory, and Laura’s actual dog serves 
a similar well-established function within the domestic order. The dog, Nina, plays a 
conventional role in solidifying reader dislike and distrust of Sir Percival Glyde through 
embodied communication. The creature, Nina, and the creaturely woman, Anne Catherick, 
both warn against Laura marrying the baronet. Nina disapproves of Sir Percival, as 
Gilmore, the solicitor charged with protecting Laura’s affairs, explicates in his narrative: 
“The little beast, cowardly and cross-grained as pet-dogs usually are, looked up at him 
sharply, shrank away from his [Sir Percival’s] outstretched hand, whined, shivered, and 
hid itself under a sofa” (133). Here the pet refuses the touch of Sir Percival as “[h]e held 
out his hand, and called to the dog good-humouredly.” The amiable Gilmore attempts to 
look out for Laura’s best interests in her engagement, but his reading of Nina shows that 
his good intentions do not always have a solid perception of human and animal character 
to match. Gilmore simultaneously infantilizes the dog by pointing to her diminutive stature 
and disavows her ability to judge by emphasizing that she is merely a “beast.” He 
generalizes about pets as stubborn and fearful, assuming that Nina’s retreat from Sir 
Percival’s outstretched hand was irrational. But Victorian readers were attuned to the 
instinctual knowingness of fictional dogs, particularly as they engaged and interfered in 
courtship rituals, as we saw in chapter 1’s analysis of Tarter attacking Donne and 
embracing Louis in Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley. When Nina “barked and snapped at” Sir 
Precival (134), experienced readers of Victorian fiction know to be suspicious of the 
Baronet just as they are comforted when the greyhound physically shows appreciation for 
Gilmore: “Her cross-grained pet greyhound was in the room, and I fully expected a barking 
and snapping reception. Strange to say, the whimsical little brute falsified my expectations 
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by jumping into my lap, and poking its sharp muzzle familiarly into my hand the moment 
I sat down” (141). Gilmore expects unintelligent violent touch from the dog to be directed 
at all unfamiliar humans, but receives affectionate caresses appropriate to what we know 
of the lawyer’s evidently worthy character. Nina attempts to perform protective violent 
touch as described in the first chapter of this project, but Laura is not closely engaged with 
her enough to read that touch and other people do not recognize or value her opinion 
enough to follow her guidance. Laura follows patriarchal dictates and marries the man her 
father endorsed before his death, though her dog told her better.   
Beyond highlighting good and bad characters early in the novel, Nina also acts as 
a prop in Laura’s idealized domestic setting before she leaves Limmeridge House upon her 
marriage, rather than as a companion. Walter briefly mentions Laura’s dog in his account 
of watching her picturesque walks from afar: “By her side, trotted a little Italian greyhound, 
the pet companion of all her walks” (92) Yet again, Nina is not valued as a companion with 
whom to share communicative touch. Laura “did not seem to notice the dog…The dog 
shivered and trembled, and pressed against her dress impatiently for notice and 
encouragement. But she never heeded him” (92). The simultaneously bland and somewhat 
cruel description has the cold dog longing to be comforted by Laura’s physical affection. 
Walter’s narration does not criticize Laura’s lack of attention towards Nina, but he rather 
admires the fact that she is so absent in her thoughts, presumably of her unrequited love 
for him, that she remains beautifully unaware of her canine companion. In fact, Walter’s 
lack of interest even extends to not naming and misgendering the female dog as a “him.” 
Nina as Laura’s pet deviates from Fosco’s animals in several ways. First, Laura is not 
represented as having a close embodied bond with the dog. Next, Nina is a clear marker of 
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Laura’s class status: “For the upper classes, pedigreed dogs reflected the high status of their 
owners” (Amato 26). The greyhound was a breed favored by the upper classes and even 
royalty, including Queen Victoria, unlike the working-class pets in the Count’s 
possession.82 The breed was frequently featured in portraits of domestic scenes, so it is 
fitting that Nina is part of the image the artist Walter creates of Laura.83 Furthermore, the 
pet dog is a fleeting presence in the text, unlike Fosco’s persistently present pets, as Nina 
is not mentioned again in the discussion of Laura’s experience as a married woman at 
Blackwater Park. Nina’s brief textual presence serves three purposes in the text, none of 
which has to do with a significant affective bond between her and her human companion: 
first, she emphasizes Sir Percival’s bad character, next she makes up a part of the pictorial 
ideality of Laura’s world in Hartright’s eyes, and, finally, she reveals to readers that Laura 
is not attuned to the potential for meaningful human-animal touch. Laura disregards 
Fosco’s strange animal companions and her own pet dog, a potential reason why the Count 
feels little sympathy towards her. Thus, Laura’s inattention to animals leaves her doubly 
vulnerable: she misses the hints from her dog that, if heeded, could have led her to safety, 
and she does not display the ugly sympathy that would in turn make her more sympathetic 
to the man who would do her the most harm. 
Attention to Fosco points us in the direction of Marian not just as valuable woman, 
but also as an embodiment of grotesque human-animal sympathy. Just as Marian is not as 
attractive as Laura, Collins’s depiction of her encounter with an animal is less appealing to 
behold than Laura’s, though it is more sympathetic. Compare the vignette of Laura ignoring 	
82 See Baird, Victoria the Queen: An Intimate Biography of the Woman Who Ruled an Empire. 
83 For examples, see Wheatley, A Gentleman and His Dog in Landscape; Landseer, Study of a 
Greyhound (ca. 1860); Paperweight in the Shape of a Greyhound from John Derbyshire & Co. 
(design registered 1874). 
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Nina’s quest for comfort and affection to Marian’s encounter with Mrs. Catherick’s dying 
dog. Marian relates finding “a poor little dog — a black and white spaniel…[whose] eyes 
were glazing fast [with] spots of blood on its glossy white side” after being shot by the 
Blackwater Park gamekeeper (206). In her detailed and tactile description in her own 
journal, Marian uses “glossy” as a decidedly sensory term: one can see a glossy shine, but 
one can also feel glossy smoothness. While she is out for a walk by herself, Marian finds 
the dog in a shed by the lake and carries it “more than half a mile” (204) back to the main 
house: “I lifted the poor dog in my arms as gently as I could, and contrived a sort of make-
shift hammock for him to lie in, by gathering up the front of my dress all round him. In this 
way, I took the creature, as painlessly as possible, and as fast as possible, back to the house” 
(206). Given the description of the dog’s coloring, the animal is likely part English Springer 
Spaniel, a breed that usually weighs over 50 pounds. Regardless of the dog’s exact weight, 
a medium dog of anything between 25 and 60 pounds is a substantial weight for a woman 
to carry the distance from the lake to the main house. As well as the trek from the shed in 
which she finds the dog, Marian’s rooms are on the second floor of the house, an extra 
distance to carry the dog. It dies in the main house rather than the shed, Marian’s rooms 
rather than the servants quarters: “I went up at once to my own sitting-room, made a bed 
for the dog with one of my old shawls” (206). Here, the age of Marian’s shawl points to 
the humility of her belongings, instead of a choice to sacrifice only bad clothes to the dying 
dog, since the shawl was good enough for her to bring from Limmeridge to her new home 
at Blackwater Park.  
Marian engages with the dog physically as it moves from life to death. Marian takes 
notice of the dog, attends to the dog’s needs, holds it to her body, soils her dress with its 
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blood (as she walks back to the house with the dog wrapped in her clothes like Fosco’s 
pets), does not abandon the horrible scene to leave the dog under the watch of servants, 
and cares for the creature until it dies. The dog has “spots of blood on its glossy white side” 
(206), so when Marian takes the dog in her arms it is not just body-to-body contact in the 
conventional sense. The blood is internal matter flowing to the outside and coming into 
contact with another being. This reveals a willingness on Marian’s part to have a physical 
encounter that many would find contaminating, and a profound intimacy of nurturing when 
the creature is at its most vulnerable. Marian outlines the progressive failing of the dog’s 
senses from the “eyes…glazing fast” (206) to a dim vocalization to a bodily convulsion: 
“The dog was dead. It had given a faint, sobbing cry, it had suffered an instant’s convulsion 
of the limbs…in one moment the creature lay lifeless under our [Marian’s and the 
housekeeper’s] hands” (209). The dog’s senses cease to work as it approaches death, but 
presumably the dog can feel comforting touch until the end, and, significantly, the tremors 
of the animal body are mentioned last, after both sight and voice. Sight goes, voice fails, 
so the final mode of communication from the dog is physical movement that takes place 
“under [their] hands.” Earlier in this segment of the novel, both Marian and the 
housekeeper also have embodied responses to the dog, with Marian “start[ing] to [her] feet 
in a fright” upon hearing the dying dog (205) and the housekeeper “start[ing] and 
chang[ing] colour” when “she saw the dog on the floor” (207). Since their emotional 
reactions resonate deeply in the bodies of Marian and the housekeeper, one can imagine 
that it was another sensory shock that Collins hoped would reverberate on the bodies of 
readers as well. With the dog laying on the ground, Marian must either stoop or sit on the 
floor herself to tend to the animal, a lowering gesture that is surprising for a woman of 
	 	 116 
Marian’s class positioning and a supplicant position for a human to take in relation to a 
dog. The housekeeper implores Marian to “moisten its lips with the milk” as she “wash[es] 
the clotted hair from the wound” (207), so both women are involved in deeply physical, 
uncomfortable, ugly, and nurturing labor, as Marian holds milk to the dying dog’s mouth 
and the servant tends its bloody injury. Marian’s task is especially maternal, as she provides 
milk for the weak creature. Marian attending to the wounded spaniel is a prime example of 
Schreiner’s “mother-love” in action, since this episode makes clear “the guardianship of 
the strong over the weak,” and Schreiner might argue that this ministration shows Marian’s 
evolved nature: “You may almost estimate the height of development in the creature by 
the amount of mother-love and care he stands for” (From Man to Man 185-186, ital. mine). 
Fosco would agree that Marian is an advanced “creature.”   
The gruesomeness of Marian’s encounter with the dying dog is accompanied by the 
ambivalence of her language of sympathy. Marian laments the dog’s passing, though she 
follows that exclamation with a sentence riddled with qualifying phrases: “The poor little 
dog! I wished my first day at Blackwater park had not been associated with death — though 
it is only the death of a stray animal” (209). Death is bad, but this death “only” affects an 
“animal” and a “stray” at that. On the one hand, this animal death is a plot device that 
serves as an omen that makes Marian anxious for the humans Laura and Anne. Yet, 
Marian’s actions in this scene—her embodied human-animal bonds—convey more 
meaning, more about the depth of her character and why that richness attracts others like 
Fosco to her, than her words. Marian is generally a reliable narrator; however, readers 
should question Marian’s capability to speak in an unbiased way about her own worth and 
that of other animals. Just as Marian uses the qualifying “only” to describe the dog’s 
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passing, she uses the same language to undermine her own status: “I was only a woman” 
(245); “My courage was only a woman’s courage” (319); “You shall not regret, Walter, 
that you have only a woman to help you” (439); “Don’t refuse me because I’m only a 
woman” (583). Though Marian is “only a woman,” her intellect and bravery permeates the 
novel; if being “only a woman” is to be more vibrant than other characters (like Walter and 
Laura, for examples) or less treacherous (than Sir Percival), then to be only a stray dog 
might have significant value regardless of what Marian’s words indicate to the contrary. 
Even though the dog is “only” a stray animal, Marian insists that the creature merits 
profound sympathy: “The misery of a weak, helpless, dumb creature is surely one of the 
saddest of all the mournful sights which this world can show” (206). This declaration is 
extreme. Animals like Mrs. Catherick’s dog do not just make the compassionate Marian 
feel. According to Marian, this kind of nonhuman suffering is likely to provoke such 
intense feeling in anyone. The language implies the universality of such solicitude, with 
the absence of “me” or “I” in the sentence, which shows the expansiveness Marian’s sense 
of sympathy for the lowly.  
Despite Marian describing sympathy for the dying dog in terms that imply common 
sentiment, not all characters in The Woman in White extend fellow feeling as widely as 
Marian. Laura cares for Marian and Walter, but does not even show concern or attention 
for her own dog. Walter loves Laura as an innocent creature, but has less sympathy for 
Anne as a poor stray creature and for Marian as an odd creature. Fosco has affection for 
his mice, canaries, cockatoo, the sickly monkey, and Marian, but little sympathy for Laura 
or Anne. Marian alone has sympathy for all human and nonhuman animals: the privileged, 
the lost, the stray, and the strange. As much as she resists it, she even feels a sympathetic 
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draw to Count Fosco. While Fosco endearingly cares for those whom society frequently 
abandons, he does not seem to esteem others. Marian has compassion for both those 
socially ignored and those valued. Heeding Count Fosco turns our eyes to unorthodox 
forms of sympathy—sympathy for the odd like Fosco’s pets and Marian, and the sympathy 
that the peculiar Marian displays towards nonhuman animal others. Fosco and Marian 
reveal that valuable sympathy is not just a pretty picture of a lovely young woman walking 
with her purebred dog, but can also be the excessively grotesque and unaesthetic images 
of an unattractive woman holding a dying dog in her arms and mice and birds erotically 
clamoring over a fat man’s body. Fosco claims that Marian “is a person of similar 
sensibility…Miss Halcombe is a person of similar sensibility” to himself (337, 338).84 
Resist as she might being the Count’s pet and protégé, her sympathy for the wounded stray 
dog begs to differ. The place where the similarity in sensibility ends is in Marian’s ability 
to extend consideration further than the Count in her sympathy not just for the strange and 
poor creatures, but the typical as well. The Count’s sympathy is exclusionary, but so too is 
that system of feeling proffered by typical English mores of the Victorian era exemplified 
in Walter. The other chapters in this project focus on dogs and cats—different in how they 
challenge the anthropocentrism of the typical Victorian family and in their breeds (or lack 
thereof), but still somewhat conventional for middle and upper class pet keepers of the 
time. Fosco’s deviation from attachment for standard types shows his ability to reach even 
further beyond the status quo. Fosco points to sympathetic alternatives featuring grotesque 
human-animal touch, but the “magnificent Marian” (336) comes closer to an all-inclusive 
	
84  Marian describes Fosco as having moments of being genuinely “a Man of Sentiment—of 
sentiment, as I believe, really felt, not assumed for the occasion (286). For Fosco’s references to 
his sentiments, see 286, 289, 329, 333, 336, 337, 338, 589-90, and 607. 
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ideal. This chapter dealt with grotesque sympathy, but the next chapter builds on this to 
show the lack of a clear distinction between violence and benevolence in grotesque mercy 
killings.  	
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CHAPTER 4. EMBODIED GRIEF AND VIOLENT SYMPATHY IN FRANCES 
POWER COBBE’S REPRESENTATIONS OF GRIEVING DOGS 
“[T]he care of the dead body…is therefore a sign of piety, of love, of affection, and of 
religious devotion…it is about linking the common dead to the divine through the bodies 
of blessed martyrs—the special dead—around whom they are buried. Place and proximity 
matter after all.”—Thomas Laqueur’s The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal 
Remains 
 
Olive Schreiner’s 1921 reburial with her dog, Nita, which left “[t]he two, 
inseparable in life, now there together” (Cronwright-Schreiner 342), is a realization of the 
argument that human and animals who are bonded in life should remain together in death. 
This assertion is also made by the canine narrator of Frances Power Cobbe’s The 
Confessions of a Lost Dog (1867): “poor Snap was buried the same day as the mistress he 
loved, though they would not bury him at her feet, where he ought to have lain” (36). The 
placement of dead animal bodies was a topic of general concern in the Victorian era, with 
the rise of the animal graveyard as a place that indicates an imagined likeness of souls and 
eventual shared heavenly home between humans and animals. 85  The location of pet 
graveyards close to human places, particularly parks and later human cemeteries, is not the 
same as Schreiner’s and Cobbe’s interest in humans being buried with their animal 
companions. Furthermore, the supposed spiritual similarity made evident in animal burial 
grounds presents an abstract likeness that does not by itself account for the physical 
meeting of Schreiner and Nita in their final resting place—a human-animal nearness that 
	
85 See Howell, “A Place for the Animal Dead: Animal Souls, Pet Cemeteries, and the Heavenly 
Home” from At Home and Astray: The Domestic Dog in Victorian Britain. Howell positions 
himself against Teresa Mangum’s skepticism about human motives in both grieving for and talking 
about the grieving of animals; she argues that mourning for individual pets in the Victorian era 
often offered a distraction from and masked an indifference to broader violence against animals. 
See “Animal Angst: Victorians Memorialize Their Pets,” Victorian Animal Dreams 18. For other 
analyses of humans grieving for animals, see also Tague, Animal Companions 206, 226; “Dead 
Pets: Satire and Sentiment in British Elegies and Epitaphs for Animals.” 
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has implications beyond Schreiner’s seemingly anomalous interment. Rather than focusing 
on humans like Schreiner coping with animal death, this chapter considers animals grieving 
the loss of humans, turning to Cobbe and the various attempts at closeness and touch that 
her representations of human death and animal mourning display. Though death challenges 
the ability to touch, this chapter looks at several types of (at times thwarted) physical 
relationships between humans and animals around the event of death, with precise attention 
paid to what I will term “embodied grief” and “violent sympathy.” First, I explore 
embodied grief, a response to the loss of the physical connection that humans and animals 
shared when both were living. In this form of mourning, the body is the main way for 
animals to convey the power of their feelings,86 through the animal staying near the dead 
human body and devastation so profound that it causes physical markings even to the extent 
of disease. The second section of this chapter hones in on mediated or instrumental touch, 
particularly as it appears in violently sympathetic “mercy killings” of dogs exhibiting signs 
of extreme embodied grief. Philip Howell takes it as a given that a pet was an “undeniable 
member of the family” (128), but an exploration of these relationships centered on touch 
at the point of death—at times erotic, intimate, and violent—foregrounds the complex 
sculpting of identities that go into this human-animal family. 
Although Thomas Laqueur defines “necro-sociability” as the ways that human 
identities and communities are shaped by interactions with the dead, a process in which 
animals have no place, I pursue aspects of necro-sociability that Laqueur neglects by 
focusing on representations of animal attempts to participate in social and physical 
relationships with dead human bodies. In their emphasis on the deeply felt emotional 
	
86 See Smuts, “Embodied Communication in Non-Human Animals.” 
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experience of animal grief, recent scholarship (Barbara J. King’s How Animals Grieve) and 
novels (Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone) demonstrate interest in what can be described 
as necro-social animal behaviors around burial and the importance placed on the bodies of 
the dead. Still, they deal primarily with practices between animals of the same species or 
among different groups of nonhuman animals. Instead of focusing on same-species kinship, 
I concentrate on the relationships between human and nonhuman animals in order to argue 
that Frances Power Cobbe allows animals a place in Victorian family structures through 
her depictions of necro-social grieving animals. In doing so, Cobbe’s schema recognizes 
gender on a flexible continuum as she posits a feminized animal grief marked by excess, 
while she concurrently masculinizes human sympathy by making it violent through mercy 
killings of grieving animals that complicate our accepted understandings of nineteenth-
century sentiment. If, as Martha Vicinus has argued, “[t]he sex/gender system did not fit 
any neat paradigm, but rather was adapted and altered by both observers and participants 
as circumstances warranted” (11), Cobbe’s work evokes binarized gender stereotypes—
including that women are excessively emotional in a way that is intensely felt in the body, 
though intellectually shallow—in order to show how fluid, unstable, and fictional those 
gender categories always already were.  
Cobbe, a journalist and reformer, actor in the Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals and later founding member and leader of the Victoria Street Society 
which focused on antivivisectionist work, was a central public voice for both animal 
welfare and women’s rights in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These dual concerns 
point to the importance of intersectionality in Cobbe’s works, as her pieces dealing with 
gender typically also addressed animals and vice versa—as in the always male perpetrators 
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of violence against the lost Hajjin in The Confessions of a Lost Dog and the men killing 
animals in order to punish their spouses in “Wife-Torture in England” (1878).87 While 
Cobbe’s public work showed the vulnerability and fictionality of the Victorian ideal of 
separate spheres that associated women with the domestic, her private experience as a pet 
keeper, which she also made public through her writings, helps to establish her expertise 
on the subject of human-animal relationships. Cobbe’s intimacy with her dogs enabled her 
to theorize about real life human-animal relationships. The impetus for much of Cobbe’s 
work on behalf of animals was disgust with animal experimentation for scientific gain and 
a hesitance to accept the moral and intellectual authority of medical men.88 Even when 
Cobbe’s animal writings, including descriptions of dogs she personally knew, were not 
explicitly about vivisection, contextual magnitude remains in Cobbe’s “some two hundred 
tracts for the antivivisection movement” (Mitchell 2). Cobbe and her fellow 
antivivisectionists were most offended by the fact that it was the animals that should have 
been domestic pets—dogs and cats—who were used for experimentation, displaying the 
problematically exclusionary nature of Cobbe’s animal welfare ethics.89 Nevertheless, 
Cobbe’s sense of the incorrect treatment of household animals sheds light on her 
conceptualization of the correct way to treat animals. 
In spite of Cobbe’s value to scholars trying to understand nineteenth-century 
perceptions of animals, distinct demands exist in dealing with Cobbe’s animal writings. 
Specifically, the violence perpetuated against the grieving animal body, as well as the 
	
87 See The Confessions of a Lost Dog 54; “Wife-Torture in England” 304, 311. 
88 See Obenchain, The Victorian Vivisection Debate: Frances Power Cobbe, Experimental Science 
and the ‘Claims of Brutes.’ 
89 For a discussion of Cobbe’s meat-eating versus her understanding of scientific experimentation 
as cruel, see Broomfield and Mitchell’s introduction to “The Rights of Man and the Claims of 
Brutes” 263.   
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apparent anthropocentrism of animal mourning for the dead human versus proto-
posthumanism at other places, makes Cobbe’s animal philosophy challenging to classify 
according to our present categories. This difficulty particularly arises in the copiousness of 
her works on the subject, along with the conflicting ideas that occur within that quantity of 
materials written over a span of roughly forty years. Further, self-contradictions appear 
even within the same pieces. For example, in the antivivisectionist treatise titled “The 
Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes” (1863), Cobbe for a moment engages in what can 
arguably be called proto-posthumanist 90  thought when she encourages humans to act 
“disinterestedly” in their charitable encounters with animals: “We are bound to consider 
the welfare of the brutes for their sakes, not ours” (281). At this particular point in this 
essay, Cobbe positions her animal-centric ethics against moralists for whom “cruelty was 
forbidden, not because it tortured the animal, but because it brutalized the man” (280); yet, 
throughout this piece she also argues that we can allow animal suffering for our wants, just 
not our wantonness (274). In this system, meat eating is an example of a want, while 
prolonged experimentation on animals sans anesthesia is wantonness. Elsewhere she 
follows the well-trod understanding that the problem with boys’ cruelty to animals is that 
it will ultimately lead them to be cruel to humans (The Modern Rack 236).91 And despite 
indicating at times more egalitarian relationships between humans and animals, she also 
	
90 Current theorists identified as “posthumanist” do not always embrace the term. Part of the issue 
is competing though related loyalties in fighting different oppressions, gender and species, as well 
as the continued challenges faced by those occupying distinct identity categories: “I never wanted 
to be posthuman, or posthumanist…For one thing, urgent work still remains to be done in reference 
to those who must inhabit the troubled categories of woman and human” (When Species Meet 17). 
So the fact that Cobbe is at times focused on human experiences is in fitting with this perspective. 
Gates refers Cobbe as proto-ecofeminist. See Kindred Nature 252. 
91 See also the work of the Brontës as discussed in chapter 1, as well as Hogarth’s The Four Stages 
of Cruelty. 
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uses the hierarchical terms “master” and “mistress” throughout her career, implying 
servitude and slavery for the animal companion.92 In “The Consciousness of Dogs” (1872), 
Cobbe even goes so far as to state that the bond between dogs and humans is analogous to 
the relationship between humans and god (436). Cobbe’s grieving animals highlight 
particularly complicated moments in her forward thinking. Her flashes of proto-
posthumanism appear amid progressive but still often problematically anthropocentric 
thought, in which she acknowledges the emotional depth of animals, but that emotion is 
always motivated by or directed towards humans. The animals who mourn in Cobbe’s 
writings build on the tradition of canine fidelity, in which the human who is mourned, and 
the humanity for which the individual stands as a representative, is the focal point. 
Nevertheless, these renderings of grief also acknowledge the emotional depth of animals, 
in contrast to Descartes’ famous and far reaching description of animals as automata driven 
by instinct. This recognition of animal emotion motivates what might otherwise appear to 
be a puzzling contradiction in Cobbe’s thought: Cobbe ultimately insists that animals not 
be killed for science and human medical gain while also maintaining that they can be killed 
to spare them emotional and physical suffering in the texts that are at the center of this 
chapter’s analysis. 
Cobbe returns to the idea of pet dogs who are grieving so profoundly that they must 
be mercifully killed in order to spare them their unbearable physical and emotional misery 
in The Confessions of a Lost Dog and “Dogs Whom I Have Met” (1872). Confessions is 
written from the perspective of Cobbe’s dog, Hajjin (fig. 3), and tells of a former dog 
	
92 Borrowing from Marcus, Flegel argues that the human-animal relationships in Cobbe’s The 
Confessions of a Lost Dog allow the mistress a form of erotic dominance (“Mistresses and 
Masters”). 
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acquaintance of Hajjin’s who had to be put down because of his emotional response to the 
death of his human companion, evident through erratic physical behaviors that brought him 
in contact with the coffin of his beloved human. Five years later Cobbe details an eerily 
similar story of animal loss, this time with the canine victims multiplied and the physical 
manifestation of grief pathologized as hydrophobia in the essay “Dogs Whom I Have Met.” 
In both of these narratives, meaningful physical touch between human and animal 
companions both in life and death is replaced with a mediated violent sympathetic 
encounter, one that requires deadly mercy. This violent sympathy, on the one hand an 
example of presumably difficult to perform mercy, also brings the human sympathizer with 
animals into close connection with the indifferent masculinized violence of scientific men, 
the vivisectionists whose invasive experimentation on animals Cobbe spent much of her 
career censuring. Cobbe’s anecdotes of animal grief suggest that literature often dismissed 
as simplistically playing with reader emotions was actually engaging with questions about 
the complexity of sympathetic mercy in a way that can stimulate our philosophical 
comprehension of human-animal relations today. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Photograph of 
Hajjin 
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Fidelity and Feminized Embodied Grief 
Cobbe’s literary treatment of grieving animals appears against the backdrop of the 
frequently analyzed fidelity trope, in which dogs are described as either remaining by the 
corpse of their human companions or returning repeatedly to the human’s grave.93 Early 
nineteenth-century interest in the concept of canine loyalty after death was reflected in the 
artistic preoccupation with the life and death of Charles Gough, an artist who died during 
an ill-advised and unguided exploration of Helvellyn in 1805. When his skeletal remains 
were found several months after his death, his dog was still present on the scene. Initial 
responders and more recent scholars alike hypothesized that his dog ate Gough’s corpse—
an altogether different kind of embodied connection; still, the Romantics were able to look 
upon the story with more idealistic eyes. Sir Walter Scott’s “Helvellyn” (1806), William 
Wordsworth’s “Fidelity” (1807), and Edwin Landseer’s Attachment (1829) all take the 
story of Gough’s death as their inspiration. Though Landseer’s painting is careful to show 
no signs of decomposition (whether by slower natural processes or at the teeth of the dog),94 
Wordsworth describes “[a] human skeleton” (l. 39) and Scott points to how “the pilgrim of 
nature lay stretched in decay / Like the corpse of an outcast abandoned to weather, / Till 	
93 For readings of the fidelity trope, see Kenyon-Jones, Kindred Brutes 160-161; Garber, Dog Love 
249-258; Brown, “Dog Narrative: Itinerancy, Diversity, and the Elysium of Dogs” from Homeless 
Dogs and Melancholy Apes, particularly her discussion of death and transcendental reunion 135-
143; Perkins, Romanticism and Animal Rights 27; Mangum 19-20; Kete, “The Notion of Fidelity 
in a Bourgeois World” from The Beast in the Boudoir, which reads the fidelity trope as an idealistic 
response to the anxieties of modernity, and elsewhere she discusses cat grief and suicide 117, 128; 
Pielak uses the term “animemorial” to describe a living memorial of dead humans, Memorializing 
Animals During the Romantic Period 132-140.  
94 The placard currently with Landseer’s painting at the Saint Louis Art Museum has a similarly 
idealized description of the history behind the painting: “A climber, Charles Gough, fell to his death 
in 1805 in the Lake District region of northwest England; his faithful terrier kept guard over the 
body for three months.” One might wonder if the children who visit the museum are part of the 
reason for this sanitized history; if so, that revision shows striking cultural shifts given Cobbe’s 
decision to put a grotesque fidelity narrative in The Confessions of a Lost Dog, a story written for 
children.	
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the mountain-winds wasted the tenantless clay” (ll. 10-12). Although only the god who 
granted the dog such a capacity for faithfulness knows “[h]ow [the dog was] nourished 
here” (l. 62), Wordsworth insists that “proof was plain that since that day / On which the 
traveller thus had died / The dog had watched about the spot, / Or by his master’s side” (ll. 
58-61). Much the same, Scott holds onto the idea of the protective fidelity of the canine 
companion: “Nor yet quite deserted… / For, faithful in death, his mute friend attended, / 
The much-loved remains of her master defended, / And chased the hill-fox and the raven 
away” (ll. 13-16). With Wordsworth’s emphasis on the dog’s location “by his master’s 
side” and Scott’s description of the “much-loved remains,” longstanding affection coupled 
with close proximity to the body of the dead are a crucial part of the fidelity tradition that 
Cobbe maintains. Wordsworth continued to attend to the pull of the grieving animal to the 
deceased human in “The White Doe of Rylstone” (1815), and Landseer’s The Faithful 
Hound (ca. 1830), The Shepherd’s Last Mourner (1837), The Shepherd’s Grave (1838) 
also take up the theme. The Romantic ideal of fidelity carries over into the myth making 
that occurs in biographies of nineteenth-century authors, including Lord Byron’s dog, 
Lyon, following the poet’s corpse on its return from Greece to England and dying shortly 
thereafter (Kenyon-Jones 50) and Emily Brontë’s dog, Keeper, participating in her funeral 
service, famously described in Elizabeth Gaskell’s 1857 Life of Charlotte Brontë (294). 
For a Victorian example of the trope of the grieving animal in the cultural consciousness, 
we can look to the tale of Greyfriar’s Bobby, a dog who was said to watch over his owner’s 
grave for 14 years until the dog's own death in 1872.95 All of these examples follow the 
Romantic ideals of fidelity and same-sex friendship, in which both the dog and human were 
	
95 See American author Eleanor Atkinson’s Greyfriar’s Bobby (1912) 
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made heroically masculine—a valiantly dedicated friend—even when the dog was actually 
female.96 This regendering of the canine companion is seen to the extreme in Wordsworth’s 
“Fidelity,” in which the poet explicitly makes the dog male (note the shift from Scott’s 
historically accurate “her master” to Wordsworth’s “his master’s side”). In the Romantic 
tradition, male dogs perform canine fidelity and direct this faithfulness towards men. These 
earlier texts are more sentimental and saccharine than Cobbe’s exploration of the same 
subject. Canine fidelity in Cobbe’s writings displays far more messiness in animal grief, 
with the dogs displaying extreme feminized emotion to the point of madness and disease. 
Cobbe’s advocacy works show less vulnerability to sweetness or human self-centeredness 
than those in the dominant tradition of predominantly male-authored texts.97  
For Cobbe, animal grief usually takes an embodied, physical form, as we see 
grieving animals pulled to the dead bodies of their human companions. In “The 
Consciousness of Dogs,” Cobbe points to the legend of Greyfriar’s Bobby described above 
as the prime example of canine selflessness and faithfulness: “He [referring to the general 
dog] acts continually from pure love and sympathy, with perfect disinterestedness. Nobody 
ever taught, or could teach a dog…to spend long years, like Grey-Friar’s Bobby, mourning 
on his grave” (441). But Cobbe pushes beyond the standard dramatic fidelity trope in other 
places, which showcase even more extravagant versions of excess in mourning. There, 
	
96  The ideal of same-sex friendship was influenced by “[t]he rise of sentimentality and then 
Romanticism,” which began “[d]uring the second half of the eighteenth century, [with] women’s 
intimate friendships” (Vicinus xvii).	
97 While the focus in this chapter is on Cobbe’s representations of animal grieving, one can also 
look to Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1838) for excessive animal grief leading to animal death. 
In that novel, Bill Sikes’s dog, Bull’s-Eye, accidentally throws himself to his death trying to 
physically reconnect with his dead human partner who has died in an attempt to escape an angry 
mob. This example also displays a chaotic grief, but the ambiguity of intention keeps it from acting 
as an instance of fidelity in the same way as the pieces by Cobbe and her predecessors. 
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grieving animals accompany their human companions in death. In “The Rights of Man and 
the Claims of Brutes,” Cobbe stresses both the heroism and self-sacrifice of dogs, willing 
to risk anything to protect the lives of their human companions. When the human’s life 
cannot be saved, Cobbe emphasizes the dogs’ dejection and continued proximity, as the 
animals “will often refuse all food, and die of starvation upon his grave” (289) or, more 
generally, succumb to “grief for the loss of their masters” (285). Elsewhere, Cobbe puts 
this phenomenon even more expressly in relationship to touch, noting that “dogs, having 
no language to supplement their caresses, are of course more demonstrative than human 
beings; but if the master do not respond to the demonstration, the finer-natured dog…lives 
a life of devotion, and sometimes dies of despair on his master’s graves” (“Dogs Whom I 
Have Met” 664). Cobbe’s chronicles of animal grief are hyperbolic by today’s standards, 
evident when she claims that “[r]egret and grief [the dog] feels so deeply that they often 
break his heart” (“The Consciousness of Dogs” 428), but even this dramatic description 
shows restraint compared to her treatment of the subject in much of her prose. The dog’s 
death is often presented as the natural result of the dog’s emotional turmoil in losing a 
beloved human or as a suicide of sorts that grants the dog some power of choice, as in the 
above instances; however, death sometimes becomes the premeditated result of a human’s 
judgment of the animal’s severe psychological and bodily response.  
Grieving dogs are killed to spare them from embodied grief in both The Confessions 
of a Lost Dog and “Dogs Whom I Have Met.” The similarities are so striking, in fact, that 
they give the impression that the latter version is just a revision of the former. These 
narratives describe female pet keepers who die while away from home, and whose bodies, 
enclosed in coffins, are brought back to the dwelling they shared with their animal 
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companion. Hajjin, being a dog, does not have the precise vocabulary for the coffin (despite 
her otherwise fluent English), but explains that “one day, an awful black thing, like a great 
box, was brought and put into the middle of her library” (35). The fumble at this word 
foregrounds the helplessness and unspeakable nature of grief, and the “awful black thing” 
that stands in the stead of the correct term makes the manufactured object linguistically, 
emotionally, and physically incomprehensible. In much the same manner, in “Dogs Whom 
I Have Met,” “her body was brought to her house enclosed in a leaden coffin placed on 
trestles in her library” (671). The coffin as a material entity is important in that it prohibits 
direct physical contact between the animals and their human companions, and the 
expectation is that the failure to see the body will also preclude understanding of what the 
box contains and, by extension, the solemn event that necessitates its presence. But this is 
not the case in either tale. Both Snap and Sly inexplicably recognize that the new object 
placed within the room is an indication of death: “Then poor Snap knew somehow that his 
mistress was dead, and that she was in that black box” (Confessions 35); “In some 
inscrutable manner the strange, pall-covered object conveyed to the dog the fact that her 
beloved mistress lay within” (“Dogs Whom I Have Met” 671). Likewise, the dogs respond 
with similar physical activity in the two narratives: “[Snap] jumped up at it, and yelled and 
screamed so wildly, that it was necessary to shut him out of the room” (35); “the poor brute 
[Sly] yelled with agony, and leaped again and again upon the coffin with piteous 
gesticulations of fondness and despair” (671). Cobbe uses yelling and screaming, terms 
that can be used to describe either human or animal utterance, but are more typically 
employed in reference to humans.98 The jumping and leaping at the coffin are both physical 
	
98 See Menely, The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice. 
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exhibitions of grief, but they are also an attempt on the part of the animal to get near the 
body of the human. All of these visceral and bodily responses provoke pity, as they are a 
language to be read, telling of lamentations for the lost physical encounters and 
concomitant relationships.  
Cobbe’s writings on dogs make evident that bonds between (often female) human 
companions and their dogs can create an alternative to traditional heteronormative marriage 
structures, and that gender identity can be renegotiated in these untraditional 
arrangements.99 This move that harkens back to Olive Schreiner’s and Wilkie Collins’s 
understanding of gender fluidity and flexibility with regards to who could fill the maternal 
role in human-animal relationships. Cobbe’s “Dogs Whom I Have Met” offers an extended 
effort at proclaiming the significance of canine consciousness and the legitimacy of the 
partnership between humans and animals—from the use of “whom” rather than the 
objectifying “that” in the title to the essay’s larger attempt to place the human-animal 
relationship within a (surprisingly amorphous) heteronormative system. In this essay, 
Cobbe coins the term “polydoggery” for when “one human being [keeps] several dogs at 
once,” something which she condemns as “a thing against which all proper feeling revolts” 
(666). Cobbe evokes traditional marital expectations for humans as she insists upon 
monogamy in human-animal couples. Further delineating proper behaviors which mirror 
human marriage, Cobbe clarifies that “[w]hen one dog is dead, after a reasonable interval 
the widowed owner may, without violation of decency, take to himself another canine 
companion.” Here Cobbe uses the masculine pronoun for the human, though her writing 
	
99 For a discussion of how female marriages were often socially if not legally sanctioned, and even 
given legitimacy through the pet, see Marcus, Between Women 52. Marcus includes Cobbe as an 
example of a participant in such a union. 
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makes clear that either men or women could commit the grave moral error of polydoggery. 
Furthermore, the language of “the widowed owner” confuses gender identity, since either 
a man or a woman can be widowed, as the verb can apply to both widow and widower. 
This prescription for a single canine domestic partner also subtly evokes the problem of 
surplus women, significant given Cobbe’s work in aid of finding homes for excess dogs.100 
Since there were more women and dogs than potential husbands and human companions 
to claim them, this grants (hu)man(s) the power of choice and the authority to deem 
potential wives and pets unfit for roles as domestic companions.  
Cobbe compares marital and human-animal bonds, but also reveals that differences 
remain between human spouses and human-animal partnerships, particularly with regards 
to the duration of the intimate relationship. For instance, Cobbe describes the “wisdom a 
dog would attain who should live to the length of our span, and could celebrate a ‘Golden’ 
anniversary of devotion to his master” (“Consciousness of Dogs” 422). She continues by 
noting that the already profound grief that humans experience for their pets would increase 
with this expanded lifespan, and thus “would trespass too closely on the sacred borders of 
human bereavement.” Human partnerships with dogs are likened to marital unions, but 
they are not quite the same in Cobbe’s estimation. Although Cobbe assumes that the ability 
of humans to care for dogs is limited by the abbreviated life expectancy of the animals, she 
places no boundaries on the love dogs feel for their human companions, with this intimate 
attachment made especially evident in Cobbe’s representations of grieving dogs. As Cobbe 
masculinizes the human companions, the dogs of Cobbe’s prose take on a stereotypically 	
100	Mitchell explains that The Confessions of a Lost Dog was written to raise funds and attention 
for the Lost Dog’s Home at Holloway (166), and one of the morals in the text is Hajjin’s learning 
to sympathize with lost dogs. For an explanation of the Victorian distinction between lost dogs, 
who were worthy of a home, and other less deserving strays, see Howell 78.  
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feminine role in their excessive emotional responses to death, because it was thought in the 
event of death that women (like the dogs Cobbe describes) “could not control their 
feelings” and thus they were often not permitted to be a part of burial ceremonies (Jalland 
221). Therefore, animal devotion to a human “master” in life and the forceful exclusion 
from the processes of grieving death reflects Victorian gender ideologies as well as 
speciesist hierarchies. Cobbe’s grieving dogs operate like the woman whose entire identity 
depends on her role as wife, validating these emotions for her public even as she 
accentuates the subordinate position of these figures under the present systems of power. 
In her treatment of gender and species, Cobbe exhibits just how flexible these 
categories could be. Cobbe’s challenge to strict gender identities through her feminization 
of dogs aligns with other nonconventional aspects of her private domestic life and public 
identity. In her partnership with Mary Lloyd, Cobbe also challenged heteronormative 
structures and the types of bonds that were deemed to be of value in Victorian culture. 
Cobbe and Lloyd engaged in what was termed by Sharon Marcus a “female marriage,” 
becoming a model for this type of union between women: “The rhetoric of female marriage 
was best exemplified in lifewriting by and about Frances Power Cobbe” (51). Moreover, 
the couple’s long-lasting union and Cobbe’s profound grief over Lloyd’s death in 1896 
makes the pair a prime illustration of human fidelity: “The Ladies [of Hengwrit, Cobbe and 
Lloyd] had succeeded brilliantly in presenting themselves as exemplars of female fidelity” 
(Vicinus 14). Cobbe’s deliberately masculine lifestyle and authorial persona provoked 
observations from her friends and attacks from her opponents, and this individual assertion 
of identity connects to her fluid gendering of the human-pet couple.	Critics declared that 
“Cobbe was ‘manly’ or ‘strong-minded’…[and] she had ‘a tone of the trousers’” 
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(Obenchain 9) and an acquaintance, Lady Paget, described her “rather mannish ways” (qtd. 
in Obenchain 12). According to Marcus, Cobbe was indeed mannish: “she identified with 
the masculine world of politics, wore her hair short, and adopted streamlined fashions 
perceived as male” (52). Likewise, her animal writings utilize gender ambiguity and 
androgyny. Cobbe identified and was seen as masculine, and in much the same manner the 
gender-neutral names of the grieving dogs Snap (male) and Sly (female) welcome gender 
uncertainty. While others understood gender flexibility as worthy of insult or judgment, 
Cobbe found this fluidity beneficial, both in its ability to grant her self-empowerment as a 
woman and to help her rethink Victorian marriage and companionship systems through 
human-animal relationships. Feminizing dogs typically means that the animals are 
anthropomorphized and connotes a subordinate position within a patriarchal society. 
However, making dogs womanly also aligns animals with the domestic sphere, bringing 
them into family structures in a meaningful way.   
 The flexible gendering of humans and animals in Cobbe’s writings offers alternatives 
to heteronormative domestic structures by affirming relationships made up of members of 
the same sex or different species. Yet Cobbe is not merely using the cross-species 
relationships as a coded legitimization of relationships between women. Confessions 
minimizes same-species partnerships in order to focus on human-animal bonds. Mary 
Lloyd appears briefly as an unnamed “lady who lived in the house with us,” and Hajjin is 
careful to note that “she did not love dogs” and judged the dog’s comfortable familiarity 
within the bedroom of her human companion by “look[ing] at [Hajjin] solemnly” and 
proclaiming her “a self-indulgent dog!” (20-21). Just as Lloyd’s true significance to Cobbe 
is not displayed in this rendering, Hajjin’s relationships with her biological family and 
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“husband” are secondary to the connection to Cobbe. While Cobbe was travelling, Hajjin 
formed “a marriage de convenance” (38) with Carlo, a golden retriever, but the match was 
dropped upon Cobbe’s return: “Of course, now she had come home, I had no time for 
Carlo” (40). The marriage of convenience with Carlo offers Hajjin a diverting physical 
relationship while Cobbe is away, but the cross-species kinship between Hajjin and Cobbe 
is presented as a superior companionate love match (the erotic human-animal relationship 
is more important than the sexual bond between canines). The text keeps circling back to 
the mutual love that Hajjin and Cobbe feel for each other: “My dear old mistress! I did not 
think then how you were to be the object of my whole life’s affections” (18); “My mistress 
loved me” (19); “I knew in my heart my mistress loved me” (23); “I loved my mistress 
dearly” (54). And Hajjin presents a love built on self-sacrifice as one that perseveres in 
sickness as in health, though the renunciation does appear unhealthily one-sided: “When a 
dog really loves, it prefers the person who gives it nothing, and perhaps is too ill ever to 
take it out for exercise” (16). On the one hand, this passage is anthropocentric (authored 
by a human giving voice to her real dog), assuming a spouse-like devotion on the part of 
the animal. At the same time, it presents a certain emotional intelligence on the part of the 
dog, understanding when a human cannot do something (versus willful negligence on the 
human’s part) and feeling deep devotion that does not take into account personal 
convenience. Speaking generally about animal autobiographies, Monica Flegel argues that 
Hajjin’s move from her biological first family to her second family with Cobbe 
“particularly works to prepare the girl reader for heteronormative marriage” (“Everything 
I Wanted to Know About Sex I Learned from My Cat” 125),101 but it seems unlikely that 
	
101 See also Flegel, Pets and Domesticity in Victorian Literature and Culture 187. 
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Cobbe’s tale is surreptitiously espousing conventional matrimony. By presenting the 
human-animal alliances as a coupling centered on love “till death do us part,” Cobbe 
explores conceptualizations of death and the species hierarchy in ways that promote 
worthwhile commitments between beings outside of the confines of traditional marriage. 
Hajjin understands death as the equalizer of species, not in the expected way of asserting 
that both humans and animals share common mortality, but rather that there is a similar 
response to the loss of the loved one: “in case of death…then they [humans] seem just as 
helpless as we are. They hope to see those they love again…The poor dumb dog, and the 
wisest man, are just alike. We seek those we love and find them not” (34). Love and death 
put dogs and humans on the same level. 
By describing a sacramental love between animals and humans that exists until and 
beyond death, Cobbe lays the groundwork for Hajjin to intervene in theological debates. 
Hajjin imagines a Heaven where humans and animals may be united: “Perhaps Snap 
managed to follow his mistress somehow. After all, she would, I think, have missed him a 
little in the very happiest place she could go. Surely it would not make people less enjoy 
any good place that it should be full of loving happy animals!” (36). Hajjin continues to 
hold that Eden itself, the ultimate Arcadian ideal, would not actually reach Edenic 
perfection without the presence of animals: “I should think it would be dull (I am sure my 
mistress would find it so) in a garden of Eden without birds or beasts.” Though Cobbe puts 
this argument in the humble canine voice of Hajjin, who tempers her assertion with 
“[p]erhaps,” “I think,” and “I should think,” she also grants that voice more authority with 
its confident “surely” and “I am sure” in her unconventional declaration that dogs have 
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souls.102 Howell notes the significant role of Victorian pet cemeteries and grieving for pets 
in going against traditional religious understandings of animal souls and the afterlife, 
describing “a complementary imagined geography that challenged Victorian orthodoxies” 
(129), but Cobbe does something more iconoclastic still in putting these musings in the 
voice of Hajjin; rather than just advocating a philosophy of separate but similar, Hajjin 
espouses physical nearness in burial and the afterlife. The title of Confessions emphasizes 
its place in the masculine traditions of religious autobiography harkening back to 
Augustine’s Confessions (ca. 400 AD), making the female dog Hajjin (whose name, 
according to Cobbe, means “pilgrim”) the subject of a quest narrative, one whose 
movement with regards to physical, intellectual, and moral development is at the center of 
the text.103 If we return to Laqueur’s idea of the importance of being buried near martyrs, 
and Cobbe’s association of humans with god, Hajjin’s promotion of the burial location of 
the dog “at her [human companion’s] feet” (36) has profound—meaningful, even if not 
completely egalitarian—religious and spiritual implications. 
In relaying the story of Snap, Hajjin notes the appropriateness of mistress and dog 
being together after death, with regards to both their earthly and otherworldly location, as 
	
102 Cobbe presents a similar opinion more boldly and in her own voice in “The Immortality of the 
Higher Animals,” anonymously published in the Spectator on November 18, 1871. In this brief 
piece, Cobbe points to the common belief that infants who have died would go to heaven, and from 
there holds that an animal, which surpasses babies in terms of “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, 
Intelligence, [and] Power of Love,” would undoubtedly find a place in the afterlife as well: “I 
merely contend that where any animal manifestly surpasses an average human infant in those steps 
of development which can be assumed to involve existence after death, then we are logically and 
religiously justified in expecting that the creator of both child and brute will show no favourtism 
for the smooth white skin over the rough hairy coat.” 
103 Hamilton points out that the biographical tradition that originated with Augustine allowed 
biography to become “a record of the individual mind as much as of the exploits of a person” (57). 
The genre continued to be a significant marker of Romantic subjectivity with Jean Jacques 
Rousseau’s Confessions (1789) and Thomas De Quincey Confessions of an English Opium Eater 
(1859). Hajjin’s quest can also be read as a bildungsroman plot. 
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would be fitting with a husband and wife. Hajjin holds that the pair’s preference for 
physical proximity was thwarted as they were put in the ground: “poor Snap was buried 
the same day as the mistress he loved though they would not bury him at her feet, where 
he ought to have lain” (36). This passage juxtaposes temporal and physical closeness, and, 
while it is meaningful that the dog’s death followed so closely after that of the human 
companion and that they were placed in the earth at essentially the same time, the failure 
to allow bodily nearness in death is described as unjust, failing to account for the intimacy 
in life and fidelity in death. Hajiin as narrator has the authority to present herself as more 
knowing than the corrupt yet powerful “they” who would not bury Snap where he 
belonged. Proximity, here, in addition to promoting species and spiritual similarities, 
demonstrates the ways that animals can be welcomed into burial practices usually reserved 
for members of the human family unit. Laqueur adds that humans “understood themselves 
to be creating, through bodies, specific memorial communities and specific histories” (93). 
Schreiner’s burial with Nita and Hajjin’s belief that pets and their beloved human 
companions should be placed close to each other in the ground are both attempts at building 
such necro-social groups membered with humans and dogs. Cobbe puts this desire in the 
voice of Hajjin, which shows a belief that this type of community was mutually beneficial 
for and wanted by humans and animals. A dog’s grave positioned next to that of a human 
companion highlights the possibility of a queer, feminist, non-reproductive, and potentially 
posthumanist history. The spiritual claims of an afterlife shared by humans and animals 
remains important, but the way that necro-sociability points backwards to experiences in 
life—the alternative families formed and the chronicle of those unions—is more significant 
still. 
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Masculinized Violent Sympathy and Grieving Unto Death 
The century that saw Queen Victoria’s extended and profound grief after the death 
of her husband, Prince Albert, privileged ritualized and at times extreme mourning within 
the royal family and among the masses, and spousal bonds were one of the relationships 
that sanctioned such mourning. Cobbe inserts the animal into these processes that were so 
central to Victorian life. Cobbe’s reworking of the Victorian family privileges human-
animal bonds but also acknowledges the violence often present in these domestic entities—
the violent emotion of the animal and the violent control of the human. Her anecdotes 
present grief for the death of the human spouse figure so extremely exhibited on the body 
and mind of the animal that the only possible end for the victim is in death, which is brought 
on by a putatively merciful human hand coming from outside the original dyad of human 
and pet.104 Cobbe brings her audience’s attention to the multiple means of interfering with 
or performing fierce versions of human-animal touch in portraying the demise of mourning 
animals. With men using guns to shoot grieving dogs and scalpels to dissect living animals, 
a point of direct contact exists between the human and the animal, but there is a mechanism 
involved that prohibits direct body-to-body encounter. This section of my chapter considers 
the deadly meetings with animals instigated either by executioners carrying out mercy 
killings or scientists experimenting on animals. To an extent the methodical cruelty that 
drew Cobbe’s ire on behalf of animals was not always far different in appearance from the 
form of sympathy that she encouraged, while the rationale behind these like actions were 
profoundly unalike. Here I consider phallic tools used in carrying out violent touch: the 	
104 Due to the fact that “euthanasia” did not come to mean mercy killing until the fin de siècle, I 
avoid using the word throughout unless I specify that I mean the precise nineteenth-century 
understanding of the term as a good and natural death. See Jalland, Death in the Victorian Family 
93. 
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gun of the mercy killer and instruments of the vivisector. In as much as Cobbe endorses 
these mercy killings, they destabilize the binary of masculine violence and feminine 
sympathy by complicating gender performance, the separation between public and private, 
and the concept of mercy in a pure and unambiguous form. Cobbe describes violent 
sympathy for grieving animals in such a way that clearly calls to mind vivisection in order 
to espouse an animal-centric moral consideration interested in the compassionate nature of 
the intent rather than on the act and outcome, as well as a gender-bending view of 
sympathy. 
Cobbe presents the anecdotes from “Dogs Whom I Have Met” and especially 
Confessions as depicting human mercy for animal suffering, but the mode of execution at 
points seems to complicate that intent. Both of these pieces depict grieving animals killed 
with guns, weapons that make death loud and messy, evoke murder when turned on 
humans, and deviate from our modern associations of euthanizing animals with the tonally 
and literally more peaceful “putting them to sleep.”105 Elsewhere, in condemning scientists 
who encage and examine dogs contaminated with rabies rather than “quickly [putting 
them] out of their misery by a merciful gun-shot” (The Modern Rack 233), Cobbe 
highlights the surprising benevolence that can come at the barrel of a gun. Regardless of 
the compassion behind the purpose, however, this method of killing is one that 
automatically requires some distance between the bodies of the shooter and victim, with 
	
105 Methods used to kill unwanted or ill animals during the nineteenth century included shooting, 
hanging, drowning, and poison. For an example of hanging unwanted animals, see Hareton 
destroying dogs in Wuthering Heights 183. Michael Field (pseudonym of Katherine Bradley and 
Edith Cooper) tried to mercy kill their ill dog, Whym Chow, with sleeping draughts, but mistakes 
meant that it took six hours for the dog to die. See Donoghue, We Are Michael Field 105. Thus, 
while unexpected to many of today’s readers, shooting could be one of the quicker and less painful 
methods of animal destruction at the time.  	
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this relationship creating a stark contrast with that which was shared between the animals 
and their human companions. Much like the tools used in the medical laboratory that Cobbe 
perceived to be indefensible instruments of torture, the guns in these passages are 
instruments that necessitate space between human and animal and, of course, allow 
violence. The same consequence arises in the case of both the vivisector who is indifferent 
to animal suffering and the mercy killer who is attuned to that pain: death. Yet, the rationale 
varies greatly, as the mercy killer destroys life because the animal’s physical and mental 
health has failed so completely as to make life untenable, while the vivisector kills to 
(supposedly) find benefits for human health. Cobbe not only gives thought to animal pain 
(in the example of the grieving dog), but also at points places the significance of animal 
suffering over that of humans (you cannot let animals hurt through experimentation just to 
benefit humans). Thus, Cobbe, in as much as she espouses violent sympathy, advocates a 
rich morality that contemplates the animal experience as worthy of consideration even over 
humans, and in doing so refines gendered definitions of sympathy and offers realms of 
inquiry that can enliven our contemporary animal studies conversations.  
Cobbe’s descriptions of grieving animals, especially in “Dogs Whom I Have Met,” 
blur the lines between human and animal, as well as between emotional and physical 
disease with her diagnostic assertion that “all [the dogs] displayed unequivocal signs of 
madness” (671). The narrative abruptly shifts from Sly’s grief in one sentence to this 
multivalent term “madness” in the next, ultimately closing the paragraph with the more 
explicit diagnosis of hydrophobia. The language of madness here speaks to a canine 
emotional response comparable to human insanity. The Victorians attributed madness in 
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humans to either emotional or physical causes, such as an overheated brain,106 and Cobbe 
blurs the lines between mental and bodily distress. Describing the grief as “madness” is yet 
another way that the dog is feminized. Madness was often understood by the Victorians to 
be a feminine ailment—hence the trope of the madwoman in the attic—with its origin in 
the faulty female anatomy and mind.107 When the sufferer was male, madness also had an 
emasculating effect. Even though men were clearly not immune to madness in the 
Victorian era, “Victorian medical authors hastened to minimize, rather than dramatize, 
incidence of hysteria among their own sex…primarily by stressing its comparative rarity 
and by linking it with effeminacy” (Oppenheim 143). In using the term “madness” to 
describe dogs, Cobbe argues that this grief is not just like a mental disturbance but that it 
literally causes rabies.108 Thus, Cobbe pathologizes the dogs’ grief. The leaps made in this 
story from psychological to physical disease might seem unclear to modern readers, but in 
associating extreme grief with this sickness Cobbe follows the Victorian scientific belief 
that rabies was the result of external stressors, such as “overfeeding and sexual 
frustration…cold weather, wet weather, hot weather, thirst, hunger, confinement, terror, 
pain, and other violent emotions” (Ritvo, Animal Estate 188). 109  Thus, per medical 
authorities, grief could be so strong that it caused disease. Cobbe, in “Mad Dog!!” 
(published in The Modern Rack in 1889), describes the misconception that rabies is purely 
	
106 See Taylor and Shuttleworth, Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830-
1890; Oppenheim, Shattered Nerves: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in Victorian England. 
107 See Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-
Century Literary Imagination.	
108 For discussions of the rabies threat that was at the fore during the Victorian era, see Ritvo, “Cave 
Canem,” from The Animal Estate; Noble Cows and Hybrid Zebras 77-83; Howell, “Assembling 
the Dog-Walking City: Rabies, Muzzling, and the Freedom to Be Led” from At Home and Astray. 
109 Ritvo explains that while people also understood that rabies could also be transmitted via bites, 
it was not until Louis Pasteur’s findings on inoculation in the 1880s that the stressor theory was 
disproved (Animal Estate 187). 
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behavioral rather than also physical: “as human insanity is not necessarily the condition of 
physical suffering…[there is a] common notion [that] canine madness is connected merely 
with erratic and alarming behavior” (227). For Cobbe, the physicality of suffering makes 
the rabid animal worthy of compassion, but too many people failed to understand the real 
cause and effect: “[the violence of the rabid animal does not appeal to human] compassion, 
as it would do were it understood to be the dumb expression of unbearable agony.” Rather 
than being merely a stage of mental anguish that can eventually be overcome during a 
process of mourning, the madness of this extreme embodied grief becomes an incurable 
physical condition, the symptoms of which manifest themselves on the body and the brain. 
In a state of terminal and dangerous disease, the question, then, becomes how to mercifully 
deal with the pathologically grieving dog. 
“Dogs Whom I Have Met” engages with the program of Victorian science through 
the treatment of grief-caused disease and the violent encounters with animals. In this essay, 
the dogs “were enclosed in the stable-yard and shot down by the servants from the window 
overlooking it” (671). That both the dogs and the servants are made plural makes the event 
more extreme and chaotic, highlighting that this is not an intimate experience shared 
between individuals. Likewise, the separation is further emphasized by the window 
keeping the servants indoors and away from the dying dogs outside. The window serves as 
a framing device for the grotesque spectacle, much like a proscenium stage that divides the 
audience from actors they look upon, which in turn evokes the theatre of the experimental 
medical laboratory, consisting of the spectators watching those medical men leading the 
experiments. The fact that the people are said to be “overlooking” the dogs, moreover, 
indicates a hierarchical split between the humans above and the animals below. The word 
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“overlooking” can also be used in the sense of negligence; in spite of the gruesome nature 
of the scene, the executioners demonstrate a lack of concern or emotional response. Yet 
Cobbe still presents these acts as violent forms of sympathy. They are versions of mercy 
killings, though, of course, a type that deviates from our standard expectations. Cobbe’s 
audience would have known that when a dog developed a communicable disease it was 
necessary to kill or contain it to prohibit contagion, so part of the benefit would have been 
external to the suffering dog. In The Modern Rack, Cobbe argues that the sparing of the 
lives of animals and holding them in quarantine so that humans can learn about their 
condition is immoral (227). Conversely, Cobbe’s focus on a quick killing and animal 
psychological and physical pain make the dead dogs the only unequivocal beneficiary of a 
similarly brutal act within her essay that touches on animal grief causing rabies. 
In spite of the like mediated touch used to perform violent sympathy in both 
Confessions and “Dogs Whom I Have Met,” these narratives fall in very different places if 
we consider a continuum of intimacy in killing. Confessions depicts a single servant killing 
an individual dog, and makes sure to emphasize that the human “loved him [the dog] 
dearly” (35), a statement implying a certain kind of intimacy within the violent encounter. 
110  This scene represents a stereotypically feminine way of empathizing through the 
emphasis on love on the part of the canine and the killer, for the dead human companion 
and the soon to be dead dog, respectively. Thus, violent sympathy has the power to 
feminize the man even while he engages in a masculine and violent act. Unlike in “Dogs 
	
110 Not only does Cobbe, in Confessions, allow for the intimate mercy killing of an animal, but 
other texts of the Victorian era take up the idea as well. See Agnes Grey crushing the birds meant 
to be tortured by her young male pupil in Anne Brontë’s novel (1847), Tess strangling the birds 
wounded and left to die by hunters in Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), and the 
title character of Sarah Grand’s The Beth Book (1897) killing the dog that was being experimented 
on by her scientist husband. 
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Whom I Have Met,” Snap is simply said to be “in such a state,” with no explicit medical 
diagnosis for the result of his grief, but again the emphasis is on the dog’s bodily and 
emotional well-being. Concern is for the dog, not the human population of the tale. This 
occurrence is definitely jarring to today’s reader because of our different relationships to 
death and the sense that this scene is a brutal outlier in a text meant for children and it likely 
caused a jolt to nineteenth-century readers as well. Through the passage’s shocking nature 
it ends up teaching an androgynous form of sympathy that requires both active violence 
and compassion for the complex consciousness of animals. 
While putting down dogs suffering from embodied grief is, according to Cobbe, a 
sensitive act, the method of killing, the excessiveness of the violence, and the feminized 
victims of the attack on the grieving dogs all echo the worst fears about vivisection held 
by Cobbe and others. Cobbe was especially afraid of the spread of Continental practices to 
England. Theodore G. Obenchain describes particularly gruesome tests on animals in 
France: “one researcher inflicted multiple gunshot wounds in dogs’ abdomens to better 
understand the agonal changes accompanying death. In another, a scientist removed the 
breasts of a nursing dog to evaluate the strength of the maternal instinct for feeding her 
young” (47). The first example and the extermination of the mourning dogs share the use 
of guns, while the second makes evident how biological sex and gender spur the violence. 
The guns or surgical instruments serve as vehicles of masculinized violence, while they 
grotesquely in the name of scientific curiosity bring about the mutilation and death of the 
feminized, and often female, bodies. Cobbe and others denounced the unfeeling and 
unnecessary violence of scientific experimentation on animals, repeatedly using the trope 
of the cruel vivisector in an attempt to galvanize the public against such practices. Among 
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novels, Wilkie Collins’s Heart and Science (1883) offers a prime example of this 
maneuvering, as he positions the sympathetic innocence of Carmina and moral idealism of 
doctor Ovid Vere against the evil practices of Dr. Benjulia. In the case of Heart and 
Science, Benjulia’s experiments on nonhuman animals are meant to offend readers; 
however, they absolutely shock and appall when performed on a human. Unlike the active 
violent sympathy of Cobbe’s stories, passiveness marks the cruelty in the case of Benjulia, 
but both go against stereotypical assumptions about gently passive femininity and (at times 
violently) active masculinity. The heroine of the novel becomes another victim for Benjulia 
when he decides not to treat her brain disease, but rather observe the process it takes on the 
way to her destruction: “From that day, Carmina was destined to receive unknown honour: 
she was to take her place, along with the other animals, in his note-book of experiments” 
(280). This passage metaphorically shrinks and flattens Carmina’s body, as it positions her 
upon the page of his book. Collins is careful here to avoid the simile in order to highlight 
that Carmina is not only like the animals, she is one. By making the young woman the 
subject of the doctor’s nefarious plot, Collins genders animal cruelty by associating it with 
violence against women, an alignment that Cobbe also acknowledges. However, Collins 
also demonstrates how unstable gender expectations can be by having Mrs. Gallilee 
(Ovid’s mother) as the second villain of the novel, a woman obsessed with science and her 
own financial interests. Devoid of femininity, Mrs. Gallilee loses the only trappings of 
conventional womanhood that she has at the start of the novel, as her husband and her 
children abandon her because of her cruelty.  
Not only was violence against animals often conflated with violence acted upon 
women, but both sides of the vivisection debate were also understood in gendered terms: 
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antivivisection as feminine and the scientific community and their advocates as masculine. 
For example, Cobbe’s “The Ethics of Zoophily” (1895) responds to the Reverend George 
Tyrell’s “Zoolatry,” an attack from earlier that same year on the idolatrousness and 
irrationality of the women-led antivivisectionist movement. Cobbe describes Tyrell’s 
utilization of sexism to advance his argument: “The reader thus enters a discussion against 
the claims of animals supported by the knowledge that he has only a woman to deal with 
as their advocate” (497). Throughout her essay, Cobbe repeatedly uses Tyrell’s own words 
against him, letting his closely related anthropocentrism and androcentrism speak for itself, 
as in the following citation of him: “To leave the ministry of one’s husband…and children 
in order to serve poodles, or to found hospitals for hungry cats while Christians are starving 
in our streets, is one of the silly corollaries of the philosophy of sentiment which has 
dethroned the philosophy of common-sense” (505-506). In ignoring Cobbe’s intellectual 
heft and the practical benefits for humans and animals resulting from Cobbe’s work,111 
Tyrell presents a reductive and dismissive description of what women like Cobbe really 
do, and a series of false either-or scenarios: women can either fulfill their domestic duties 
or care for animals, they can either serve poor Christians or care for animals.112 Tyrell also 
does not allow that animals could be a central part of the home—it is animals versus the 
domestic, not animals as a crucial part of the family. Both Cobbe and her opponents 
establish the positions of the debate with reference to binarized terms, including 
masculine/feminine, rational/irrational, scientific/sentimental, and merciful/violent. 
	
111 See, for example, the legislation to protect wives from spousal abuse that originated with “Wife-
Torture in England,” and the support for dog homes that came from the proceeds of The Confessions 
of a Lost Dog. 
112 Cobbe treats the falseness of these alternatives in “Philanthropy and Zoophily,” published in 
The Modern Rack. 
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Antivivisectionists read violence against animals as gendered, and both sides discerned the 
opposing discursive modes in gendered terms. In doing so, Cobbe upholds the binary that 
the mercy killings ultimately unsettle, in order to privilege the womanly as superior, 
granting her kind the victory in particularly religious terms: “I yet carry my heresy far 
enough to think that on a question of mercy a woman is likely to have a truer, sounder 
judgment, qua woman, than a man” (498). This passage is replete with delightful irony, as 
Cobbe allows that in positioning herself against the male-dominated church that she is 
heretical, while eventually concluding that she and her fellow women are better at Christ-
like mercy than men, undermining church representatives such as Tyrell in the process. 
Looking at the violence of the mercy killings of grieving animals, however, upsets the 
understanding that both Cobbe and her opposition actually seem willing to find common 
ground on, that women are more benignly merciful, sympathetic, and sentimental. While 
upholding the tradition in which women, such as the “angel in the house,” are moral guides 
is not necessarily feminist, Cobbe, much like Schreiner, claims power through the nurturing 
traditionally thought to be a feminine attribute. In doing so, these writers create a politics 
of care that men and women, humans and animals can perform. The servant killing Snap 
in Confessions demonstrates that men can perform acts of mercy, but the deviation from 
direct physical contact with the use of the phallic gun shows that sympathy can be 
simultaneously masculinized.  
Cobbe positions herself against the scientific community, but her support of 
sympathetic violence by humans against animals complicates the dichotomy that is so 
crucial to much of her anti-vivisectionist work. Cobbe grants all humans an authority 
similar to that claimed by medical men by giving them intellectual and moral license to 
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decide whether animals live or die; in doing so, she reveals that the treatment is not the 
same for all members of the human-animal family. Although Cobbe clearly presents human 
destruction of animal lives as a sympathetic act of mercy in the case of excessive grief and 
related physical disease, she also distinguishes between this type of cross-species mercy 
killing and similar violent sympathy performed on members of the same species. Cobbe 
contends that animal willingness to kill suffering members of their own group is a sign of 
instinctual inferiority: “It is clear at first sight that animals have, as a rule, far less power 
of sympathy than civilized man, and that there exists in many of their tribes an instinct of 
a contrary sort…to destroy the wounded and decrepit” (“Consciousness of Dogs” 431). 
Describing her claim that animals have “far less power of sympathy” as instantly 
observable and irrefutable, Cobbe doubly emphasizes the “less,” both through her italics 
and the addition of the adverb “far.” Cobbe delivers a racialized and speciesist affront, as 
she positions “civilized man” (Cobbe’s type, white European humans) against “their 
tribes,” with the possessive drawing attention to how animals differ from her and those like 
her, and “tribes” bringing to mind racial others in the distant lands of the British empire. 
Also dealing with same-species violence, many Victorians resisted the idea of prematurely 
ending the lives of dying humans. Given the mortality rate in Victorian Britain and the 
many diseases that could be treated but not cured, it is unsurprising that euthanasia and 
mercy killing were discussed at length. Pat Jalland explains that the scientific community 
supported euthanasia as a good, natural death, counter to our current definitions of the term. 
This good death could potentially be read as less merciful than ending suffering with an 
early demise, while Jalland also notes that some members of the lay population were 
advocating mercy killings in the event of some painful terminal diseases in humans (93). 
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Ultimately, diseases in humans were usually allowed to run their painful course. In 
espousing cross-species mercy killing, with the “higher” animal killing the lower, while 
maintaining the moral superiority of not performing those same acts on members of the 
same species, Cobbe’s language aligns her idea of mercy killing with the propagation of 
suffering at times allowed by the scientific community that she so denounced. The mercy 
killer and the medical man all have the power to weigh the harms and benefits of taking or 
sparing lives, and mercy is seldom perfect. 
Cobbe and others from the Victorian era to today (not to mention those who came 
before) condone human-to-animal violent sympathy, describing it as “merciful” (The 
Modern Rack 233), yet Cobbe keeps the violence of this mercy at the forefront. These 
anecdotes of grieving animals are especially jarring to contemporary readers because of an 
important evolution that occurs in both the language and methods used to enact this mercy, 
and it is frequently understood that these changes reflect a progression in which people 
have become kinder towards and more understanding of animals. The twentieth-century 
saw the rise of medicalized euthanasia for excess or sick animals, and it is at roughly the 
same time that people begin couching the event in other pleasant terms such as “sleep”: 
“[W]hen our dogs become old and ill many of us choose the day and time of their deaths. 
We ‘have them put to sleep.’ Always a painful decision, and a guilty one. But we feel guilt 
either way. Guilt that we survive. Guilt, as well as joy, that we have been so greatly loved” 
(Garber 243). Garber, writing Dog Love113 in 1996, offers a smart and thoughtful analysis 
of human-animal relationships and she is well-aware of the rhetorical violence and hubris 
	
113  Though written by an academic, Dog Love was published for and marketed to a popular 
audience. Some readers, expecting to have a pleasant read about dogs, felt alienated by the 
treatment of challenging subjects, including bestiality. 
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of anthropocentrism commonly accepted as dangers by animal studies critics. All the same, 
this passage subtly articulates the power of human choice, and foregrounds the human as 
the victim and the survivor. The guilt speaks to either putting the animal through the pain 
of life or death, but the emphasis is on the human and the animal experience is largely 
erased. The destruction of animal life in Cobbe’s anecdotes, on the other hand, brings the 
animal to the fore. While Garber deflects away from violence in order to focus on human 
emotion, Cobbe startlingly leaves us with the violence of animal sentiment and death, 
rather than with human feeling. By shifting the concentration in this way, Cobbe reveals 
her thought to be more innovative and even less anthropocentric than many contemporary 
animal studies theorists.   
Cobbe, through her representations of violent sympathy and the idea that it can be 
translated across species but not among members of the same species, calls on scholars to 
add nuance to many of our common definitions of sympathy as deeply felt but not 
thoroughly thought out, and as philosophically problematic but not physically brutal. For 
example, Tague defines sympathy as “the idea that moral behavior entailed an ability to 
imagine oneself in the position of another” (Animal Companions 69), but Cobbe’s violent 
sympathy depends on the idea that the animal receives different treatment from the human. 
Audrey Jaffe emphasizes the distance created between the sympathizing subject and the 
object of their sympathy.114 For Jaffe, the need for this distance is born out of a fear of 
falling from a superior position, an anxiety relevant to human-animal relationships given 
nineteenth-century evolutionary theory and the corresponding fall on the chain of being. 
This distancing sympathy appears perhaps most explicitly in children’s conduct books of 	
114 Though Jaffe’s focus is on sexual and economic disparity rather than species, her definitions 
translate nicely to nineteenth-century animal studies. 
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the period, including The Duty of Kindness to Animals (1853) and A Mother’s Lessons on 
Kindness to Animals (1863), in which the sympathetic treatment of animals is presented as 
an essential means of receiving divine salvation. In these examples, sympathy for animals 
makes one morally good and thus superior to animals. Still, this model of distance does not 
account for the physical intimacy inherent in pet keeping relationships. As discussed in 
chapter 2, Philip Armstrong asserts that both nineteenth-century scientific discourse and 
twentieth-century literary modernism were a response to the perceived sentimental excess 
of the long nineteenth century (220), a model compatible with Cobbe’s own presentation 
of the scientist versus the antivivisectionist. In accordance with Armstrong, Cobbe’s 
narratives are clearly ones of strong emotions, but their distinct violence proves a point of 
commonality between science and sympathy. Recent scholarship has begun to complicate 
the conventional definition of sentiment, including Howell’s statement that Victorians 
grieving for animals make “an ethical as well as an emotional statement” (148). Howell 
even posits the idea of “ruthless sentimentality, with care and killing, love and indifference, 
high principle and low pragmatism, seemingly inseparable” (175-176). Others explicitly 
challenge the divide between scientific and sympathetic/sentimental discourse; for 
example, Jed Mayer argues that Darwin’s sentimentalism in The Descent of Man indicates 
“the close rhetorical ties between the late-Victorian scientific community and its critics” 
(405). Nevertheless, we also need to consider the less palatable forms of sympathy that link 
the antivivisectionists to the scientists. 
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Figure 4. Sympathy Circle 
Rather than thinking about Victorian texts concerned with the humane treatment of 
animals as falling into one or another binary—masculine versus feminine, scientific/anti-
sentimental versus sympathetic/sentimental—I propose that we instead think in terms of a 
circular continuum. In this circle (fig. 4), we can see the violent indifference of the cruel 
vivisector at one degree, while the violent sympathy towards the executed dogs in Cobbe’s 
texts is at 359 degrees (and perhaps the distancing sympathy of the conduct manuals at 
about 90 degrees, and a more animal-centered sympathy, like in Black Beauty, at 180 
degrees). If we look at the circle one way, Cobbe’s violent sympathy is the furthest you 
can possibly get from violent indifference; considered another way, however, violent 
indifference and violent sympathy are very close to each other. Victorian sympathy was 
anything but facile sentimentalism, as the complex moral consideration for animals in 
Cobbe’s writings prove. In exploring the social relationships between animals and the 
human dead, Cobbe highlights the different Victorian family structures made available 
through pet keeping, but also the ways that physical and emotional violence encroaches 
into these formations, performing a nuanced scrutiny of the gendering and pragmatism of 
sympathy in the process. 
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CONCLUSION: “TO A SMALL GIRL-CHILD, WHO MAY LIVE TO GRASP 
SOMEWHAT OF THAT WHICH FOR US IS YET SIGHT, NOT TOUCH”115 
In Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch, I first looked at protective 
violence (a violent touch that reaches outside the dyad of pet and pet keeper), a condoned 
ferocity that frequently united and guarded pet and pet keeper against unwanted (amorous) 
intrusions from the outside world, while also allowing for animal agency and deviation 
from the pet keeper’s wishes (chapter 1). I next turned in chapter 2 to a familial/relational 
touch that was frequently a source of anxiety and cause for mockery and disdain because 
it supposedly indicated affection stolen from rightful recipients: spouses and children. This 
touch allowed for erotic alternatives to heteronormative marriage structures and biological 
childrearing in a way that made it a site of serious feminist and animal welfare politics. 
Chapter 3 discussed grotesque sympathetic touch as conveyed through messy encounters 
between unattractive humans and odd or dying animals. This revealed a sympathetic 
aesthetics of ugliness that valued typically underappreciated women and animals. Finally, 
embodied grief was defined as when animal dejection at the loss of their human 
companions was so severe that it manifested itself on the body to the point of disease, 
which led to violent sympathetic touch evidenced in the practice of killing grieving dogs 
(chapter 4). By spending time with works by Charlotte Brontë, Olive Schreiner, Wilkie 
Collins, and Frances Power Cobbe, I hope to have shown that representations of human-
pet touch in nineteenth-century literature were not just exemplary of sweet sympathy, but 
rather violent, erotic, and grotesque explorations of what living with animals could 
potentially be or even a heightened version of what human-pet families typically were 
	
115 From the dedication to the 1890 edition of Olive Schreiner’s Dreams. 
	 	 156 
outside of literature. However, these depictions were not just shocking for the sake of 
unsettling readers, but rather as a way of making audiences think about how human-animal 
touch could empower women and men trying to move beyond binarized gender 
expectations, as well as animals.   
Olive Schreiner, who envisioned human-pet “mother-love” as an embodied politics 
of care, prefaces the 1890 edition of Dreams with a conditionally expectant dedication: 
“To a small girl-child, who may live to grasp somewhat of that which for us is yet sight, 
not touch.” Here the idea of touch has symbolic significance, with Schreiner and others 
being able to envision a more egalitarian world with less constricting gender roles that she 
hopes that the next generation can actually experience—touch, hold, embrace, feel—so 
that the erstwhile sight can become a tangible reality. Schreiner’s dedication speaks to 
changing gender experience, but, as I have discussed, the long nineteenth century also saw 
philosophical, legislative, and domestic shifts impacting the lives of animals that are also 
at the heart of these writers’ interests. In this project, I considered how representations of 
actual touch could help to close the metaphorical gap between look and touch that 
Schreiner describes, and the jarring nature of the physical encounters that are part of that 
process. Nineteenth-Century Pets and the Politics of Touch shows that Victorian writers 
were anticipating and transcending our recent feminist animal studies discussions and a 
vision of how domestic structures could appear when recentered around animals. 
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